Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court No. SA054153 of Los Angeles County, Lance A. Ito, Judge.
Deborah L. Hawkins, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey and Taylor Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BIGELOW, P. J.
A jury convicted William Sadowski of murdering a police officer, with findings that the murder was committed during a carjacking and that he had used a deadly weapon – the officer’s patrol car – to commit the murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17), 12022 subd. (b)(1).) The jury found the murder had not been premeditated. The jury further convicted Sadowski of two counts of carjacking and one count of attempted carjacking. (§§ 215, subd. (a), 664/215, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found that Sadowski had been sane at the time he committed the crimes. The trial court sentenced Sadowski to a term of life without the possibility of parole, plus a determinate aggregate concurrent term of 15 years. We affirm.
All further references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
The information alleged that Sadowski knew or should have known that the victim was a peace office engaged in the performance of his duties within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(7). The jury found this allegation not true.
FACTS
The Crimes
On April 29, 2005, Los Angeles Airport Police Officer Tommy Scott stopped his marked patrol car on Lincoln Boulevard to contact Sadowski. While the two men were talking, Sadowski suddenly pushed Officer Scott aside, ran to his patrol car, jumped in the driver’s seat, and started driving away. As Officer Scott tried to gain control of the vehicle by way of the driver’s door, Sadowski accelerated up to 50 miles per hour, and began swerving across all lanes. Officer Scott hung on to the vehicle. To an eyewitness, it looked like Sadowski was trying to “shake the policeman off” the patrol car. Sadowski continued for a quarter-mile then crashed into a concrete wall at 45 to 55 miles per hour. Inside the patrol car, airbags saved Sadowski from significant injury. The driver’s side door hit a fire hydrant, and Officer Scott was decapitated.
After the crash, Sadowki stumbled from the wreckage, and walked up to a car that had stopped near the accident. Sadowski tried unsuccessfully to drag Christina Koesler from the car through the locked driver’s door. Sadowski then walked to a Ford Explorer stopped behind Koesler, and took it from its driver, Craig Lazar. Sadowski sped off for about 900 feet. He lost control of the Explorer, crashed into a fence, and flipped the Explorer upside down. Police took Sadowski into custody at the scene.
As he was being pulled from the Explorer, Sadowski stated, “I’m sorry. I know I did wrong. I did not try to hurt the guy. I know I fucked up. I fucked up real bad. I just want to kill myself.” While being transported to UCLA Medical Center by ambulance, Sadowski kept repeating statements to the effect, “I want to die. Let me die. I deserve to die. I’m sorry, sorry for what I did.” At one point he said something to the effect, “Please don’t tell my mom what I did.” While being transported from the hospital to police headquarters, Sadowski made statements to the effect that he needed a lawyer “to save [his] life, ” and to help him avoid “the electric chair or... the gas chamber.”
The Criminal Case
In September 2006, the People filed an information charging Sadowski with the murder of Officer Scott (§ 187, subd. (a)), two counts of carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)), and one count of attempted carjacking (§§ 664/215, subd. (a)). The murder count included ancillary allegations that Sadowski committed the offense in the course of a carjacking (§ 190.2(a)(17)), and that he used a deadly weapon, a motor vehicle (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and that he knowingly killed a police officer engaged in the performance of his duties (§ 190.2 (a)(7)). The charges were tried to a jury during the fall of 2009. The prosecution evidence established the facts summarized above.
Sadowski presented evidence showing that he had a history of mental illness, and that he had been acting unusual both in the days leading up to the events on April 29, 2005, and after being taken into custody. A psychiatrist at the Twin Towers jail facility testified that he diagnosed Sadowski as suffering from bipolar disorder. Sadowski’s defense counsel’s argument to the jury implored the jurors to find that Sadowski was not guilty because he did not have the required intent for the charged crimes as he was mentally ill. On November 16, 2009, the jury returned verdicts finding Sadowski guilty of the murder of Officer Scott, with findings that the murder was committed while Sadowski was engaged in the commission of a carjacking, and that Sadowski used a deadly weapon to commit the murder. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17), 12022 subd. (b)(1).) The jury found that the murder was not premeditated. The jury also convicted Sadowski of the two carjacking counts and the one attempted carjacking count. (§§ 215, subd. (a), 664/215, subd. (a).)
On November 25, 2009, at the conclusion of a bifurcated proceeding, the jury returned a verdict finding that Sadowski had been sane at the time he committed the crimes. On January 15, 2010, the trial court sentenced Sadowski as noted at the outset of this opinion.
DISCUSSION
I. Uniformed Police Officers as Trial Spectators
Sadowski filed a motion for new trial based on several claims, one of which was that his trial had been unfair because uniformed police officers were permitted to sit in the courtroom audience during the trial. The trial court denied Sadowski’s claim. On appeal, Sadowski contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial. We disagree.
A fair trial is a fundamental due process right guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560, 570 (Holbrook).) Whether the presence of uniformed police officers in a courtroom is so inherently prejudicial as to render a trial unfair is largely a matter of degree. The test is whether the police officers’ presence creates an “ ‘unacceptable risk... of impermissible factors coming into play.’ ” (Ibid.) In Holbrook, the United States Supreme Court ruled that four uniformed state troopers sitting in a spectators’ row immediately behind the defendant to supplement the court’s ordinary security personnel did not create such an inherent risk of prejudice that it denied the defendant a fair trial. (Holbrook, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 570.) At the same time, the court cautioned that “a roomful of uniformed and armed policemen might pose [a risk] to a defendant’s chances of receiving a fair trial.” (Id. at pp. 570-571.)
In People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233 (Cummings), our Supreme Court addressed the issue of police officer spectators at trial using this language: “Defendants argue... that the [trial] court abused its discretion in permitting any uniformed officers to attend the trial as spectators. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The right to a public trial is not that of the defendant alone. [Citations.]... Only if restriction is necessary to preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial may the court restrict attendance by members of the public. Because a First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings is also recognized, they may not be closed ‘unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that “closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’ ” [Citations.]
“In this case there was no effort to close the proceedings... [but Defendant] sought to exclude a segment of the public. As members of the public, the police officers had both common law and constitutionally based rights to attend the trial. Exclusion of any group on the basis of the members’ status would be impermissible. The trial court sought to balance the rights of those officers whose duty assignments precluded attendance in civilian clothes against the possibility that seeing large numbers of uniformed officers among the spectators would somehow influence the jury. The concerns expressed by [Defendant] were not sufficient to establish that excluding all uniformed officers was essential to a fair trial, and the record does not support his claim of actual prejudice.” (Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1298-1299.)
In his opening brief on appeal, Sadowski cites to five instances during trial he believes demonstrate uniformed officers were improperly in the courtroom during trial. They include:
(1) The denial of a request by defense counsel that police officer spectators be required to wear civilian clothes, rather than uniforms. Even though the court denied this request, we note that the prosecutor nevertheless advised the court that she had been asked by an airport police department’s liaison “about who could come [to the trial], ” and that she had given this “guidance” on the subject: “I said, ... if [an officer] is on their way to work or in their uniform for some reason, they won’t have to take their uniform off to come in [court]. But neither do they... have to put it on if they’re on a day off and they’re coming down because they’re supportive or a friend or they want to see [and] that it’s perfectly fine to wear a suit, civilian clothes, that nobody is asking them to put on uniforms to come down here. [¶]... But I also wasn’t comfortable in saying... you can’t wear your uniform if you want to wear your uniform.”
(2) Before voir dire, the court indicated that it was willing to further consider the issue of uniformed police officers in the courtroom and that counsel was free to question prospective jurors on the issue of whether their presence might influence them in some way.
(3) Sadowski posits that the prosecutor expressed sympathy for Scott during closing argument at the guilt phase, and “turned to the family who were surrounded by numerous uniformed... officers.” However, the citation to the record he set forth, page 530 of the clerk’s transcript, is a page from his motion for new trial.
(4) At one point during the guilt phase, defense counsel advised the trial court that a uniformed police officer had held the door open for jurors. Counsel said, “I don’t see a problem with that [but] he touched the juror that walks with a cane, like gently escorting her, and I have a problem with that type of contact.” Counsel asked the court to instruct the officer “not to have that type of contact with the jurors.” The court agreed with defense counsel’s position, stating the gesture was probably “just a matter of manners, but not appropriate.” The investigating detective accompanying the prosecutor promised the court that he would “have a talk” with the officer.
(5) During the motion for new trial, the trial court stated: “[O]ne of the items that is not clearly explained in the court record is the attendance of the Los Angeles World Airport police officers... during the course of the trial in uniform.... [¶] Although, at the beginning and end of the case, ... during the arguments and opening statements, we did have a number of police officers here present in the courtroom. We also had sheriffs as well, who wear a different uniform, but there clearly was a presence of law enforcement in the courtroom.”
We reject Sadowski’s claim that the presence of uniformed officers in the courtroom audience rendered his trial unfair. It is undisputed that police officers sat in the courtroom audience, at least at some parts of trial. At the same time, the record does not support any conclusions concerning the number of officers present at any given point. In addressing Sadowski’s motion for new trial based on the uniformed police officers factor, the trial court expressly noted that officers had been present, but then stated: “However, I don’t believe [the officers’] presence was in any way oppressive or in any way intimidating, and I also believe that police officers have a right to attend court proceedings in uniform if they’re on duty.”
The record does not establish that “a roomful of uniformed and armed policemen” had been present throughout Sadowski’s trial or at any part of the trial (Holbrook, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 570-571), nor does the record establish that there had been “large numbers of uniformed officers among the spectators” at any particular time during Sadowski’s trial (Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1298-1299). We do not see that the trial court abused its discretion. The record does support a conclusion that the trial court acted unreasonably in declining to find that Sadowski’s trial had been unfair. We reach this conclusion after considering the issue in the light of either an “unacceptable risk” of possible prejudice (Holbrook, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 570-571), or “actual prejudice” (Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1298-1299). The record simply does not persuade us that there was any taint arising from the presence of police officers.
Finally, Sadowksi takes issue with the trial court’s statement that police officers had “a right to attend court proceedings in uniform if they’re on duty.” We acknowledge that the record does not show whether they officers who were present in uniform were actually on duty. But, the bottom line is this -- the record does not show that the presence of uniformed officers resulted in a denial of a fair trial. The record does not suggest that an “air of authority” from the presence of uniformed police officers overshadowed Sadowski’s trial, nor does it suggest a possibility that the outcome of Sadowski’s trial may have been affected by uniformed officers.
II. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Issue
Another claim presented in Sadowski’s motion for new trial was that prosecutorial misconduct rendered his trial unfair. The trial court denied the motion on this ground also. On appeal, Sadowski contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial based on his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. We find otherwise.
Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a prosecutor employs either a reprehensible or deceptive method to persuade a jury. The defendant need not show bad faith on the part of the prosecutor to establish misconduct because a defendant is injured by an improper trial tactic, regardless of whether it occurred inadvertently or through an intentional design. (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 822-823.) Where a reviewing court finds that misconduct infected a trial with such unfairness as to make the defendant’s resulting conviction a denial of due process, the misconduct is an error of constitutional magnitude compelling reversal of the defendant’s conviction. (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.) Where a reviewing court finds that misconduct merely exposed jurors to some form of improper evidentiary matter, the error is reviewed under the harmless error test articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 976, disapproved on another ground on People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)
1. Forfeiture
Sadowski alleges four categories of misconduct: (1) appealing for sympathy for the victim’s family; (2) misstating the law; (3) disparaging defense counsel; and (4) misstating facts. Before examining any of Sadowski’s misconduct claims, we must address the People’s argument that Sadowski forfeited certain of his misconduct claims because he did raise a timely objection, and request an admonition to the jury at the time of the alleged misconduct. (See. e.g., People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 553.)
We agree with the People that Sadowski forfeited his claim that the prosecutor disparaged defense counsel in the course of her closing argument during the sanity phase of trial. The prosecutor’s argument encompasses 51 pages of the reporter’s transcript; Sadowski claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by belittling defense counsel in this one passage from the prosecutor’s closing argument: “Please use your critical thinking skills when something is said to you by Ms. Nunez [defense counsel] and not supported by the record. Just say to yourself, she is desperate, she really has nothing to work with, she is desperate. She has to stand here and say something, so she picks and chooses and takes things out of context. She never talks to you about [Sadowski’s rational acts]. She says he is crazy, he is crazy, you have to find him insane because he is crazy.” There was no objection. As a result, we find the claim of misconduct must be considered forfeited.
We disagree with Sadowski’s argument that we should veer from the general requirement for an objection as the record does not persuade us that an objection would have been futile. The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objections to other statements made by the prosecutor, and admonished the jury. We have no reason to believe the trial court would have disregarded an objection to other portions of the prosecutor’s arguments.
Neither do we find ineffective assistance based on a failure to object. In Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, the Supreme Court established that “[t]he claim of ineffective assistance of counsel involves two components, a showing the counsel’s performance was deficient and proof of actual prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington[, supra, ] 466 U.S. 668...; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171...)” (People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 786.) On a direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel only where the record demonstrates there could have been no rational tactical purpose for counsel’s challenged act or omission. (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 442; People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1058 [“ ‘If the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, “unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, ” [citation], the contention [that counsel provided ineffective assistance] must be rejected.’ ”].)
Here, the record does not demonstrate that there could have been no justifiable, tactical reason to forego an objection. Further, the record does not demonstrate that if an objection had been made, that it might have resulted in a different outcome of the sanity phase of the trial. Although it may have been better for the prosecutor to say that that the defense’s position was desperate, rather than saying that defense counsel was desperate, we see no harm in the decision to forego an objection. The respective lines in Sadowski’s case were drawn cleanly for the jurors. Assuming without deciding that the prosecutor employed improperly focused language, she exposed the jurors to little more than a colloquially-phrased comment that the defense position in the case should be viewed as weak. We will not abandon the forfeiture rule to avoid an ineffective assistance claim that does not withstand scrutiny.
We next agree with the People’s argument that Sadowski forfeited his claim that the prosecutor misstated facts. Sadowski’s opening brief on appeal cites us to 19 points in the prosecutor’s closing argument at the sanity phase, during which, claims Sadowski, the prosecutor misstated facts. We have examined the reporter’s transcript at all 19 points cited, and find that no objection was interposed. Because no objection was made at any point, all of Sadowski’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct based on allegedly misstated facts are forfeited.
Two passages that Sadowski claims are objectionable came closely connected, near the outset of the prosecutor’s argument. Sadowski’s defense counsel requested a sidebar, but there was no express objection, and no request for an admonishment. The sidebar is not reported; the prosecutor’s argument continued after the sidebar without any comment from the trial court.
We again reject Sadowski’s argument that we should apply an exception to the requirement for an objection. We are not persuaded that an objection would have been futile. More importantly, the record suggests that Sadowski’s trial counsel had a reasonable tactical reason for not objecting to the prosecutor’s misstatements of facts. On reviewing the argument by Sadowski’s trial counsel, we find that the very first words by defense counsel presented a theme to this effect: let me tell you all the things that the prosecutor said that “were not right.” In short, the record supports a conclusion that the reason no objections were interposed to the prosecutor’s allegedly improper statements is that a tactical decision was made to let the prosecutor build a case based upon misstatements, and then to attack those misstatements in rebuttal. In other words, the record shows that defense counsel believed it would be better to highlight that the prosecution needed to make misstatements to buttress its case, rather than make serial objections to every misstatement as it arose. We will not apply an exception to the forfeiture rules for misconduct given the record before us.
We now turn to the claims of prosecutorial misconduct preserved by objection.
2. Sympathy for the Victim
Sadowski argues the prosecutor improperly invoked sympathy for Officer Scott in an effort to persuade the jury. The citation to the record offered by Sadowski shows this exchange during the prosecutor’s argument to the jury at the penalty phase of the trial: “[The Prosecutor]: In the opening statement, [defense counsel] said [Sadowski] has lost everything. No, he didn’t lose everything. And I thought to myself, Officer Scott lost everything because he lost his life.... He didn’t lose it. He was robbed of his life. It was violently taken from him.... [¶] Don’t let this defendant rob Officer Scott of the sympathy that each and every one of you would have for him.
[Defense Counsel]: Objection. Your Honor.
[The Court]: Sustained. [The Prosecutor], sympathy is not an issue in this case.”
[The Prosecutor]: Did the defendant lose everything?...”
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to grant a new trial based on the prosecutor’s passing reference to sympathy for Officer Scott. It is true that the prosecutor should not have invoked sympathy for Officer Scott in an effort to persuade the jury that Sadowski was guilty (People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 362 [appeals to sympathy or the passions of the jurors are improper at the guilt phase of a criminal trial]). However, only misconduct that prejudices a defendant’s right to a fair trial requires reversal. (Id. at pp. 363-364.) We see no reasonable probability that the jury’s verdicts at the guilt phase of trial may have been more favorable to Sadowski without the prosecutor’s lone, passing utterance of the word “sympathy.” The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection with a statement that sympathy was not an issue. Beyond this, the court instructed the jurors that they were to decide the case on the facts alone, and were not to allow bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence their decision. (CALCRIM No. 200.) In the absence of something in the record to indicate otherwise, we presume that the jurors treated the trial court’s instructions as a statement of law from a judicial authority, and treated the prosecutor’s comments as the words of an advocate who was attempting to persuade. (People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 179.) We see no possibility of prejudice.
3. Misstatement of Law
Sadowski next contends the prosecutor improperly misstated the law in an attempt to persuade the jury during the sanity phase of the trial. We disagree.
During the sanity phase of the trial, the prosecutor tried to emphasize that the burden was on Sadowski to prove that he was not sane, and tried to explain that, if the evidence was “a tie, ” then Sadowski had not met his burden. Sadowski points to the following reference in the trial record to establish that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by misstating the law:
“[The Prosecutor]: So given the fact that it is [defendant’s] burden, let’s say, you say maybe he is [insane], maybe he was [insane]. That is not enough, not maybe. [¶] Well, it’s possible [he was insane].... That is not enough. Those things are not enough. [¶] And... you will remember there was a jury instruction from before that says if there [are two] reasonable interpretations from the evidence, you must adopt the one against the person who has the burden....
[Defense Counsel]: That isn’t the law.
[The Court]: I’m sorry counsel, that instruction doesn’t apply to this portion of the case.
[The Prosecutor]: Strike that. [¶] If you say to yourself, well, one side says this, one side says that, it’s a tie. That then means he is not legally sane, [he] has not carried [his] burden. And you must find that he is sane....”
Even if the prosecutor misstated the law, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision that the prosecutor’s misconduct did not compel a new trial. Again, we discern no reasonable probability of prejudice arising from the misconduct. The prosecutor was not deceptively or reprehensibly persuasive. Further, Sadowski’s counsel immediately objected, and the trial court stated that the instruction to which the prosecutor had alluded did not apply to the sanity phase of the trial. The prosecutor promptly backed off the point by saying “strike that, ” and moved on to her point regarding the burden of proof, and a “tie” in the evidence. We see no possibility that the prosecutor’s words regarding “two reasonable interpretations” of the evidence had any effect on the outcome of the sanity phase of Sadowski’s trial.
III. The Jury’s Sanity Finding
Sadowski contends the jury’s finding that he was sane at the time he committed his crimes is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
Our criminal law presumes a defendant was sane at the time he or she committed a crime. (§ 1026, subd. (a).) A defendant may plead not guilty to an offense, and deny any special allegations, and join that plea with a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. (§ 1016, subd. (2) & (6).) When such pleas are entered, the court conducts a bifurcated trial, and the issues of guilt and sanity are separately tried. (People v. Hernandez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 512, 520.) The sanity phase of trial is part of the same criminal proceeding as the guilt phase, but differs procedurally from the guilt phase of trial in that the issue is confined to sanity and the burden is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not sane at the time he or she committed an offense. (Id. at p. 521.) In addressing the issue of whether the defendant was sane at the time of a criminal offense, a trier of fact determines whether the defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the crime. (§ 25, subd. (b).)
A jury’s finding on the issue of sanity is reviewed under the substantial evidence test. (People v. Hernandez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 527.) This means a reviewing court must consider the whole record, examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, presuming every fact the jury could reasonably deduce from the evidence, and deferring to the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence. (People v. Padilla (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 127, 134-135.) In other words, before we may overturn the jury’s finding that Sadowski was sane, we must find as a matter of law that the finder of fact could not reasonably have rejected the evidence of insanity. (People v. Skinner (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1050, 1059.)
The sanity phase of Sadowski’s trial boiled down to the jury’s election between the testimony of opposing mental health experts. The defense and the prosecution presented their respective experts’ conclusions about what was or was not established by the evidence of Sadowski’s behavior and his mental health treatment, both past and present. The jury accepted the prosecution’s presentation, and we cannot find as a matter of law that its decision was unreasonable.
The prosecution’s primary witness, Barry Hirsch, Ph.D., a forensic psychologist, testified that the evidence showed Sadowski had been sane at the time of the events on April 29, 2005. Dr. Hirsch discounted the significance of an event in early April 2005, when Sadowski was “found naked trying to get into a church.” Dr. Hirsch interviewed Sadowski about the incident in 2009, and had reviewed some hospital records related to the incident. He opined: “My impression was that this was a decision on this man’s part to try to subvert authority and continue his $4,000 a month disability paycheck, and that this was a conscious decision that perhaps was influenced by some manic kinds or hypomanic kinds of thinking that propelled him in the direction of public exposure.” Dr. Hirsch noted that Sadowski’s “disrobing” came during a period of time related to a conclusion by a “Dr. Zetin” that Sadowski’s “disability check should stop.”
Dr. Hirsch also noted evidence that Sadowski was defiant with authority figures, and that he had made a false claim for financial benefit. Sadowski accused CBS Studio security guards of assaulting him as they escorted him out of the studio. He filed a police report, and claimed he suffered from anxiety as a result of the assault. Dr. Hirsch talked to the security guards and watched the event on videotape. He concluded that Sadowski’s representations were false and designed to work up medical claims for the purpose of a lawsuit.
Dr. Hirsch further observed that Sadowski’s life activities around the time of his crimes also showed that he was functioning normally despite any mental illness. He had traveled oversees, which belied a showing of mental disorganization or mania. Sadowski had little difficulty navigating through foreign countries and was able to make logical decisions during travels with extensive itineraries. Sadowski was able to understand and follow the tourism visa rules for extending his European visits.
Dr. Hirch interviewed Sadowski a number of times and found his memories of his crimes were selective and self-serving. When addressing his crimes, Sadowski recalled only memories that aided the claim that he was delusional and suicidal, whereas he had little problem recalling information unrelated to the crimes. As Dr. Hirsch explained, Sadowski had a good memory about the facts involved in his legal matters, but had memory lapses when discussing the instant crimes. Dr. Hirsch concluded “[i]t was a case of malingering through denial of knowledge, denial of memory.”
Apart from his after-the-fact memory problems regarding his crimes, Dr. Hirsch also believed that Sadowski’s behavior during the crimes showed he knew right from wrong at the time of the crimes. As Dr. Hirsch put it, Sadowski’s behavior showed “he knew what he was doing. It was purposeful. It followed [a] specific direction in terms of the means that contributed to it.” Sadowski’s statements to paramedics and police after the crimes also showed he knew his actions were legally and morally wrong, and his statements about being executed for what he had done was also of legal significance in that it showed Sadowski was aware of his legal dilemma. Sadowski’s show of regret for what he had done was of significance; his statement that he deserved to die showed he understood the moral wrong he had committed. To the extent that Sadowskis’s motivations may have been irrational (e.g. to reunite with Satan), those motivations did not negate that Sadowski knew what he was doing, and knew that it was wrong from a societal perspective to do what he was doing.
Finally, Dr. Hirsch also reviewed progress and treatment notes prepared by Dr. Zetin for his treatment of Sadowski from December 2001 to April 2005. Dr. Zetin’s notes from the period around early April 2005 indicated that Sadowski was “recovered, ” and that his prognosis was for “no restrictions, ” and that he was “very ready for vocational rehab.” The notes “reflect[ed] more communication” between Dr. Zetin and Sadowski, and showed that Sadowski as discussing “his job, the insurance, the Social Security, and that he was sending internet job applications out.” Dr. Zetin recorded that Sadowski did not appear “pressured or grandiose, ” indicating that his speech or physical motions were not overly rapid, and that Sadowski was not “thinking that [he was] the best, ... the greatest....” Dr. Zetin’s notes further indicated that Sadowski’s “mood [was] pretty stable overall.”
The evidence in the form of Dr. Hirsch’s testimony is substantial evidence that Sadowski was sane at the time of his crimes, and the evidence showing the contrary does not mean that the jury’s sanity finding cannot be sustained. While Dr. Zetin’s assessment of Sadowski may have been overly optimistic in April 2005, it cannot be ignored that Sadowski’s own treating therapist generally considered him to be functional during the time frame closely approaching the murder of Officer Scott. The remaining evidence in Sadowski’s favor does not defeat that substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict.
IV. The Sentencing Issue
Sadowski contends his sentence of life without the possibility of parole amounts to cruel or unusual punishment under the California Constitution. We disagree.
A sentence is cruel or unusual within the meaning of article I, section 17, of our state Constitution when it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed that “ ‘it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.’ ” (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478.)
We reject Sadowski’s argument that his sentence must be considered shocking to the conscience and offensive to fundamental human dignity. Sadowski murdered a police officer who was performing his duty. The murder was committed during the course of a carjacking, and was followed by an attempted carjacking and a carjacking in an effort to escape. The events were horrifically violent, even for a case of murder. We have little doubt, as Sadowski’s trial counsel ably argued, and as his appellate counsel has ably argued, that a mental health factor was involved in Sadowski’s actions. Still, we cannot accept his argument that his sentence must be found disproportionate under constitutional precepts because he suffered from mental health problems. A jury found that Sadowski was sane when he committed his crimes, and we do not agree that his sentence must be lessened in order to reach a constitutionally permissible period of incarceration. The alleged failures of the mental health profession and mental health support system noted by Sadowski may posit important questions insofar as public policies and expenditures are concerned, but they do not persuade us that Sadowski’s sentence of life without the possibility of parole for murdering a police officer during the commission of a violent felony violates our state’s Constitution. The punishment fits the crimes.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RUBIN, J., GRIMES, J.