Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. CM027825, CM027981
ROBIE, J.
In case No. CM027825 (the drug case), defendant George Ernest Rogers III pled no contest to possessing LSD and admitted serving a prior prison term. In case No. CM027981 (the drunk driving case), defendant pled no contest to driving with a blood alcohol content over .08 percent causing great bodily injury and to leaving the scene of an accident. He admitted two enhancements attached to each of these counts, one for committing the offenses while released from custody (the on-bail enhancement) and one for serving a prior prison term.
The court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of eight years four months in prison for both cases and imposed a $200 restitution fine and a $200 parole revocation fine in each case. Specifically, the court sentenced him to three years for driving under the influence, two years for the on-bail enhancement, one year for the prior prison term enhancement, eight months for leaving the scene of an accident, and stayed terms for the on-bail enhancement and prior prison term enhancement attached to this count. The court sentenced him to eight months for possessing LSD plus one year for the prior prison term enhancement.
On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in: (1) imposing a stayed sentence on the second on-bail enhancement attached to his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident; (2) imposing a stayed sentence on the second prior prison term enhancement attached to his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident; and (3) imposing two restitution fines and two parole revocation fines. We agree with defendant’s first two contentions only and modify the judgment accordingly.
DISCUSSION
I The Second On-Bail Enhancement Must Be Stricken
An on-bail enhancement generally can be imposed only once in a given case because it relates to the nature of the offender rather than the nature of the crimes charged. (People v. Augborne (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 362, 375-377; cf. People v. Warinner (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1352, 1356 [two enhancements may be imposed when defendant was on bail in two different cases].) We therefore strike the stayed on-bail enhancement attached to defendant’s conviction for leaving the scene of an accident.
II The Stayed Prior Prison Term Enhancement Must Be Stricken
Just like the on-bail enhancement, a prior prison term enhancement relates to the nature of the offender rather than the nature of the crimes charged and therefore may be imposed only once per case in arriving at the aggregate sentence. (People v. Augborne, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 377.) We therefore strike the stayed prior prison term enhancement attached to defendant’s conviction for leaving the scene of an accident.
III Two Restitution Fines And Parole Revocation Fines Were Proper
Defendant contends the court erred in imposing a separate $200 restitution fine and $200 parole revocation fine in each case “because the cases were sentenced together.” He is mistaken.
“In every case where a person is convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate and additional restitution fine . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b), italics added.) “In every case where a person is convicted of a crime and whose sentence includes a period of parole, the court shall at the time of imposing the restitution fine pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4, assess an additional parole revocation restitution fine in the same amount as that imposed pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4.” (§ 1202.45, italics added.)
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
In People v. Ferris (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1272 (Ferris), the court found that the phrase “‘every case’” in these statutes was “ambiguous” in the context of separately charged but jointly tried and sentenced cases where the trial court imposed the statutory maximum $10,000 restitution fine and identical parole revocation fine for each case. (Ferris, at p. 1277.) The Ferris court adopted “the statutory construction that [wa]s favorable to [the defendant],” interpreted the phrase to apply to “a jointly tried case although it involve[d] charges in separately filed informations,” and modified the judgment to include only one $10,000 restitution fine and one $10,000 parole revocation fine. (Ferris, at pp. 1277-1278.)
In People v. Enos (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1048 (Enos), the court distinguished Ferris where the trial court in a “single sentencing hearing” imposed restitution fines of $600 in one case and $200 each in two other separate cases that “ended with a comprehensive plea agreement” in the three cases. (Enos, at p. 1048.) Unlike Ferris, “there was never a motion to join or consolidate the three cases,” and the cases “were not tried together.” (Enos, at p. 1049.) Most importantly, the aggregate restitution fines and parole revocation fines did not exceed the $10,000 statutory maximum. (Enos, at p. 1049.) “[T]he Ferris court’s primary concern was not with the trial court’s imposition of more than one section 1202.4, subdivision (b) restitution fine and more than one suspended section 1202.45 parole revocation fine but rather with the resulting total of the fines that exceeded the $10,000 statutory limit.” (Enos, at p. 1049.) Since the trial court in Enos imposed an aggregate amount in restitution fines that was well below the statutory maximum and the “total fine would be the same, whether imposed in the aggregate or portioned and separately imposed in each case, there [was not] any prejudice to appellant.” (Enos, at pp. 1049-1050.)
In People v. Schoeb (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 861, (Schoeb), this court agreed with the reasoning in Enos that “the imposition of multiple restitution fines spread over several cases that cumulatively did not exceed the $10,000 statutory maximum could never constitute prejudicial error.” (Schoeb, at pp. 864-865.) We repeated with approval language from Enos that “‘[t]here is nothing in section 1202.4, subdivision (b) . . . that prohibits multiple section 1202.4, subdivision (b) restitution fines . . . in consolidated cases disposed of at a single sentencing hearing.’” (Schoeb, at p. 865.) And we concluded that where the total restitution fine of $2,600 imposed did not exceed the $10,000 limit imposed by the statute, there was no error. (Schoeb, at p. 865.)
We find Schoeb and Enos persuasive. The cases here were not consolidated, the total restitution fines did not exceed the $10,000 limit, and there is nothing in the record to support defendant’s speculative claim that the trial court “may have desired to impose the lowest statutorily permitted” amount had it “understood that it could impose only one set of fines under Ferris.” In short, there was no error in the imposition of multiple restitution fines.
DISPOSITION
The judgment in case No. CM027981 (the drunk driving case) is modified to strike the stayed on-bail enhancement (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)) and the stayed prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). As modified, the judgment in case No. CM027981 and case No. CM027825 are affirmed. The trial court shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P.J. MORRISON, J.