Opinion
14860 Ind. No. 578/17 Case No. 2018–04013
12-14-2021
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Dayquan ROBERTSON, Defendant–Appellant.
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Ben A. Schatz of counsel), for appellant. Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Shera Knight of counsel), for respondent.
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Ben A. Schatz of counsel), for appellant.
Darcel D. Clark, District Attorney, Bronx (Shera Knight of counsel), for respondent.
Gische, J.P., Webber, Oing, Singh, Higgitt, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Martin Marcus, J.), rendered November 13, 2018, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of strangulation in the second degree and assault in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to concurrent terms of seven years, unanimously affirmed.
The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ). There is no basis to disturb the jury's credibility determinations. The victim's testimony was corroborated by physical evidence and the testimony of other witnesses. The contradictions in the proof cited by defendant were minor or could be easily explained by the expert testimony regarding the behavior of domestic violence victims. There was no evidence to support a claim that the victim falsely blamed defendant for injuries inflicted on her by some unidentified person.
The court providently exercised its discretion in allowing evidence of two prior assaults by defendant on the victim. This evidence was admissible to provide necessary background information regarding the nature of the couple's relationship, which was directly relevant to establish defendant's motive and intent (see People v. Dorm, 12 N.Y.3d 16, 19, 874 N.Y.S.2d 866, 903 N.E.2d 263 [2009] ; People v. Ebanks, 60 A.D.3d 462, 874 N.Y.S.2d 111 [1st Dept. 2009], lv denied 12 N.Y.3d 924, 884 N.Y.S.2d 706, 912 N.E.2d 1087 [2009] ). The probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, which, in any event, was mitigated by the court's limiting instructions (see id. at 462, 874 N.Y.S.2d 111 ).
The court also providently exercised its discretion in allowing expert testimony on the dynamics of domestic violence. Such testimony was necessary to aid the jury in evaluating the behavior of the victim after the assault (see People v. Turner, 143 A.D.3d 582, 583, 40 N.Y.S.3d 369 [1st Dept. 2016] ; People v. Jackson, 133 A.D.3d 474, 475–476, 20 N.Y.S.3d 352 [1st Dept. 2015], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 1146, 32 N.Y.S.3d 60, 51 N.E.3d 571 [2016] ). Contrary to defendant's contention, the expert testimony did not unfairly prejudice defendant by furthering any propensity inferences against him. The expert testified only in general terms about the subject, without expressing any opinions on the facts of this case. Further, any prejudice was mitigated by the court's limiting instructions.
We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence or directing that it run concurrently with defendant's sentence on an unrelated conviction.