Opinion
November 18, 1992
Appeal from the Oneida County Court, Buckley, J.
Present — Denman, P.J., Pine, Lawton, Boehm and Davis, JJ.
Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: The trial court did not err in refusing to disqualify a prospective juror for cause on the ground that his wife's first cousin was already sworn as a juror (see, CPL 270.20 [b], [c]). The prospective juror stated that he was able to render an impartial verdict based solely upon the evidence adduced at trial (see, CPL 270.20 [b]; People v Blyden, 55 N.Y.2d 73, 76; People v Biondo, 41 N.Y.2d 483, 485, cert denied 434 U.S. 928). Furthermore, the prospective juror's familial relationship to the sworn juror is not a relationship that implicates CPL 270.20 (1) (c).
We conclude that the hearing court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the initial sweep search (see, Mincey v Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-393; see also, Maryland v Buie, 494 U.S. 325; People v Febus, 157 A.D.2d 380, lv granted 76 N.Y.2d 898, appeal dismissed 77 N.Y.2d 835) and upon the execution of the two subsequently obtained search warrants (see, Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, reh denied 404 U.S. 874; United States v Bolts, 558 F.2d 316, 320, cert denied sub nom. Hicks v United States, 434 U.S. 930).
We reject defendant's contention that the accomplice testimony was not sufficiently corroborated to support his conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the physical evidence seized from defendant's apartment, the testimony of the bank teller, and the testimony of the police officers who were at the apartment constituted independent evidence that connected defendant to those crimes and provided the necessary corroboration of the accomplices' testimony to support defendant's conviction (see, CPL 60.22; People v Moses, 63 N.Y.2d 299).
Finally, we conclude that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, People v Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495) and that the sentence imposed was neither harsh nor excessive.