Opinion
Argued June 9, 1976
Decided July 6, 1976
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department, MAX E. COOPER, J.
Harvey L. Greenberg for appellant.
Eugene Gold, District Attorney (Alan D. Rubinstein of counsel), for respondent.
MEMORANDUM. Order of the Appellate Division affirmed.
The identity, description and address of the civilian who was with the undercover police officer when defendant first sold the narcotics was disclosed before trial in the People's bill of particulars. The civilian was not a confidential or co-operating informant but was himself a police suspect. Thus, the People were under no obligation to produce him at trial.
Defendant's remarks made in the course of the criminal transaction were not historical narrative; they were instead part of the corpus delicti. Hence, they need not have been disclosed in the bill of particulars (CPL 200.90, subd 3).
Since no order of mistrial had been entered and the jury had not been discharged, the trial court's purported declaration of a mistrial obviously was a statement of intention rather than a completed act, despite its declarative form. It was rescinded almost immediately. Hence, there is no basis for the assertion of double jeopardy.
Defendant was not entitled to preinterrogation warnings before being asked pedigree information in an interview in connection with his possible release on his own recognizance (cf. People v Rivera, 26 N.Y.2d 304, 309). In any event, even if the taking of the information without first having given the warnings violated defendant's constitutional rights, its use to impeach defendant's credibility on cross-examination was permissible (People v Harris, 25 N.Y.2d 175, 177, affd 401 U.S. 222; People v Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 323).
Chief Judge BREITEL and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES, WACHTLER, FUCHSBERG and COOKE concur.
Order affirmed in a memorandum.