Opinion
2014-03-19
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Melissa S. Horlick of counsel), for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Morgan J. Dennehy of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Melissa S. Horlick of counsel), for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Morgan J. Dennehy of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ingram, J.), rendered March 25, 2010, convicting him of reckless endangerment in the first degree (two counts), reckless endangerment in the second degree, reckless endangerment of property, grand larceny in the third degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, unauthorized use of a vehicle in the first degree, criminal mischief in the second degree (two counts), criminal mischief in the third degree, criminal mischief in the fourth degree, unlawful imprisonment in the first degree (two counts), endangering the welfare of a child, petit larceny, possession of burglar's tools, reckless driving, and leaving the scene of an accident, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the judgment as imposed the sentence is dismissed, as that portion of the judgment was superseded by a resentence of the Supreme Court, Kings County, imposed July 15, 2013; and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as reviewed.
The defendant's contentions that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions of grand larceny in the third and fourth degrees, unauthorized use of a vehicle in the first degree, two counts of reckless endangerment in the first degree, two counts of criminal mischief in the second degree, and criminal mischief in the third degree are unpreserved for appellate review ( see CPL 470.05[2]; People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492–493, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946;People v. Finger, 95 N.Y.2d 894, 895, 716 N.Y.S.2d 34, 739 N.E.2d 290;People v. Santos, 86 N.Y.2d 869, 871, 635 N.Y.S.2d 168, 658 N.E.2d 1041; People v. Cortes, 44 A.D.3d 1068, 844 N.Y.S.2d 403;People v. Sudol, 89 A.D.3d 499, 500, 932 N.Y.S.2d 49). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to those crimes.
Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the opportunity of the trier of fact to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053,cert. denied 542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828;People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to the aforementioned crimes was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the verdict finding him guilty of both criminal mischief in the third degree and reckless endangerment of property for his conduct in operating a motor vehicle on a certain date was not repugnant ( see generally People v. Trappier, 87 N.Y.2d 55, 637 N.Y.S.2d 352, 660 N.E.2d 1131).
The defendant's contention that the merger doctrine precluded his convictions of two counts of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, is without merit ( see generally People v. Gonzalez, 80 N.Y.2d 146, 589 N.Y.S.2d 833, 603 N.E.2d 938;People v. McLeod, 50 A.D.3d 826, 856 N.Y.S.2d 164).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. DICKERSON, J.P., CHAMBERS, AUSTIN and SGROI, JJ., concur.