Opinion
165
February 13, 2003.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Ira Globerman, J.), rendered July 13, 1998, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the first degree, two counts of murder in the second degree (felony and intentional murder) and robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him to concurrent terms of life without the possibility of parole, 25 years to life (two terms) and 12½ to 25 years, respectively, unanimously affirmed.
Peter D. Coddington, for Respondent.
David J. Klem, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Tom, J.P., Sullivan, Ellerin, Marlow, Gonzalez, JJ.
We reject defendant's challenges to the legal sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence supporting his convictions for first-degree murder, second-degree felony murder and first-degree robbery. There was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion that defendant killed the decedent in furtherance of a robbery, based on the trial evidence as viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Williams, 84 N.Y.2d 925;see also People v. Norman, 85 N.Y.2d 609, 620-621). The evidence permitted the jury to reasonably infer that defendant killed the victim in the course of a robbery wherein he forced her to divulge her PIN number, which he used to withdraw money from her bank account.
The court properly denied defendant's challenge for cause to a prospective juror whose stepson had been robbed and assaulted at a bank ATM four years earlier. The totality of the colloquy, including the prospective juror's unequivocal responses to the court's thorough clarifying questions, did not cast any doubt on his ability to reach an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence (see People v. Chambers, 97 N.Y.2d 417, 419).
Defendant failed to preserve any of his present arguments in support of his claim that the hearing court should have suppressed a belt and money, and a wallet containing the victim's identification, which were recovered in the motel room in which defendant was arrested (see People v. Turriago, 90 N.Y.2d 77, 82; People v. Tutt, 38 N.Y.2d 1011; CPL 470.05; see also People v. Hines, 289 A.D.2d 40, lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 755), and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would find that any error in the admission of the belt and money at trial was harmless because these items added nothing to the People's case (see People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230), and that the wallet was properly searched incident to defendant's lawful arrest as it was within defendant's "grabbable area" and might have contained a small, easily concealable weapon, such as a razor blade like the one found in the bathroom (see People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 454, 455-456; People v. Wylie, 244 A.D.2d 247, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 946; People v. Johnson, 86 A.D.2d 165, 167-168, affd 59 N.Y.2d 1014).
The court properly denied defendant's request to submit manslaughter in the first degree to the jury as a lesser included offense of intentional murder. Given the nature of the injuries, there is no reasonable view of the evidence that defendant intended to cause serious physical injury but not death (see People v. Butler, 84 N.Y.2d 627, 634).
The record does not support defendant's assertion that the sentencing court misunderstood its range of discretion in imposing sentence.
Defendant's remaining arguments, including his challenges to the constitutionality of the first-degree murder statute and its sentencing scheme, all require preservation (see People v. Graham, 93 N.Y.2d 934;People v. Ianelli, 69 N.Y.2d 684, cert denied 482 U.S. 914, compare People v. Mower, 97 N.Y.2d 239, 244), and we decline to review these unpreserved claims in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would note that some of defendant's arguments have been rejected by the Court of Appeals (see People v Harris, 98 N.Y.2d 452, 475-477), and would find all of them to be unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.