Opinion
2018-01038 Ind. No. 6586/15
06-07-2023
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Anthony SANDERS, appellant.
Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (Tammy E. Linn of counsel), for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Gamaliel Marrero, and Jason Eldridge of counsel), for respondent.
Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (Tammy E. Linn of counsel), for appellant.
Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Gamaliel Marrero, and Jason Eldridge of counsel), for respondent.
COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P., PAUL WOOTEN, WILLIAM G. FORD, LILLIAN WAN, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (William M. Harrington, J.), rendered December 8, 2017, convicting him of burglary in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and attempted robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of burglary in the first degree, robbery in the first degree, and attempted robbery in the first degree arising out of a gunpoint robbery of the complainant and an attempted robbery of the complainant's mother in the home of the complainant's mother.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the verdict of guilt on the conviction of attempted robbery in the first degree with respect to the defendant's actions in relation to the complainant's mother was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Lamont, 25 N.Y.3d 315, 319, 12 N.Y.S.3d 6, 33 N.E.3d 1275 ; People v. Mitchell, 59 A.D.3d 739, 740, 874 N.Y.S.2d 226 ). "Whether a defendant had the intent to forcibly steal property is a question for the trier of fact ... which may be answered based on direct evidence of such intent, or upon reasonable inferences drawn from the trial evidence" ( People v. Gordon, 23 N.Y.3d 643, 651, 992 N.Y.S.2d 700, 16 N.E.3d 1178 ; see People v. Marcus, 171 A.D.3d 1093, 1095, 96 N.Y.S.3d 651 ). Upon reviewing the record here, the credible evidence established the defendant's intent to commit robbery with respect to the complainant's mother as well as the complainant.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in conducting a suppression hearing in the defendant's absence. " ‘A defendant's right to be present at a criminal trial is encompassed within the confrontation clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions’ " ( People v. Samuel, 208 A.D.3d 1261, 1262, 174 N.Y.S.3d 758, quoting People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d 136, 139, 454 N.Y.S.2d 967, 440 N.E.2d 1313 ). "The significance of the suppression hearing is such that the rationale for requiring the defendant's presence at the trial applies with equal force to require his [or her] presence at the suppression hearing" ( People v. Anderson, 16 N.Y.2d 282, 287, 266 N.Y.S.2d 110, 213 N.E.2d 445 ). " ‘However, the right to be present may be waived, and a defendant may forfeit [the] right to be present when his [or her] conduct unambiguously indicates a defiance of the processes of law and it disrupts the trial after all parties are assembled and ready to proceed’ " ( People v. Samuel, 208 A.D.3d at 1262, 174 N.Y.S.3d 758, quoting People v. Lundquist, 180 A.D.3d 806, 807, 119 N.Y.S.3d 496 ; see People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d at 140–141, 454 N.Y.S.2d 967, 440 N.E.2d 1313 ).
The record demonstrates that the Supreme Court informed the defendant of his right to be present at trial and to testify, and further advised him that, if he deliberately failed to appear, he could be tried in absentia (see People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d at 141–142, 454 N.Y.S.2d 967, 440 N.E.2d 1313 ; People v. Ramos, 179 A.D.3d 842, 844, 117 N.Y.S.3d 96 ). Thereafter, at the suppression hearing, the court warned the defendant that he would be held in contempt if he continued to interrupt the court proceeding; shortly thereafter, the defendant violently assaulted court officers in the court's presence. The Justice then recused himself and the hearing was adjourned to the following week before a different Justice, who thereafter adjourned the hearing again because the defendant was spitting on court personnel. The following day, the court indicated that it was informed that the defendant assaulted corrections officers who were attempting to produce the defendant in court. Under these circumstances, the court's determination that the defendant's persistent misconduct constituted a waiver of his right to be present at the suppression hearing was a provident exercise of discretion (see People v. Zeigler, 201 A.D.3d 972, 973, 160 N.Y.S.3d 334 ; People v. Ramos, 179 A.D.3d at 844, 117 N.Y.S.3d 96 ). Moreover, the record shows that the court satisfied its obligation to consider the appropriate factors before proceeding with the suppression hearing in the defendant's absence (see People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d at 142, 454 N.Y.S.2d 967, 440 N.E.2d 1313 ; People v. Zeigler, 201 A.D.3d at 973, 160 N.Y.S.3d 334 ).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).
DUFFY, J.P., WOOTEN, FORD and WAN, JJ., concur.