Opinion
2014-02-7
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Corey ROHADFOX, Defendant–Respondent.
William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Maria Maldonado of Counsel), for Appellant. Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Piotr Banasiak of Counsel), for Defendant–Respondent.
William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Maria Maldonado of Counsel), for Appellant. Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Piotr Banasiak of Counsel), for Defendant–Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, CARNI, SCONIERS, and WHALEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
The People appeal from an order in which Supreme Court sua sponte converted defendant's postverdict pro se “motion for dismissal” to a CPL 330.30(1) motion to set aside the verdict and granted that motion.Following a jury trial during which defendant represented himself, the jury found defendant guilty of one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [1] ), but not guilty of two other counts of the same crime (§ 220.16 [1], [12] ). In granting defendant's motion, the court determined that it had deprived defendant of his right to retained counsel of his choice by denying his request for an adjournment to obtain new retained counsel.
“Pursuant to CPL 330.30(1), following the issuance of a verdict and before sentencing a court may set aside a verdict on ‘[a]ny ground appearing in the record which, if raised upon an appeal from a prospective judgment of conviction, would require a reversal or modification of the judgment as a matter of law by an appellate court’ ” (People v. Benton, 78 A.D.3d 1545, 1546, 910 N.Y.S.2d 795, lv. denied16 N.Y.3d 828, 921 N.Y.S.2d 192, 946 N.E.2d 180). “The power granted a Trial Judge is, thus, far more limited than that of an intermediate appellate court, which is authorized to determine not only questions of law but issues of fact ..., to reverse or modify a judgment when the verdict is against the weight of the evidence ..., and to reverse ‘[a]s a matter of discretion in the interest of justice’ ” (People v. Carter, 63 N.Y.2d 530, 536, 483 N.Y.S.2d 654, 473 N.E.2d 6).
The issue before us on this appeal therefore is whether a court's alleged abuse of discretion in denying an adjournment would require reversal of the judgment of conviction as a matter of law upon an appeal therefrom ( see generally People v. Spears, 64 N.Y.2d 698, 699–700, 485 N.Y.S.2d 521, 474 N.E.2d 1189). Under the unique circumstances of this case, we conclude that it would.
“It is certainly well established that the right to counsel, guaranteed by both the Federal and State Constitutions ..., embraces the right of a criminal defendant to be represented by counsel of his own choosing ... As a necessary corollary to this right, a defendant must be accorded a reasonable opportunity to select and retain his counsel” (People v. Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d 264, 270, 425 N.Y.S.2d 282, 401 N.E.2d 393). In other words, the fundamental right to be represented by counsel of one's own choosing “is denied to a defendant unless he [or she] gets reasonable time and a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his [or her] own choice” (People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 483, 53 N.E.2d 356; see generally Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d at 273, 425 N.Y.S.2d 282, 401 N.E.2d 393).
In our view, the court's refusal to grant defendant's request for an adjournment was “an abuse of discretion as a matter of law” and effectively denied defendant the fundamental right to be represented by counsel of his own choosing (Spears, 64 N.Y.2d at 700, 485 N.Y.S.2d 521, 474 N.E.2d 1189; see People v. Walker, 29 A.D.2d 973, 973–974, 289 N.Y.S.2d 284; see generally Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d at 273, 425 N.Y.S.2d 282, 401 N.E.2d 393; McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. at 482–483, 53 N.E.2d 356). On the date scheduled for suppression hearings, defense counsel, who had been retained by defendant's family while defendant was incarcerated, withdrew defendant's requests for suppression and sought an expedited trial without defendant's knowledge or consent. At the next court appearance, defendant requested an adjournment of the expedited trial to afford him time in which to retain another attorney. The court, in denying that request, did not afford defendant “[a] reasonable time and a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice” (McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. at 483, 53 N.E.2d 356; cf. People v. Sapienza, 75 A.D.3d 768, 771, 904 N.Y.S.2d 568; People v. Mao–Sheng Lin, 50 A.D.3d 1251, 1253, 855 N.Y.S.2d 729, lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 961, 863 N.Y.S.2d 145, 893 N.E.2d 451), particularly in view of the fact that the trial was expedited without defendant's knowledge or consent ( see People v. Hartman, 64 A.D.3d 1002, 1005, 883 N.Y.S.2d 361, lv. denied13 N.Y.3d 860, 891 N.Y.S.2d 694, 920 N.E.2d 99; cf. People v. O'Kane, 55 A.D.3d 315, 316, 865 N.Y.S.2d 61, lv. denied11 N.Y.3d 928, 874 N.Y.S.2d 13, 902 N.E.2d 447; People v. Campbell, 54 A.D.3d 959, 960, 863 N.Y.S.2d 827, lv. denied12 N.Y.3d 756, 876 N.Y.S.2d 708, 904 N.E.2d 845). Inasmuch as we conclude that defendant was denied the fundamental right to be represented by counsel of his own choosing, reversal of the judgment of conviction on that ground would be required as a matter of law upon an appeal therefrom ( seeCPL 330.30 [1] ), and the court therefore properly set aside the verdict.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.