Opinion
February 19, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrus, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's claim that the evidence seized from his mother's apartment should have been suppressed is meritless. The warrantless police entry into the apartment was justified under the emergency doctrine (see, People v Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177-178, cert denied 426 U.S. 953). The record reveals that the police responded to a radio call concerning a "barricaded perpetrator" at 211 Irvine Avenue. From the fire escape outside the kitchen window of that address, one of the officers observed the victim lying on the floor, bleeding profusely but still alive. The defendant was stabbing the victim. Based upon all of the information available to them, the police had reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency situation existed at that location and that there was an immediate need for assistance in order to save a life. The primary motivation in entering the apartment was clearly not to effect an arrest or to seize evidence.
Under the circumstances, the hearing court's refusal to suppress the fork seized in the course of disarming the defendant was proper. The other two forks, which were seized from the floor of the crime scene in plain view, were also admissible.
Furthermore, the defendant's claim that the police lacked probable cause to enter the apartment, since the officer transmitting the information justifying the entry did not testify at the suppression hearing, is also meritless. Where an officer relies upon information from another police officer who had personal knowledge of an offense, the testimony of the former is sufficient to justify a warrantless entry (see, People v Petralia, 62 N.Y.2d 47, cert denied 469 U.S. 852; People v Colvin, 144 A.D.2d 960). In the present case, the transmitting officer had personal knowledge of the victim's injuries since he was on the fire escape and saw that she was bleeding profusely.
Notwithstanding the defendant's claim of intoxication, the jury could still find that he was capable of and did form the requisite intent to be found guilty of assault in the first degree (see, People v Robinson, 161 A.D.2d 676). Thompson, J.P., Kunzeman, Lawrence and Miller, JJ., concur.