Opinion
H025085.
10-31-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LARRY LEE RODGERS, Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Larry Lee Rodgers was charged by information with felony hit and run resulting in injury (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a) - count 1), and misdemeanor driving with a suspended or revoked license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a) - count 2). The information further alleged that defendant had served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant waived his right to a jury trial. The trial court found defendant guilty of both counts, and found the prior allegation to be true. Defendant was sentenced to three years in state prison, with 450 days of custody credits.
Defendants sole contention on appeal is that the evidence [* 2] is insufficient to support his conviction of hit and run causing injury. We disagree, and therefore affirm.
FACTS
Tommy E. was six years old at the time of defendants July 2002 trial. Tommy testified that he was riding a friends bicycle the year before when he saw a red car coming and then got hit by the car. He did not see anybody get out of the car, and he did not recognize defendant at trial. Friends helped him. As a result of the accident, at the time of the trial Tommy had an indentation and a bruise mark on his left leg.
Angel Rodriguez was in the garage of his home at 2556 Amaryl Drive on November 4, 2001, around 2 p.m., when he heard the sound of a car hitting something. He ran out and saw a child lying in the street. Defendant got out of his car and asked Rodriguez if the child was okay. When Rodriguez responded that he did not think so, defendant said, "Okay, Ill be back." Defendant then left. Defendant did not ask Rodriguez to call 911 or to help the child, and Rodriguez did not tell defendant that he would. Rodriguez saw defendant walking back to the scene approximately 20 minutes later, after the paramedics and police had arrived.
On November 4, 2001, Shannon Sanchez called 911 around 2 p.m. and reported that a boy had just been hit by a car in front of her home at 2559 Amaryl Drive. She had been leaving her home with friends when she heard a sound like that caused by two cars colliding. She ran outside and saw a pink bike flying in the air. She then saw a boy lying face down in the street. A red Eclipse stopped, defendant got out of the drivers side, and said, "He came out of nowhere." Sanchez did not see anybody else in defendants car. Sanchez approached the boy. Defendant did not ask her to call 911 and she did not see defendant attend to the boys injuries. She screamed to a friend that she was going to call 911. When she went back inside to call 911, defendant was still at the scene.
The 911 dispatcher asked Sanchez if the car was still there. As Sanchez was walking back outside to check, her friend told her that the driver had driven off. She told the dispatcher that the car had driven away, and that it was a red Eclipse. She also described the driver as an African-American male, in his 20s, with a medium build, a black hat, a red shirt, and black pants. About ten minutes later, Sanchez saw defendant return by himself on foot. By that time, the police, ambulance, and firefighters had already arrived. She did not hear defendant say anything. A few minutes later, defendants girlfriend arrived and Sanchez heard her say that she had been driving the car.
San Jose police officer Steve Wilson was dispatched to a call on Amaryl Drive around 2 p.m. on November 4, 2001. He arrived at approximately the same time as Officer Gonzales. The fire department and paramedics were already there and were assisting the victim. Wilson saw defendant walk up to the scene. He did not see defendant try to render aid to the victim or try to give his license or insurance information to anyone.
San Jose police officer William Enos went to Amaryl Drive around 2 p.m. on November 4, 2001. Defendant was in the back of Officer Gonzaless patrol car when Enos arrived. Defendant told Enos that he was with his girlfriend, who was driving, when she hit the child on the bicycle. She panicked. He crawled over her, out the drivers side door, and approached the child. After looking down at him, he got back in the drivers seat of the car; his girlfriend had moved over to the passenger seat. He then left the scene and went to his girlfriends [* 5] house to call 911.
Enos then spoke to defendants girlfriend, Bithiah Dunning. Dunning told Enos that defendant had taken the car. When he returned a few minutes later he told her that he had hit a child on the next street over. Dunning said that she was not in the car at the time. Enos took defendant into custody.
Wilson found the car involved at Dunnings house at 2545 Amaryl Court, which is at the corner of Amaryl Drive and Amaryl Court. He had the car towed. There was damage to the left front of the car, and the drivers windshield was shattered. The victim had black hair and Wilson noticed black hair in the windshield.
Nyssa Dunning lives at 2545 Amaryl Court with Bithiah Dunning and defendant. At approximately 2 p.m., on November 4, 2001, Nyssa heard defendant enter the house. When she saw him he looked upset and shocked. After defendant and Bithiah left the house Nyssa called 911 and said that a little boy had been hit around the corner by a red car. Nyssa followed defendant and Bithiah to the accident scene. An ambulance and fire truck were there, but not the police. Nyssa was present when Bithiah was interviewed by the police. At the time, defendant was already in a police car.
Bithiah Dunning and defendant were married six months before defendants trial. Bithiah testified that defendant came home around 2 p.m. on November 4, 2001. Defendant looked scared and in shock. The front windshield of her red Eclipse was totally shattered so that one could not see through it. After defendant talked to Nyssa, defendant and Bithiah walked back to the scene of the accident. Bithiah could hear sirens but no enforcement agencies had arrived yet. When Bithiah later talked to the police she told them that she was driving the car. The police then separated her from defendant and put him in a police car. When police questioned her again she said that she was not driving the car.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He admitted being in an accident on November 4, 2001, and hitting a boy on a bicycle. He was on his way to work. After the accident, he jumped out of the car. When he saw blood he told Angel Rodriguez that it was an accident and that he was going to come back, because he did not have his wallet or a cell phone. He did not tell Rodriguez his name. He did not ask Rodriguez to call 911 and Rodriguez did not offer to make the call for him. Defendant [* 7] jumped back in the car and drove it in reverse all the way back to his house, which was approximately one-half mile away. When he got home he grabbed his wallet and told Bithiah and Nyssa that he had hit a little boy and that he had seen blood. He asked somebody to call the police so that he could go back to the scene. He ran back to the scene; he could not drive the car because the front windshield was shattered. Bithiah followed him. The ambulance, fire engines, and police all arrived after he did. At first he told the police that he was not driving the car at the time of the accident because he was afraid. He admitted that he had been the driver when the officer came back after talking to Bithiah. At the time, he did not have a valid drivers license and had a prior conviction for driving on a suspended license. He was also on parole for possession for sale of cocaine, and did not want to go back to prison.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for hit and run in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001. He argues that because he did not leave the child alone, and he immediately summoned aid, there was insufficient evidence that he failed to render the reasonable assistance referred to in the statue. The People argue that the trial court could infer from the evidence that defendant failed to render reasonable assistance to the child and failed to perform other duties required by the statute.
Whenever the sufficiency of the evidence is raised on appeal, "the trial courts findings on such matters, whether express or implied, must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence." (People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160, 107 Cal. Rptr. 13, 507 P.2d 621.) In determining the presence of substantial evidence, the appellate court " must view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citations.]" (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-577, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) "Evidence, to be substantial must be of ponderable legal significance . . . reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 576.)
"In reviewing the evidence on appeal, the applicable test is not whether guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the trier of fact. [Citations.] The reviewing court does not perform the function of reweighing the evidence; instead, the court must draw all inferences in support of the verdict that can reasonably be deduced from the evidence. [Citation.]" (People v. Culver (1973) 10 Cal.3d 542, 548, 111 Cal. Rptr. 183, 516 P.2d 887.)
Vehicle Code section 20001 provides in relevant part: "(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to any person, other than himself or herself, . . . shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and shall fulfill the requirements of Sections 20003 and 20004." Sections 20003 and 20004 require that the driver stop at the scene of the accident and provide specified information (such as the drivers name and current address), as well as render reasonable assistance to injured persons. (See CALJIC No. 12.70.)
The gravamen of a section 20001 offense is not the initial injury of the victim, but leaving the scene without presenting identification or rendering aid. (People v. Escobar (1991) 235 Cal. App. 3d 1504, 1509 (Escobar); People v. Jiminez (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1626, overruled on another ground in People v. Kobrin (1995) 11 Cal.4th 416, 419, 903 P.2d 1027.) " The legislative purpose of sections 20001 and 20003 is to prevent the driver of a vehicle involved in an injury-causing accident from leaving injured persons in distress and danger for want of medical care and from attempting to avoid possible civil or criminal liability for the accident by failing to identify oneself." (Escobar, supra, 235 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1510.)
In People v. Limon (1967) 252 Cal. App. 2d 575, 60 Cal. Rptr. 448, the defendant testified that he left the scene of the accident when he saw a witness giving attention to the victim, and that he went back to the bar he had previously been at in order to telephone the police. Officers found defendant about 35 minutes after they arrived, walking back in the direction of the accident. The defendant was convicted of violating Vehicle Code section 20001, and did not challenge on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. (Id . at p. 577.) Instead, his principal attack on the conviction was the refusal of the trial court to give his requested instruction: " You are further instructed that a defendant is not required to render assistance to other individuals where such individuals are being adequately cared [for] by others. " (Id. at pp. 577-578.) The appellate court found that any error in refusing to give the instruction was not prejudicial. (Id. at p. 578.) "At least as applied to the facts in the case before us, [the requested instruction] would have been inadequate in this respect: it fails to mention what we regard to be a continuing and overriding duty of the driver to see to it that the victim is cared for until arrangements for his medical or surgical treatment are made. The instruction, as offered, might be construed by the jury to exculpate the driver if adequate first aid were administered by someone else, and nothing more were done. This, we hold, is not the intent of the law. [P] Of course, the reasonable assistance referred to in the statute might be the summoning of aid. In some cases, it would be much better for the driver to call for assistance than to attempt immediate ministrations to the injured person. In the case before us, we can hardly believe that the jury would have convicted Limon for not intruding himself on the assistance that was being given by [another]." (Id . at p. 579.) The court also noted that, "Omission to perform any one of the acts required by section 20001 of the Vehicle Code constitutes the offense. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 578.) "Although [the defendant] did, of course, give his name when he was encountered by the police, his departure without having provided it to the victim could be regarded as having completed the offense. [Citation.]" (Ibid.)
In People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, the defendant drove away from the scene of an accident that left the driver in the other car injured and the passenger unconscious and bleeding. (Id. at p. 1015.) At trial the defendant presented an unconsciousness defense; he denied recalling the accident or his flight. (Id. at p. 1016.) On appeal the defendant contended in part that the trial court committed instructional error by giving CALJIC No. 12.70 ("Felony Hit and Run") instead of instructing the jury that the defendant had no duty to assist the victims because others were already providing aid. The appellate court found no error. (Id. at p. 1026.) "We hold the drivers duty to render necessary assistance under Vehicle Code section 20003, at a minimum, requires that the driver first ascertain what assistance, if any, the injured person needs, and then the driver must make a reasonable effort to see that such assistance is provided, whether through himself or third parties. [Citation.] [P] . . . The mere presence of bystanders who arguably gathered to aid the victims does not guarantee that the injured person will receive all necessary aid. . . . [P] . . . The fortuitous fulfillment of the drivers duty to render reasonable assistance to the injured victim or victims by Good Samaritans cannot operate to exonerate the driver and nullify the fact such duty was breached by the driver. To reach a contrary conclusion would impermissibly immunize the driver from the penal consequences of such breach and encourage scofflaws to violate both the letter and spirit of the law." (Id. at p. 1028-1029.)
In this case defendant stopped at the scene of the accident, and asked a bystander if the child-victim was okay. However, he then left the scene of the accident without giving his name or address to anyone, or making any effort to determine what medical assistance was needed by the victim or whether it was being provided. Although defendant told the bystander that he would return, nobody at the scene had identifying information that authorities could use to find defendant if he did not return (other than information about the red Eclipse). And, when defendant did return to the scene, he initially denied to authorities that he was the driver involved in the accident. On this record, the trial court could reasonably find that defendant breached both his duty to give identifying information and his duty to render reasonable assistance before leaving the scene of the accident. Substantial evidence supports defendants conviction for violating Vehicle Code section 20001.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Rushing, P. J. and Wunderlich, J.