Opinion
March 8, 1999
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lewis, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
In order to sustain convictions for criminal sale and criminal possession of a controlled substance based upon accessorial liability, the evidence presented must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the mental culpability necessary to commit the crimes charged, i.e., he knew that the substance in question was a controlled substance, and that, in furtherance thereof, he solicited, requested, commanded, importuned or intentionally aided his codefendant in the commission of the crimes ( see, People v. Kaplan, 76 N.Y.2d 140; People v. Coulter, 240 A.D.2d 756; Penal Law § 20.00, 220.39 Penal [1]; § 220.16 [1]; § 220.03). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the People ( see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish that the defendant intentionally aided his codefendant in the sale and possession of heroin ( see, People v. Wylie, 180 A.D.2d 774). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant's further contention that reversible error occurred by reason of the prosecutor's remarks during summation is unpreserved for appellate review ( see, CPL 470.05; People v. Coker, 135 A.D.2d 723). In any event, the prosecutor's statements did not exceed the broad bounds of rhetorical comment permissible in closing arguments ( see, People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396). The prosecutor's statements were either reasonably inferable from the evidence ( see, People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105) or fair responses to arguments raised by defense counsel during summation ( see, People v. Rivera, 158 A.D.2d 723).
S. Miller, J. P., Ritter, Florio and Luciano, JJ., concur.