Opinion
July 27, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (McInerney, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends, inter alia, that he was deprived of a fair trial by the introduction into evidence of a notebook and expert testimony with respect thereto which indicated his significant involvement with the sale of cocaine. We disagree.
It is well settled that evidence of prior uncharged criminal conduct is not admissible on the People's direct case when its sole purpose is to show the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime charged (see, People v. Santarelli, 49 N.Y.2d 241, 247, rearg denied 49 N.Y.2d 918; People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 46-47; People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264). Nevertheless, such evidence has been held admissible, in an appropriate case, for the purpose of proving some fact other than criminal propensity such as intent or motive (see, People v. Molineux, supra, at 313; People v. Santarelli, supra, at 247-248; People v. Vails, 43 N.Y.2d 364). The process of determining whether or not to admit particular evidence involves a balancing of the degree of probativeness as to the crime charged against the potential for prejudice to the defendant (see, People v Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350, 359-360). That determination rests in the broad discretionary power of the trial court (see, People v Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 244, cert denied 396 U.S. 846; People v. Short, 110 A.D.2d 205, 213, lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 657), and its exercise is to be based upon a proper assessment of the relevant factors (see, People v. Ventimiglia, supra, at 359-360; People v. Sudler, 100 A.D.2d 915, 916).
A review of the record indicates that the trial court conducted a sufficient inquiry to support its determination that admission of the notebook and expert testimony was probative of the question whether or not the defendant exercised dominion and control over the seized contraband. As such, it was evidence relating directly to the crime charged, i.e., possession, and inextricably interwoven therewith (see, People v. Vails, supra, at 368-369; People v. Crandall, 67 N.Y.2d 111, 116-117).
In any event, the court's instructions limited any prejudicial impact of the evidence of the defendant's drug dealing and properly alerted the jury to the manner in which this evidence was to be treated. The court reminded the jury that the defendant was charged with possession as opposed to the sale of cocaine and that the defendant should not be convicted on the basis of any uncharged crimes.
We have considered the defendant's other contentions and find them to be without merit. Lawrence, J.P., Weinstein, Kunzeman and Kooper, JJ., concur.