Opinion
2011-12-23
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles ROGERS, Defendant–Appellant.
Robert M. Pusateri, Conflict Defender, Lockport (Edward P. Perlman of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Michael J. Violante, District Attorney, Lockport (Thomas H. Brandt of Counsel), for Respondent.
Robert M. Pusateri, Conflict Defender, Lockport (Edward P. Perlman of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Michael J. Violante, District Attorney, Lockport (Thomas H. Brandt of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, GREEN, GORSKI, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Defendant appeals from a resentence imposed upon remittal of this matter to County Court. On defendant's first appeal in this matter, we reversed the judgment convicting him after a jury trial of murder in the second degree ( Penal Law § 125.25[3] ) and robbery in the first degree (§ 160.15[1] ), and we granted him a new trial on the counts of the indictment charging him with those crimes ( People v. Rogers, 16 A.D.3d 1101, 790 N.Y.S.2d 914). On appeal from the judgment convicting defendant of robbery in the first degree following the retrial, we vacated the sentence on the ground that it was presumptively vindictive, and we remitted the matter to County Court for resentencing ( People v. Rogers, 56 A.D.3d 1173, 867 N.Y.S.2d 812, lv. denied 12 N.Y.3d 787, 879 N.Y.S.2d 64, 906 N.E.2d 1098). Upon remittal, the court resentenced defendant to a determinate term of imprisonment of 20 years and to five years of postrelease supervision.
Contrary to defendant's contention, the resentence is not vindictive. As we stated in our decision with respect to defendant's second appeal in this matter, “ ‘[t]he threshold issue in evaluating whether a resentence is vindictive is whether the resentence is more severe than that originally imposed’ ” ( id. at 1174, 867 N.Y.S.2d 812; see generally People v. Young, 94 N.Y.2d 171, 176–177, 701 N.Y.S.2d 309, 723 N.E.2d 58, rearg. denied 94 N.Y.2d 876, 705 N.Y.S.2d 7, 726 N.E.2d 484; People v. Van Pelt, 76 N.Y.2d 156, 159–161, 556 N.Y.S.2d 984, 556 N.E.2d 423). Here, defendant's resentence is identical to the sentence originally imposed, and thus the presumption of vindictiveness does not arise.
We reject the further contention of defendant that the court erred in resentencing him without ordering an updated presentence report. “[T]he decision whether to obtain an updated [presentence] report at resentencing is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the sentencing [court]” ( People v. Kuey, 83 N.Y.2d 278, 282, 609 N.Y.S.2d 568, 631 N.E.2d 574). Here, the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order an updated report inasmuch as defendant had been incarcerated since the original sentence was imposed ( see People v. Brinson, 298 A.D.2d 870, 747 N.Y.S.2d 829, lv. denied 99 N.Y.2d 533, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594, 782 N.E.2d 572), and defendant presented favorable information concerning his behavior while incarcerated. Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
It is hereby ORDERED that the resentence so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.