Opinion
No. 2015BX038318.
04-26-2016
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Monica SANCHEZ, Defendant.
Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx County by Yasmin Khawaja, Assistant District Attorney, for The People. The Legal Aid Society by Isabel Mattina, Esq., for Defendant.
Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx County by Yasmin Khawaja, Assistant District Attorney, for The People.
The Legal Aid Society by Isabel Mattina, Esq., for Defendant.
ARMANDO MONTANO, J.
Defendant is charged with Driving While Intoxicated (VTL §§ 1192[2] and [3 ] ) and Driving While Ability Impaired by Alcohol (VTL § 1192[1] ) stemming from a motor vehicle accident which occurred on or about December 13, 2014 at approximately 5:26 a.m.
Defendant moves for an order 1) suppressing any and all physical evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant, or in the alternative, directing the People to provide unredacted copies of the search warrant, the underlying affidavit, and any accompanying minutes related to the issuing of this warrant and granting a hearing to determine the propriety of the issuance of the search warrant; 2) suppressing all physical evidence allegedly seized from defendant pursuant to CPL § 710.20(1) ; and 3) granting defendant the right to make additional pretrial motions and the right to amend and/or supplement this motion if made necessary or appropriate by the People's future disclosure.
On October 1, 2015, by oral decision and order, this court granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence to the extent of granting defendant a combined Huntley/Mapp/Dunaway/Johnson/Atkins hearing as well as a hearing pursuant to VTL § 1194.
By decision and order dated March 7, 2016, this court granted the People leave to reargue the portion of this court's October 1, 2015 decision and order granting defendant a hearing to determine the admissibility of the chemical test results of defendant's blood. Upon reargament, this court adhered to its prior decision. Despite the People's assertions in their moving papers that defendant's blood was obtained by the police pursuant to a valid search warrant after her blood had already been drawn by hospital staff in accordance with their routine procedures, the People failed to provide any evidence establishing the existence of a search warrant.Consequently, this court held that a hearing was required to determine whether the blood sample taken from defendant needed to comply with VTL § 1194 in order to be admitted at trial.
After the People's motion for leave to reargue was fully submitted but prior to this court's issuance of the March 7, 2016 decision and order, defendant filed the instant motion to controvert the search warrant and suppress physical evidence seized thereunder on February 26, 2016.
Defendant moves to summarily suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the execution of the search warrant, including the lab report resulting from the analysis of her blood. Defendant asserts that where, as here, she is charged with only VTL offenses, VTL § 1194 is the exclusive means of obtaining a chemical test analysis of her blood. Since no person “other than the operator was killed or suffered serious physical injury” (VTL 1194 ( [3] ), defendant argues that the warrant to obtain her blood was improperly issued. Should summary suppression be denied, defendant moves for an order compelling the People to provide copies of the search warrant materials and the holding of a hearing to determine the propriety of the issuance of the search warrant.
In opposition, the People aver that the police obtained a search warrant pursuant to CPL § 690.10(4) to procure a sample of defendant's blood which had already been drawn by the hospital staff, without any involvement from the police, for the purposes of medical treatment. Since defendant's blood was neither drawn by the hospital staff at the direction of the police nor pursuant to a court order compelling defendant to submit to a chemical test of her blood, the People maintain that VTL § 1194 is inapplicable and defendant's motion to suppress the chemical test results of her blood sample should be denied.
The People have submitted to both this court and defense counsel unredacted copies of the search warrant, the affidavit, and the minutes of the search warrant application hearing. The People argue that upon inspection of the search warrant materials, the court will determine that the search warrant was properly issued upon a finding of probable cause by the Hon. Joseph J. Dawson. The People also note that in seeking to controvert a search warrant, defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the search warrant application was perjurious. Absent any allegations of fact showing perjury or clear error by the issuing magistrate, the People assert that there are no grounds for a hearing and/or invalidating the search warrant. As there are no grounds to invalidate the search warrant, the People argue that defendant's motion to controvert the search warrant and suppress all evidence seized thereunder should be denied in its entirety.
“[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” US Const 4th Amend; NY Const art 1, § 12. “Probable cause [to issue a search warrant] does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed or that evidence of a crime may be found in a certain place.” People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423 (1985). Where an application for a search warrant relies upon information from an informant, the court must apply the two-pronged Aguilar–Spinelli test. People v. Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 409 (1988). “Under this test, the application for a search warrant must demonstrate to the issuing Magistrate (i) the veracity or reliability of the source of the information, and (ii) the basis of the informant's knowledge.” Id. at 639.
“It is well settled that a presumption of validity attaches to a warrant since there has already been a judicial review as to its justification, thereby simplifying the suppression court's task to determining whether the issuing Judge could reasonably have concluded that probable cause existed.' “ People v. Traymore, 241 A.D.2d 226, 226 (1st Dept.1998), quoting People v. Ortiz, 234 A.D.2d 74, 75–76 (1st Dept.1996) (internal citations omitted). “Where it appears that the Magistrate has conducted a measured and comprehensive examination into the basis for the warrant, the factual determination as to probable cause will, of itself, constitute a suitable makeweight when the warrant is challenged.” People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549, 559 (1975).
The affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant application includes detailed information obtained through a collision investigation conducted by members of the New York City Police Department as well as information obtained from the passenger in defendant's motor vehicle, Betty Jean Irick, an identified citizen informant, who is “presumed to be personally reliable.” People v. Parris, 83 N.Y.2d 342, 349 (1994) ; see also, People v. Hetrick, 80 N.Y.2d 344 (1992). Therefore, this court finds that the facts alleged in the search warrant application were sufficient to establish probable cause that defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and the affidavit is not facially perjurious. See, People v. Edwards, 95 N.Y.2d 486 (2000) ; People v. Serrano, 93 N.Y.2d 73 (1999) ; Traymore, 241 A.D.2d 226.
Notwithstanding the fact that the search warrant was validly issued, this court adheres to its March 7, 2016 decision and order and finds that “a hearing [must be held] to determine whether the blood sample used to determine the blood alcohol content of the defendant at about the time of the accident needed to comply with VTL § 1194 to be admitted at trial or in the alternative should be suppressed.” People v. Godulias, 36 Misc.3d 1230(A), *2 (Dist Ct, Nassau County 2012).
Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 is not the exclusive means by which the police may obtain a sample of a defendant's blood in drunk driving cases. “[T]he procedures established [under VTL § 1194 are] intended solely to govern chemical blood-alcohol tests requested or procured by an arresting police officer, and not to bar admissibility of the result of a test performed without police involvement and for purposes unrelated to section 1192 prosecutions.” People v. Ameigh, 95 A.D.2d 367, 368 (3d Dept.1983), lv denied 61 N.Y.2d 672 (1983) (internal citations omitted). If a sample of a defendant's blood was drawn by hospital personnel for purposes of medical treatment and thereafter obtained by the police pursuant to a search warrant, such evidence can be used in a prosecution. See, People v. Bueno, Sup Ct, Bronx County, February 8, 2013, Boyle, J., docket No. 2012BX013319; Godulias, 36 Misc.3d 1230(A).
However, the search warrant affidavit in the case at bar does not establish all of the circumstances surrounding the drawing of defendant's blood at the hospital. In his affidavit, Detective Murphy avers that “at approximately 5:40 a.m. on December 13, 2014, [defendant] was removed to Jacobi Medical Center and soon thereafter employees of Jacobi Medical Center drew [defendant's] blood and said blood would thereby contain evidence of alcohol and/or drugs as of the time of the incident.” Affidavit of Det. Michael Murphy, ¶ 6. This statement provides no information as to how, why, and under whose direction defendant's blood was drawn.
Absent a fact finding hearing, a determination cannot be made as to the admissibility of the chemical test results. If at the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing court determines that the sample of defendant's blood was drawn solely at the direction of the hospital for the purposes of medical treatment, then defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of the execution of the search warrant should be denied.
Accordingly, defendant's motion to controvert the search warrant is denied. Defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence is denied as moot since this court previously granted defendant a hearing to determine the admissibility of such evidence on October 1, 2015.Defendant's motion for an order compelling the People to turn over the search warrant materials is denied as moot. Defendant's reservation of right to file further motions is unauthorized pursuant to CPL § 255.20(3). Any future motions shall be summarily denied absent a showing of good cause.
This constitutes the decision and order of this court.