Opinion
A107997
12-13-2006
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH PIERRE ROLLIN, Defendant and Appellant.
Joseph Pierre Rollin appeals his conviction for abuse of a dependent adult. We reverse because a statement obtained in violation of the rule announced in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 was admitted at trial as evidence of his guilt, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Decedent Joi Wright lived with defendant in a run-down mobile home in Orick, California. In late August or early September 2000, she was visited by Michael Finamore, an adult protective services public health nurse with Humboldt County. Wright suffered from multiple sclerosis, was bed and wheelchair-bound, and was also incontinent. She had some minor bed sores, and Finamore arranged for her to receive health care services. The county also contracted with defendant to act as Wrights caregiver. Wright was then coherent and articulate, and considered competent to make decisions.
In November 2000, defendant told Finamore he wanted Wright to leave, and Finamore arranged for her to move to Eureka, with in-home support services. She remained in Eureka until the end of March 2001, when she moved back to Orick to be with defendant, against Finamores advice.
In October 2001, home care support services to Wright were terminated after defendant reportedly said he had a gun and would blow the social workers head off if he saw her again. Finamore last visited Wright at defendants trailer in November 2001 to check on her and discuss closure of her adult protective services case. She was clean and coherent, and was not concerned that the home health service had "disenrolled" her. She did not appear to be in any pain or discomfort. Finamore had some concerns about the volatility of defendants personality, but thought defendant "always tried hard and did an adequate job in providing care for [Wright]."
Defendant denied he had a gun, and claimed he was just blowing off steam. A social worker who visited Wright at defendants request several times between April and July 2001 testified Wright was sometimes afraid of defendant, but that she would rather die than go to a nursing home. The social workers visits were discontinued, apparently at defendants direction.
In January 2002, a deputy sheriff went to the trailer after he received a call from Wrights mother asking him to check on her welfare, and he returned in February after he received another call reporting that Wrights phone had been disconnected. Wright said she was fine, was excited about a pending move to New Mexico, and wanted her mother to leave her alone.
On March 11, 2002, a friend of defendants visited the trailer. He noticed a putrid smell, and heard a sarcastic-sounding female voice say something like: "Are they here? Did they bring it? Help, help. Im dying here. Come on. Whats taking so long? . . . Bring me my stuff." Defendant told his friend he had been working really hard taking care of Wright and was not in any big rush to assist her.
On March 20, 2002, defendants brother brought Wrights emaciated and soiled body to the hospital. She had been dead for hours. Her catheter had not been changed for an extended period of time, and the most serious of numerous bedsores extended to the bone. Her primary cause of death was bronchial pneumonia, caused by fecal contamination of her bedsores or by a urinary tract infection. She was malnourished, possibly because of a lack of food or due to her multiple sclerosis.
On March 13, 2001, a urologist treating Wright for a urinary tract infection and incontinence surgically inserted a catheter that needed to be changed every four to six weeks. He last saw her in November 2001.
A criminal complaint was filed against defendant on March 19, 2003. On April 8, 2003, defendant was arrested in Austin, Texas. Christine Cook, the senior investigator for the Humboldt County District Attorneys Office, went there to interview him about Wrights death. Defendant made a series of statements to police. Most were recorded. At first, defendant claimed he was out of town when Wright died in a motel where his brother had taken her. Later, after receiving Miranda warnings, defendant admitted he was present when she died. He ultimately told Cook that Wright choked and died in her sleep. Defendant claimed he fed Wright every day. He said her bedsores were beyond his control and her catheter needed attention, but Wright refused to let him take her to the hospital. After she died, defendants brother cleaned up the mobile home and took defendant to Oregon and then Arizona, where he stayed with a relative.
Further details relating to defendants statements are included in the discussion portion of this opinion.
Defendant was charged with dependent adult abuse, with allegations that he proximately caused the death of the victim and personally inflicted great bodily injury. The court concluded defendants taped statements to police did not result from interrogation, and denied defendants motion to exclude them. They were played to the jury. The jury convicted defendant as charged. He was sentenced to eight years in prison, including the midterm of three years for abuse of a dependent adult, a five-year consecutive enhancement for proximately causing the victims death, and a three-year concurrent enhancement for personal infliction of great bodily injury. He timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
"The scope of our review of [claims alleging Miranda violations] is well established. We must accept the trial courts resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if they are substantially supported. [Citations.] However, we must independently determine from the undisputed facts, and those properly found by the trial court, whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained." (People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 263.)
"The prophylactic requirements of Miranda, supra, are familiar. In order to assure protection of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination under `inherently coercive circumstances, a suspect may not be subjected to an interrogation in official `custody unless he has previously been advised of, and has knowingly and intelligently waived, his rights to silence, to the presence of an attorney, and to appointed counsel if he is indigent. . . . Statements obtained in violation of Miranda are not admissible to establish his guilt." (People v. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 271.)
"[T]he term `interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. . . . A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation." (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300-302, fns. omitted.)
An "incriminating response" includes "any response—whether inculpatory or exculpatory—that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial." (Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 301, fn. 5.) Nor is the intent of the police irrelevant, "for it may well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response." (Id. at pp. 301-302, fn. 7.)
It is undisputed that defendant was in custody when he spoke with Cook in Texas. He was transported in handcuffs from the county jail to an interview room at a police station. When the interview began at the police station, Cook identified herself, and told defendant she was there "to talk to him about Joi" and to "find out what happened to Jo[i]—how she died." Cook then told defendant she was interested in an earlier comment defendant made to a police officer during the trip from the jail that she understood to imply that Joi died from choking. Defendant told Cook that was correct, and proceeded to talk for approximately 20 minutes about his relationship with Joi and the circumstances of her death. When an officer interrupted the interview to see if defendant wanted more coffee, Cook left the room and advised defendant of his rights when she returned. During defendants 20 minute monologue, Cook repeatedly nodded her head, made affirmative sounds in response to defendants statements, and occasionally took notes. From defendants perspective, Cooks conduct must reasonably be viewed as likely to elicit an incriminating response and is the functional equivalent of express questioning.
After Cook read defendant his rights, he continued to talk and deny he was with Wright when she died. After a break, Cook told defendant his brother was in custody and had told a different story. When he was accused of not telling the truth, defendant asked for an attorney, and the interview ended. But defendant kept talking while Cook accompanied him back to the county jail. Cook told him she could not talk to him after he invoked his rights. She obtained a second waiver and made an audiotape recording of defendants remaining statements. Defendant then admitted that he, and not his brother, was with Wright when she died.
In People v. Harris (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 640, Division Four of this District concluded the functional equivalent of interrogation occurred as described in Rhode Island v. Innis when a police officer remarked to a defendant who had declined to talk with him: "`"I thought you were going to come back and straighten it out."" (Harris, supra, at pp. 646, 648-649.) The court concluded the officers remark "must be deemed the `functional equivalent of further questioning," because the officer "should have known his remark was likely to draw damaging statements from appellant." (Id. at pp. 648-649; see also People v. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 274-275 [after defendant invoked his right to counsel, a police officer invited him to make an incriminating response when the officer "advised, in effect, that defendant was still under suspicion and that investigation of his involvement would continue"].) A similar conclusion is warranted here.
The officer was apparently referring to an earlier telephone conversation when defendant, who had left town, agreed to return. (People v. Harris, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 644-645.)
Cook should have known that her words and conduct were "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" from defendant. (See Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at pp. 301-302.) She told defendant she was in Texas to interview him and get information from him about Wrights death. She accompanied him from the county jail to an interview room at a police station equipped with recording devices. She expressed a specific interest in defendants earlier comment that Joi choked to death, effectively inviting him to respond and thereby increasing the likelihood that he would incriminate himself by speaking about her death.
The Attorney General now argues that Cook was waiting for him to " `come up for air " to read him his rights, but our review of the videotape of the interview indicates Cook never attempted to interject until defendant had spoken for about 20 minutes. Cook had 15 years of experience as an investigator, 25 years as a peace officer, and had attended "many years of training regarding interviewing and interrogation techniques." The fact that she did not ask defendant explicit questions does not end our inquiry regarding whether there has been a Miranda violation. (See Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 299, fn. 3 ["To limit the ambit of Miranda to express questioning would `place a premium on the ingenuity of the police to devise methods of indirect interrogation, rather than to implement the plain mandate of Miranda. "].) Cook should have known her comments were likely to draw damaging statements from defendant, and should have given him Miranda warnings at the beginning of the interview. (See People v. Harris, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 648-649; see also Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, at p. 302.)
The Attorney General concedes that the cases relied upon by the trial court are factually distinguishable. (See People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 337-338 [no interrogation occurred when an imprisoned defendant, evidently motivated by a religious conversion, contacted prison authorities to discuss his crimes in another state]; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 985-986 [police officer had no reason to know that his casual estimate of possible penalties, in answer to the defendants question during their ride to the hospital, would produce an incriminating response, and the record instead "demonstrate[d the] defendants desire to unburden himself by confessing the murder"].) The same is true of the cases cited in the respondents brief on appeal. (See, e.g., People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 290, 302 [officers brief statement informing defendant about the evidence against him at the time of his arrest was not likely to elicit an incriminating response]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 814-816 [deputys affirmative response when defendant asked if he could light a cigarette, which preceded defendants volunteered confession, did not constitute interrogation].)
Nor do we agree with the Attorney General that the introduction of defendants unwarned statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because defendant denied culpability. (Cf. Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 301, fn. 5 ["If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution."].) The jury watched the entire videotape of defendants interview at the police station, when he denied being with Wright at the time of her death. The jury also heard the audiotape of defendants later statement in the patrol car, when he admitted he was with her when she died at the motel. The contradictions between defendants earlier and later statements to Cook formed the basis of the prosecutors repeated arguments to the jury that discrepancies in his statements should be considered as circumstantial evidence of defendants guilt. The court also instructed the jury: "If you find that before the trial the defendant made a willfully false or deliberately misleading statement concerning a crime for which hes now being tried, you may consider that statement as a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of guilt." The jury deliberated over several days, and heard evidence that Wright refused medical treatment and that her malnourishment could have been caused by her multiple sclerosis. The evidence of defendants guilt was not overwhelming. We cannot conclude that the admission of defendants statement obtained in violation of Miranda was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt even in light of his statements made after he received Miranda warnings. (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; Hinman v. McCarthy (9th Cir. 1982) 676 F.2d 343, 352.)
Because we reverse on the Miranda issue, we do not address defendants additional allegations of error with regard to the jury instructions and sentencing.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
We concur:
McGUINESS, P.J.
POLLAK, J.