Opinion
E065420
02-08-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANIEL ARMANDO RUIZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Kevin D. Sheehy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. FVI1302789) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Colin J. Bilash, Judge. Affirmed. Kevin D. Sheehy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Kathryn Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Daniel Armando Ruiz was babysitting several children, including his own, and his neighbor's children, Scarlett and Trinity. Sometime while they were in his charge, Scarlett, who was only 13 months old, suffered what appeared to be a seizure and died. The autopsy results revealed she had several broken ribs and severe injuries to her chest and lungs. The cause of death was determined to be blunt force trauma to her chest and not a seizure. Defendant initially claimed he accidently stepped on Scarlett while he was playing with the other children. He finally admitted that he purposely stepped on Scarlett's chest with all his weight because he was stressed.
Defendant was convicted of second degree murder (Pen. Code § 187, subd. (a)) and assault on a child causing death (§ 273ab, subd. (a)). Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
Defendant claims on appeal that (1) prior to him being given a polygraph examination at the San Bernardino County Sheriff's station, he was in custody and should have been given Miranda warnings; and (2) his confession should have been excluded because it was obtained using an impermissible two-step interrogation process and was a result of coercive and deceptive tactics by the interviewing detectives. We conclude his statements were properly admitted.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FACTUAL HISTORY
Andrea Hukill gave birth to Scarlett on July 7, 2012. Scarlett died on August 28, 2013.
On August 28, 2013, Hukill lived in Hesperia with Scarlett and her other daughter Trinity who was seven years old. Terra Sampson and defendant lived in the same apartment complex; she and Sampson were friends. Sampson and defendant had two children.
On August 28, Scarlett was eating normally throughout the day and was not fussy. That evening, around 8:00 p.m., Sampson and defendant came to her home with their three-year-old daughter. Sampson asked Hukill to go with her down the street to get milk and money from "the grandmother." They left defendant with the three children. There were no other adults in the home. They were gone for about 30 to 45 minutes. They received no calls from defendant while they were gone.
When they arrived back at the apartment complex, defendant came outside and told Hukill she needed to come in and check on Scarlett because he thought she was having a seizure. Defendant was frantic and panicked.
When Hukill entered the apartment, Scarlett was lying on her back on the floor propped up on a pillow. Scarlett's lips and her face were turning blue. Her eyes were rolling in the back of her head and she kept shaking her head. Hukill picked her up and directed someone to call 911 but the line was busy.
Hukill ran with Scarlett to the fire department which was across the street. Sampson ran with her. Defendant never told her that Scarlett was injured by some type of blow or force.
The paramedics at the fire department believed that Scarlett was having a seizure. They took her in an ambulance to the hospital. Hukill ran home to get her car. She saw defendant but he said nothing about Scarlett being injured. Scarlett passed away at the hospital. Defendant never told her that he stepped on Scarlett. Scarlett had no seizures prior to that day.
An autopsy was performed on Scarlett on August 30, 2013. Scarlett had no significant injuries on the outside of her body. However, during the internal exam, it was discovered there was bleeding into the soft tissue of the chest area, which was not normal. There was significant bleeding in the lung tissue and the soft tissue around her heart. There was bleeding around the blood vessels entering and exiting her neck. She had fractures to two of her ribs. Scarlett had bleeding in her abdomen.
These injuries were inconsistent with a seizure. Law enforcement officials were immediately contacted. The significance of blood away from the chest area of Scarlett, the only area which showed trauma, was that a significant amount of force would need to be applied to push the blood into different areas. This type of injury was commonly seen in car accidents where there is significant force put onto the chest or other body areas, which case the blood to enter other parts of the body.
The cause of death was determined to be blunt force injuries to Scarlett's chest. The injuries were consistent with some type of force that caused blood vessels to break and blood to escape and accumulate into the soft tissue. From the time of the injury to the time of death was a very short time. The injuries were not sustained from any life saving measures such as CPR. The injury was consistent with an adult foot being placed on Scarlet and weight being applied. The death was ruled to be a homicide. Scarlett weighed 19.5 pounds at the time of her death. There was no evidence of any diseases that could have caused a seizure.
San Bernardino Sheriff's Detective William Doemner was assigned to investigate Scarlett's death. Detective Doemner met with defendant at his apartment. Defendant agreed to go to the sheriff's station with him. Defendant rode in the front seat with Detective Doemner and it took approximately 50 minutes to get to the station. They talked the entire way. Defendant told Detective Doemner that he was training to become a medical assistant.
Detectives Doemner and Hurtado talked to defendant in one of the interview rooms. According to defendant, Scarlett became fussy when Hukill left. Trinity picked her up and comforted her. Trinity at some point laid her down on the floor in the living room propped up on a pillow. The children and defendant were playing a game that involved running around the living room. After about 15 minutes, defendant was tired so he sat down on the couch to watch television. At that point, he noticed Scarlett was stiff. He picked her up and her teeth were grinding. He thought she may be having a seizure. He set her back down as he had learned in his medical training not to hold a seizure victim. He tried to revive her. When Hukill and Sampson arrived back at the apartment complex, he immediately ran out to tell them Scarlett was having a seizure. Defendant saw nothing happen to Scarlett prior to this seizure. He did not hurt her.
Detective Hurtado's first name does not appear in the record.
Detective Doemner advised defendant that his story was not consistent with Scarlett's injuries. Defendant was sent to speak with another interviewer and gave the same story initially. However, during that interview he changed his story and said he accidently stepped on Scarlett.
Detectives Doemner and Hurtado interviewed defendant a second time after he was given Miranda warnings. The interviews were played for the jury. Defendant finally admitted in the second interview that he purposefully stepped on Scarlett and put his weight on her because he was frustrated. He was tired from working all day and he was upset that Sampson and Hukill always made him babysit. Defendant wrote an apology letter to Hukill, which was shown to the jury. The letter included, "I was playing with the girls. I seen Scarlett on the floor so I placed my foot along her chest and pressed down with most of my weight and it took some of my frustration away. So I left her on the pillow she was laying on to catch her breath." It was Detective Doemner's practice to interview witnesses and suspects at the sheriff's headquarters. There were less distractions than conducting an interview in the home.
We will discuss in further detail the interviews of defendant in the analysis, post.
Defendant presented no evidence.
DISCUSSION
Defendant claims he should have been given Miranda warnings prior to being subjected to a polygraph examination because it was a custodial interrogation. All of his ensuing statements should have been excluded as tainted by the prior un-Mirandized statements. Further, the detectives employed an improper two-step interrogation technique. Finally, his statements made under Miranda warnings were the result of coercion and offers of leniency and were not voluntary.
A. ADDITIONAL FACTUAL BACKGROUND
An Evidence Code section 402 hearing was conducted prior to trial regarding the admission of defendant's statements. The People called Detective Doemner to testify at the hearing. On August 30, 2013, he and his supervisor, Travis Newport, went to defendant's residence. Detective Doemner told defendant he wanted to discuss Scarlett's death. Detective Doemner asked defendant to accompany them to the sheriff's headquarters located in San Bernardino. It was located 40 miles from defendant's residence. Defendant agreed to go with them. Defendant did not have a vehicle to transport him to the station. Detective Doemner offered to drive defendant to the station in his unmarked sheriff's department sedan.
Defendant sat in the front passenger's seat. He was not handcuffed. Defendant was not under arrest. Newport was in a separate vehicle. When they arrived at the station, defendant was taken to an interview room located in the specialized investigations division. Defendant was told he was not under arrest. He was told he was free to leave at any time. He was advised where the restrooms were located and that he could use them whenever he needed to use them.
The room was small with only three chairs and a table in the room. Detective Doemner began to speak with defendant. Detective Hurtado joined them after a couple of hours. Detective Doemner offered a polygraph test to defendant. He told defendant that it was used in order to eliminate possible suspects in cases and would help them to determine if defendant was telling the truth. Defendant volunteered to take the test.
The polygraph test was administered in the same building. After the polygraph test, he was interviewed again. Defendant was read his Miranda rights by Detective Doemner from a card prior to this second interview. Defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights.
Detective Doemner admitted defendant was a person of interest in the murder of Scarlett when he was taken down to the station. Detective Doemner was in plain clothes but he had a firearm visible on his hip. The person who gave the polygraph test had defendant sign a consent form. Detective Doemner did not recall offering any leniency to defendant if he told them what had happened or that defendant ever asked to leave. Defendant never said he wanted to see an attorney prior to taking the polygraph test. Defendant was not told prior to the Miranda warnings that there were holes in his story. Defendant was never handcuffed.
Prior to the polygraph, defendant said nothing about causing Scarlett's injures. He only said that Scarlett had a seizure and he did not know why. Once he admitted involvement, Miranda warnings were given. Defendant presented no witnesses at the hearing.
Defendant's counsel argued the Miranda warnings should have been given to defendant prior to the polygraph examination. Defendant had been at the station for over one hour talking to the detectives. Defendant was then told they were going to give him a polygraph examination. Defendant's counsel argued, "If you're there for more than an hour and they say, we're going to put you on a polygraph, at that point I don't think any reasonable person would think they're free to leave, despite an hour ago they told you you're free to leave and the restrooms are just down the hall." The fact the detectives decided to give him a polygraph showed they questioned his explanation of what had happened. Once they decided to give him a polygraph, it changed from a consensual interview to an interrogation.
The trial court first noted there was no time limit for questioning that required a Miranda warning. It was based on the totality of the circumstances. Defendant voluntarily went to the sheriff's station. The trial court felt that up until the polygraph there was no question that he was not in custody. He was free to leave. He never asked to leave.
Defense counsel again reiterated that the situation changed when defendant was asked to take the polygraph. Any reasonable person would not believe they could leave at that point.
The trial court did not believe Miranda warnings were triggered just because someone was a person of interest or a suspect. The trial court did not believe that the first interview or the polygraph were custodial interviews. It was all voluntary. There was no need to give Miranda warnings at that point. Once defendant started making incriminating statements, the detectives determined that they needed to give defendant his Miranda rights.
The trial court ruled, "Based on the testimony I heard, I think that that seems to be what happened. I feel that there was no violation of Miranda or that the defendant was in a position of custodial investigation and should have been given his Miranda before, therefore, the Court denies that motion." The trial court also admitted the apology letter written by defendant to Hukill.
The jury heard the interviews; the transcripts were given to the jury. At the beginning of the taped interview, prior to Miranda warnings being given, the person who administered the polygraph advised defendant that Detectives Doemner and Hurtado were going to talk to him again. He advised defendant, "You gotta tell them what you told me if there's anything different you gotta tell them the truth 'cause there's a very good possibility they're gonna ask you to do this again you cannot lie on anything okay?" Defendant responded, "Okay." He then said, "But as it stands right now you're saying that you were just running, playing and you stepped on her and it as an accident. Is that right?" Defendant responded, "Yes."
This court has listened to the audio of the two interviews. --------
Defendant told Detective Doemner that he was scared. Detective Doemner asked, "it's not something you meant to happen right?" Defendant responded he was playing and accidently stepped on her. She did not cry and he thought it was because the wind was knocked out of her. Everything else that he had already said was true. At that point, Detective Doemner read defendant his Miranda rights. Defendant agreed to continue to talk to the detectives. Defendant repeatedly advised the detectives he accidently stepped on Scarlett. The detectives asked him several times why he had not called 911 or got help for Scarlett. Defendant responded that she was breathing. He never picked her up to check on her. Defendant weighed 230 pounds. Defendant did not tell Hukill that he had stepped on Scarlett. He did not believe it was connected to her having a seizure.
Defendant did not tell the police who originally questioned Hukill that he accidently stepped on Scarlett because he thought he would be arrested. Defendant did not initially tell Detective Doemner because he was scared. Defendant had not told anyone; he said, "It was eating me inside." Defendant reiterated he did not tell the detectives because he was afraid to go to prison but it had been "bugging" him not telling the truth.
Detective Doemner told defendant he was not a terrible person and he had to be completely honest. Detective Doemner told defendant, "[Y]ou've made some bad choices and those choices are gonna have consequences but you are not a bad person. These things like I told you when we first left that room you're gonna get thought this okay. You are gonna come out on the other side of this. You're gonna learn some lessons but you're gonna come out on the other side of this and you'll be a much wiser man because of it okay I honestly believe that and by you taking the first step and being honest with me is gonna go a long ways that's gonna help you.
Detective Doemner told defendant that he needed to make sure that "when we walk out this room it's all on the table there can't be any more surprises." Defendant insisted there was nothing more. Detective Hurtado questioned defendant if this was really an accident. Detective Hurtado then said he could not believe after stepping on Scarlett that he did not even bend down to check on her. He told him, "Don't bullshit us Daniel I mean that's the biggest think I told you man we can work with the truth those lies we can't fix 'em and this is the most important day of your life right now and only you right inside here Daniel only you are the one that knows. Do I think you're this monster? Absolutely not I don't think that Daniel look at me, look at me." Detective Hurtado said, "We know something happened there, we know a lot of what you told us is the truth but it's not all the truth. It's you—it's inside here man. Daniel it's you inside here your heart look down into your heart and you look [at] me as a man and tell me what happened."
Defendant did not want to tell the detectives what happened because he was afraid that everyone was going to hate him, including those in the apartment complex. Defendant said that he wanted to be with his family. Detective Hurtado told him, "Daniel I told you before look at me Daniel we can work with the truth Daniel but we can't fix a lie okay right now Daniel, right now you're in a hole and the holes only like this big okay. Bill and I we're showing up and we're gonna give you a shovel. You can [do] one of two things with that shovel. You can prop that shovel up on the side and get yourself out of that hole or you can keep digging yourself around there and get yourself deeper." Defendant responded he did not want to dig himself deeper. Detective Hurtado responded, "And we know that so let's get you out of that hole Daniel. Let's get you out of that hole. What happened?"
Detective Hurtado told defendant there were too many holes in his story. He said, "Daniel the only thing that's gonna make sense to everyone, to all of us is the truth." Defendant then responded, "I stepped on her." He stepped on her and it was not an accident. Defendant was sobbing. Defendant admitted that he was frustrated and stepped on Scarlett. Defendant was stressed out because he did not have a job that paid his bills. Sampson and Hukill used him as the "token" babysitter. He just stepped on her chest with his foot. He did not stomp on her. Stepping on her "made him feel a little better."
Defendant was again concerned that everyone in the apartment complex was going to hate him; Detective Hurtado told him he could always move. Detective Hurtado told defendant that writing a letter to Hukill telling her what he did would help with closure.
At the end of the interview, defendant asked, "So be straight up man what is the next step?" Detective Hurtado told him that they were going to talk about the next step out of his presence.
At the end of the presentation of evidence at trial, defendant again objected to the admission of the interviews. Defendant's counsel stated, "I wanted to readdress the issue whether the Court felt that it was properly, [defendant] was properly Mirandized, voluntary statement, not coerced or anything." Counsel argued the trial court had now listened to all of the interviews and had more information than at the time of the Evidence Code section 402 hearing. The trial court stated, "[H]aving listened to the full extent of the testimony and the total transcripts, the Court still believes it made the correct ruling in the original [Evidence Code section] 402 hearing so that subsequent, would still be denied."
B. LAW ON CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
"Under the familiar requirements of Miranda, designed to assure protection of the federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination . . . a suspect may not be subjected to custodial interrogation unless he or she knowingly and intelligently has waived the right to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney, and to appointed counsel in the event the suspect is indigent." (People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 440, overruled on other grounds in People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007.) "Statements elicited in violation of this rule are generally inadmissible in a criminal, trial." (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 732, abrogated on other grounds in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363.)
"'In applying Miranda . . . one normally begins by asking whether custodial interrogation has taken place. "The phrase 'custodial interrogation' is crucial. The adjective [custodial] encompasses any situation in which 'a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.'"'" (People v Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401 (Ochoa)) "Absent 'custodial interrogation,' Miranda simply does not come into play." (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 648.)
"The test for whether an individual is in custody is 'objective . . . : "[was] there a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'''" (Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 401.) "Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene is . . . reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve "the ultimate inquiry": "[was] there a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." [Citations.] The first inquiry, all agree, is distinctly factual. . . . The second inquiry, however, calls for application of the controlling legal standard to the historical facts. This ultimate determination . . . presents a "mixed question of law and fact". . . .'" (Id. at pp. 401-402.)
"'In reviewing constitutional claims of this nature, it is well established that we accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence. We independently determine from the undisputed facts and the facts properly found by the trial court whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained.'" (People v. Storm, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 1022-1023.)
C. POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION
Defendant's first claim is that he was subject to custodial interrogation when he was asked to take a polygraph examination, and should have been given Miranda warnings. Based on the totality of the circumstances, defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation.
The only evidence before the trial court at the time of the Evidence Code section 402 hearing was the testimony of Detective Doemner. Detective Doemner asked defendant to accompany the detectives to the sheriff's headquarters located in San Bernardino and defendant agreed to go with them. Defendant did not have a vehicle to transport him to the station so he rode with Detective Doemner. Defendant sat in the front passenger's seat and was not handcuffed. Defendant was not under arrest.
When they arrived at the station, defendant was taken to an interview room located in the specialized investigations division. It was small with three chairs and a table. Defendant was told he was not under arrest. He was told he was free to leave at any time. He was advised where the restrooms were located and that he could use them whenever he needed to use them.
Detective Doemner began to speak with defendant. Detective Hurtado joined them after a couple of hours. Detective Doemner offered a polygraph test to defendant. He told defendant that it was used in order to eliminate possible suspects in cases and would help them to determine if defendant was telling the truth. Defendant volunteered to take the test. He signed a waiver form that was not submitted to the trial court but there is no dispute the form was signed by defendant. The polygraph test was administered in the same building.
A reasonable person in defendant's shoes would be aware he could leave at any time. He was so advised by Detective Doemner. He was never placed under arrest and never handcuffed. Further, he volunteered to take the polygraph examination. If he did not want to take the polygraph test, he could have chosen not to sign the consent form.
In Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, the defendant was asked to take a polygraph examination so he could be excluded as a possible suspect. Defendant was hesitant but eventually agreed. He was subjected to a polygraph examination prior to being given his Miranda rights. He signed a voluntary waiver form. (Ochoa, at pp. 393, 402.) During the examination, he confessed to killing the victim. (Id. at p. 394.) The Supreme Court found that defendant was not in custody. It ruled, "A reasonable individual knows that he or she can end a voluntary association with other individuals at will. This is so despite the location of defendant's questioning: the fact that he was questioned in the police station's polygraph examination room does not necessarily require a finding of custody, even if the room was in a secure area." (Id. at p. 403.) Similarly here, defendant was aware he could terminate the interview at any time and the fact he was subjected to a polygraph was not per se custodial interrogation.
Defendant insists he was forced to take the polygraph examination because the detectives told him he was not telling the truth about what happened to Scarlett. However Detective Doemner specifically testified he advised defendant that the polygraph was a tool used to eliminate suspects and to help determine if he was telling the truth. Detective Doemner also stated "There was a question about his validity of his statements prior to going to [the] polygraph." Detective Doemner denied that he told defendant prior to giving Miranda warnings that there were holes in his story. They told him that his story did not make sense. Defendant volunteered to take the test. Defendant's claims that the detectives questioned his account "to his face" and were "prodding him to take a polygraph test" were simply not borne out by the evidence before the trial court. Moreover, no further evidence was presented during the trial to support defendant's claim.
Here, the totality of the circumstances establish defendant voluntarily went to the sheriff's station with Detective Doemner. Defendant spoke with the detectives and then was asked if he would be willing to take a polygraph examination to eliminate him as a suspect and to see if he was telling the truth. He voluntarily consented. He was not subject to custodial interrogation.
D. INVOLUNTARY STATEMENT
Defendant further contends his statements made after he was given Miranda warnings should have been excluded because (1) the interrogation violated the rule set forth in Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600 (Missouri) regarding an impermissible two-step interrogation techniques; and (2) his statement was involuntary because it was the result of coercive tactics and offers of leniency made by Detectives Doemner and Hurtado.
In Missouri, supra, 542 U.S. 600, the defendant was questioned regarding the death of a mentally ill 18 year old who was killed in a fire purposefully set at the defendant's mobile home. The detective decided to question the defendant at the police station without Miranda warnings and she confessed to a plan devised with her family members that the boy was to die in the fire. (Missouri, at p. 604.) The detectives gave the defendant a 20-minute break. After the 20-minute break, they issued Miranda warnings, the defendant affirmed her prior statements and she signed a confession. (Missouri, at pp. 604-605.) The defendant sought to exclude all of her statements. The trial court admitted the statements made after the defendant was given Miranda warnings. (Id. at p. 606.)
The plurality court reversed and held, "By any objective measure, applied to circumstances exemplified here, it is likely that if the interrogators employ the technique of withholding warnings until after interrogation succeeds in eliciting a confession, the warnings will be ineffective in preparing the suspect for successive interrogation, close in time and similar in content." (Missouri, supra, 542 U.S. at p. 613.) The statements given after Miranda warnings were excluded. (Missouri, at p. 617.)
The holding in Missouri has been interpreted narrowly as follows: "'[W]here law enforcement officers deliberately employ a two-step interrogation to obtain a confession and where separations of time and circumstance and additional curative warnings are absent or fail to apprise a reasonable person in the suspect's shoes of his rights, the trial court should suppress the confession. This narrower test—that excludes confessions made after a deliberate, objectively ineffective mid-stream warning—represents [Missouri's] holding.'" (People v. Rios (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 491, 505; see also People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 478 [no evidence the officers were following a policy of disregarding Miranda]; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 448.)
Here, there is no evidence that supports the detectives purposefully sought to circumvent the Miranda process. Defendant spoke with the detectives and then voluntarily submitted to the polygraph examination. After the polygraph examination, prior to Miranda warnings being given, the person who administered the polygraph advised defendant Detectives Doemner and Hurtado were going to talk to him again. He advised defendant, "You gotta tell them what you told me if there's anything different you gotta tell them the truth 'cause there's a very good possibility they're gonna ask you to do this again you cannot lie on anything okay?" Defendant responded, "Okay." He then said, "But as it stands right now you're saying that you were just running, playing and you stepped on her and it as an accident. Is that right?" Defendant responded, "Yes."
Detective Doemner confirmed with defendant that he did not mean to step on Scarlett. At that point, Detective Doemner read defendant his Miranda rights and defendant eventually confessed to stepping on Scarlett because he was stressed.
There was no evidence that Detectives Hurtado and Doemner intentionally refused to give defendant Miranda warnings as a tactic to get defendant to confess. Additionally, defendant did not confess until after the Miranda warnings were given to him. The only statements made prior to the Miranda warnings were that he accidently stepped on Scarlett. It was only after the Miranda warnings were given to him that he confessed to stepping on her because he was stressed. This is clearly unlike the situation in Missouri.
Moreover, the statement was voluntarily made and not as a result of coercive tactics or false promises of leniency by the detectives.
"It long has been held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution makes inadmissible any involuntary statement obtained by a law enforcement officer from a criminal suspect by coercion." (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 79.) "Voluntariness does not turn on any one fact, no matter how apparently significant, but rather on the 'totality of [the] circumstances.'" (Ibid.) "'What the Constitution permits to be admitted in evidence is "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice . . ." to confess. [Citations.] The question is whether defendant's choice to confess was not "essentially free" because his will was overborne.'" (Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 403.)
"'In assessing allegedly coercive police tactics, "[t]he courts have prohibited only those psychological ploys which, under all the circumstances, are so coercive that they tend to produce a statement that is both involuntary and unreliable."'" (People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 436.)
We have listened to the interview and reviewed the transcripts of the interviews. Based on the totality of the circumstances, defendant's will was not overborne by the detectives and he was not made false promises of leniency. Detectives Hurtado and Doemner never raised their voices or threatened defendant.
Defendant points to a statement by Detective Hurtado that he had dug himself a hole and they would provide him with a shovel. Both Detectives Hurtado and Doemner told him that they could not fix a lie and that he had to tell the truth. These were both statements reasonably interpreted to encourage defendant to tell the truth. "Absent improper threats or promises, law enforcement officers are permitted to urge that it would be better to tell the truth." (People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 444.)
Further, the statement by Detective Doemner that defendant was "gonna come out on the other side" was not reasonably interpreted to mean that he was not going to spend time in prison. Detective Doemner further told him that he was going to learn a lesson from this and become a better person. There was no improper promise of leniency.
It should be remembered, "'Once a suspect has been properly advised of his rights, he may be questioned freely so long as the questioner does not threaten harm or falsely promise benefits. Questioning may include exchanges of information, summaries of evidence, outline of theories of events, confrontation with contradictory facts, even debate between police and suspect.'" (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 115.)
Here, defendant admitted that keeping the truth inside was "eating him inside" and that he had to tell the truth. His confession was not as a result of threats by the detectives or false promises of leniency. His statement was voluntarily made.
E. PREJUDICE
Even if the trial court erred by admitting defendant's statements, the result would be the same. The erroneous denial of a motion to suppress "is subject to harmless error analysis under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18." (People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 86.)
Initially, the jury was instructed it could not find defendant guilty based only on his statements. Specifically, it was instructed, "You have heard evidence that the defendant made oral statements before the trial. You must decide whether the defendant made any of those statements in whole or in part. If you decide that the defendant made such statements, consider the statements along with other evidence in reaching your verdict. It is up to you to decide how much importance to give to those statements. Consider with caution any statement made by the defendant tending to show his guilt unless the statement was written or otherwise recorded." They were also instructed, in pertinent part, "The defendant may not be convicted of any crime based on his out of court statements alone. You may rely on them to convict him only if you first conclude that other evidence shows that the crime charged or a lesser included offense was committed." Additionally, the jury was instructed, "If the defendant made a false or misleading statement before the trial relating to the charged crime, knowing the statement was false or intending to mislead, that conduct may show he was aware of his guilt and you may consider it in determining his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant made such a statement, it is up to you to decide its meaning and importance; however, evidence that the defendant made such a statement cannot by itself prove guilt." The jury necessarily did not base their verdict solely upon defendant's statement.
Here, although there were no other witnesses who were present at the time Scarlett was injured, the evidence unequivocally pointed to defendant being the perpetrator. Scarlett's injuries were consistent with an adult foot being placed on her chest. The only other persons in the house were children under the age of seven. Defendant's explanation that she suddenly had a seizure was not consistent with the injuries suffered by Scarlett. Even without defendant's admission, the evidence supported that defendant caused Scarlett's injuries and her ensuing death.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER
J. We concur: HOLLENHORST
Acting P. J. SLOUGH
J.