Opinion
F071220
05-03-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDDIE DAVID RIVAS, Defendant and Appellant.
Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna and Ian Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Kern Super. Ct. No. BF156009A)
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John W. Lua, Judge. Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna and Ian Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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BACKGROUND
Defendant Eddie David Rivas was charged with the willful and deliberate murder of Mia Ramirez (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1); resisting an executive officer by force (§ 69; count 2); and misdemeanor battery (§ 243, subd. (a); count 3). The information also alleged defendant had suffered two prior serious felony and strike convictions: attempted carjacking and assault on a peace officer.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
The jury found defendant not guilty of first degree murder, but convicted him of second degree murder, resisting an executive officer, and misdemeanor battery. The court dismissed the allegations concerning the prior attempted carjacking conviction, and found true the allegations concerning the prior assault on a peace officer conviction.
The court sentenced defendant as follows: 30 years to life for count 1, plus five years for the prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)); plus a consecutive six-year term for count 2; and a concurrent 180-day term for count 3. The court also imposed various fines and fees.
FACTS
Discovery of the Body
Defendant's mother, Clara Rivas, and her boyfriend Alejandro Sanchez lived together in Clara's home. Before June 2013, defendant lived off and on with them.
We use Clara Rivas's first name to distinguish her from defendant.
In addition to the main residence, Clara's property housed a detached structure. The structure contained a garage and a separate room with a washer and dryer.
On June 11, Clara went to the detached structure to get clothes out of the dryer. When Clara got to the dryer, she smelled an odor like "a rat, when something is dead." She told Sanchez that there was a "foul smell and that there was maybe a rat or there was a dead mouse in there." Sanchez came to help. Sanchez found a piece of carpet with blood on it in the garage. Sanchez began to clean the carpet. As Sanchez was unrolling the carpet, he saw a yellow cord inside. Sanchez pulled on the cord and "saw feet come out." Sanchez knew it was a body because he could see black shoes and black shorts. Sanchez saw a bra near the head of the body. He told Clara to call the police.
Law enforcement personnel unrolled the carpet, exposing human remains. The remains were "heavily bound with rope, wire, cords." The body was "decomposed," and its "face and upper torso [were] unrecognizable." Law enforcement personnel could not immediately determine the gender but assumed it was a female based on the clothing. Eventually, fingerprint records showed the body was that of 18-year-old Mia Ramirez.
Other Items in the Garage
A prescription bottle and a "personal document" each with defendant's name were found in the garage. A dresser with defendant's clothes was also located in the garage. However, Clara testified that the clothes did not fit him anymore.
Events Leading up to Discovery of the Body
Several months before the body was discovered, defendant and Sanchez had been given a nonworking truck in exchange for cutting down a tree. Defendant and Sanchez were working on "fixing it up." The truck was normally kept in the garage.
Two days before the body was discovered, Clara and Sanchez left in the morning to go to church. Clara testified that when they left, the truck was in the garage, and when they returned later that day, the truck was outside of the garage. Sanchez, however, testified that when they returned from church, defendant was sitting on the tailgate of the truck, which was inside the garage. Sanchez took a nap, and when he awoke, the truck was outside the garage.
The day before the body was discovered, someone named "Scooby" or "Carlos" came to the house looking for defendant. Carlos and defendant went into the garage. Sanchez could not recall whether they were inside for five or 10 minutes.
Sanchez testified that the door to the garage could be pushed open even with the deadbolt engaged.
At around 8:30 in the morning on the day the body would later be discovered, Sanchez and defendant were fixing bicycles. Defendant peeked in the garage, then returned to Sanchez. A white car that "seemed like a police car" drove by. Defendant left "through the back" and jumped a fence to a neighbor's property.
At some point prior to leaving, defendant lifted his shirt about halfway up his chest exposing a plastic handle. The handle looked "[s]omething like" a knife handle.
The neighbor, Kathy Black, saw defendant jump the fence and asked him what he was doing in her yard. Defendant replied, "[S]hh." He then went through her yard and jumped a six-foot fence into another yard that belonged to Black's daughter. A dog came there and either bit defendant or tried to "grab" his back. Black saw a black handle on his pants, "a weapon of some sort." The item fell out of defendant's pants when the dog grabbed him. Black then lost sight of defendant as he proceeded into other yards. The dog retrieved the item that had fallen from defendant, which turned out to be a knife. Black dropped the knife into a plant "just in case something was needed of it."
Law Enforcement Interviews of Clara and Sanchez
After law enforcement discovered the body in Clara's garage and secured the scene, they spoke with Clara and Sanchez. Clara said she saw defendant in the garage with blood on his hands two days before the body was found. He appeared nervous and Clara asked what was wrong. Defendant put his hands behind his back and said nothing was wrong.
Sanchez told law enforcement he saw a blood-stained piece of carpet in the garage two days before the body was discovered, but "didn't think much of it" because Clara told him defendant had a cut on his hand. That same day, Sanchez saw defendant push his truck out of the garage at 3:00 p.m.
The testimony does not specify "a.m." or "p.m.," but both parties agree the testimony was referring to p.m.
Convenience Store Incident - June 8
Surveillance video showed defendant with Mia Ramirez in a convenience store on June 8. The surveillance video showed Ramirez in the same clothing found with her body days later.
Cecilia Diaz testified that she was at the convenience store with a friend while defendant and Ramirez were there. While at the convenience store, defendant asked Diaz's friend for her phone number. Outside the store, defendant walked behind the woman continuing to ask for her number, but she did not want to give it to him. At one point defendant "ha[d] her by the arm" and "demand[ed] her to give him her number." Ramirez was standing behind defendant with her arms crossed, staring at Diaz and her friend. Defendant handed Diaz's friend his phone and told her to put her phone number in it. Diaz's friend said she obliged because that was "the only way he was going to let her go." As soon as he let her go, Diaz and her friend ran away.
Defendant's Arrest and Interrogation
Defendant was taken into custody the day the body was found. Defendant's clothes were seized, including his shoes. Later tests showed that stains on the toe, heel and outside of the right shoe were positive for blood. DNA analysis showed the blood belonged to the victim, Ramirez.
During his interrogation, defendant denied knowing what had happened to the woman whose body was found. Defendant was asked when he was last in the garage and he replied, "Um, like a week ago probably, I don't know."
At one point in the interrogation, Commander Davis offered to remove defendant's handcuffs. Defendant began to swing wildly with his head down. He landed blows on the left side of Detective Colbert. Defendant was then transported to central receiving where he assaulted another inmate, Billy Richards, by kicking him in the chest.
Autopsy
Eugene Carpenter, Jr., M.D., performed the autopsy on the victim, Mia Ramirez. Ramirez had defensive wounds to her right wrist and right forearm. The cause of death was "at least" eight stab wounds to the right side of the throat. Ramirez also sustained a stab wound to her liver three inches deep. She sustained two other stab wounds to the abdominal area. Ramirez's wounds were "consistent with a knife of [the] size and type" of the knife found by defendant's neighbor's dog.
Dr. Carpenter testified concerning the estimated time of death. He said, "[T]he statistical general ballpark idea is this is a pretty fresh body, somewhere between 36 and 48 hours, just to get us started, because the internal organs seem quite fresh." The type of decomposition shown in the victim's body "doesn't start till about 36 to 48 hours." Dr. Carpenter qualified that the estimate was made "with the assumption that the body is under some ideal conditions" and explained that there is "a lot of variation with individual bodies."
Ramirez's body was "mutilated in a very symmetrical style," which Dr. Carpenter had not seen in the approximately 10,000 cases he had handled. The skin of the victim's throat and torso had been removed. The victim's right breast was also gone. There were deep cuts into the victim's thighs. The victim's arms had been vertically cut from the shoulders all the way down the front of the arms and the skin was "filleted open." Dr. Carpenter testified that his observations "favor[ed] a lot of damage as postmortem."
DISCUSSION
I. False Statements Instruction
A. Background
Defense counsel objected to the court instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 362, which concerns a defendant's false statements and consciousness of guilt. Counsel lodged the objection without argument.
The court decided to give the instruction over defense objection as follows:
"If the defendant made a false or misleading statement before this trial relating to the charged crime knowing the statement was false or intending to mislead, that conduct may show he was aware of his guilt of the crime, and you may consider it in determining his guilt.
"If you conclude that the defendant made the statement, it is up to you to decide its meaning and importance. However, evidence that the defendant made such a statement cannot prove guilt by itself."
B. Analysis
Defendant contends the instruction on false statements effectively told the jury "it may consider the defendant's awareness of his guilt of the crime as consciousness of [his] legal guilt as to the specific offense." (Italics added.)
In People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833 (Crandell), the defendant similarly argued that the jury could take the word "guilt" in the phrase "consciousness of guilt" in CALJIC No. 2.03, to refer to "the ultimate determination of the truth or falsity of the criminal charges" (i.e., legal guilt). (Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 871, abrogated on another point by People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 364-365.) The Supreme Court concluded that any "fear that the jury might have confused the psychological and legal meanings of 'guilt' is unwarranted." (Crandell, at p. 871.) The Court concluded that reasonable jurors "would understand 'consciousness of guilt' to mean 'consciousness of some wrongdoing' rather than 'consciousness of having committed the specific offense charged.' " (Ibid.)
"CALCRIM No. 362 is the successor to CALJIC No. 2.03, which provided as follows: 'If you find that before this trial the defendant made a willfully false or deliberately misleading statement concerning the crime or crimes for which he is now being tried, you may consider that statement as a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of guilt. However, that conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, are for you to decide.' " (People v. McGowan (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1103.)
Defendant argues that Crandell is not controlling because CALCRIM No. 362, as given here, uses the phrase "aware of his guilt of the crime" rather than "consciousness of guilt" as used CALJIC No. 2.03. He contends that the "change in the language of the jury instruction about false statements and consciousness of guilt permitted the jury to draw irrational presumptions of guilt about the charged crime including Rivas'[s] mental state." But defendant does not elaborate on the irrational assumptions the jury might have drawn concerning Rivas's mental state. Indeed, evidence of false statements can raise a logical inference that a defendant had intended to kill and harbored consciousness of that fact. (See People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 142.) Defendant has not shown how CALCRIM No. 362 permits the jury to draw unwarranted inferences about his mental state from evidence of subsequent false statements.
Defendant also contends that CALCRIM No. 362 "effectively" tells the jury "that it may consider the defendant's awareness of his guilt of the crime as consciousness of their legal guilt as to the specific offense." In other words, defendant argues "CALCRIM No. 362 violates due process because it explicitly tells the jury that awareness of guilt means awareness of guilt of the specific offense charged ...." We do not agree the jury would have understood the instruction in that way. Defendant made the purportedly false statements during his interrogation, before being charged with a crime. Obviously, defendant could not be aware that he was guilty of "the specific offense charged" because he had not yet been charged with a crime. We will not assume the jury understood CALCRIM No. 362 in a nonsensical manner.
II. The Flight Instruction
A. Background
The prosecution requested a modified version of CALCRIM No. 372, which the trial court described as follows: "There has been a request to present 372 to this jury with the following modification as to the first sentence: Quote, if the defendant fled immediately before the crime was discovered, that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt. The rest of the instruction is as presented in the general jury instructions."
Defense counsel objected to the proposed instruction. In the alternative, defense counsel requested that the court instruct the jury that if "they conclude that the defendant did not flee, that that conduct may show a consciousness of innocence." Defense counsel did not request that the instruction be modified to apply only if defendant fled for the purpose of avoiding arrest or prosecution.
The court overruled the objection and ultimately instructed the jury as follows:
"If the defendant fled immediately before the crime was discovered, that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant fled, it is up to you to decide the meaning and importance of that conduct. However, evidence that the defendant fled cannot prove guilt by itself."
Defendant essentially raises two related, but distinct issues: (1) the propriety of the inference permitted by the court's instruction; and (2) whether the instruction complied with section 1127c. We will address each in turn.
B. Analysis
1. The Inference Permitted by the Court's Instruction Was Appropriate
Defendant claims the flight instruction was not warranted by the evidence. Specifically, he contends there was no evidence of an "accusation, [a] witness to a crime, or [a] police confrontation[]." But defendant does not explain why evidence of any of those things is required before a flight instruction may be given. Nor does he cite any authority indicating as much.
The court's instruction allowed the jury to infer that defendant was aware of his guilt if it concluded he "fled immediately before the crime was discovered." This is undoubtedly a reasonable inference. " 'A flight instruction is proper whenever evidence of the circumstances of [a] defendant's departure from the crime scene ... logically permits an inference that his movement was motivated by guilty knowledge.' [Citation.]" (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 522.) The Supreme Court has observed that its precedents do not "create inflexible rules about the required proximity between crime and flight." (People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 941.) "Instead, the facts of each case determine whether it is reasonable to infer that flight shows consciousness of guilt. In People v. Santo (1954) 43 Cal.2d 319 [], for example, we held that the trial court properly admitted evidence of flight occurring more than a month after the charged murder because the facts fairly supported that inference. [Citation.]" (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
The evidence here raises an inference that " 'defendant's departure from the crime scene ... logically permits an inference that his movement was motivated by guilty knowledge.' " [Citation.]" (People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 522.) Specifically, the evidence showed that after a Crown Victoria that "seemed like a police car" drove by, defendant jumped several fences into neighbors' yards; told one of the neighbors, "[S]hh"; and dropped a knife consistent with the weapon used to kill Ramirez. One reasonable inference from this evidence is that defendant took flight because he had a consciousness of guilt. This inference remains reasonable even in light of the fact that defendant was not expressly accused of a crime nor directly confronted by police.
Consequently, the instruction does not violate due process. (People v. Gamble (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 446, 454-455 [permissive inference does not shift burden of proof and violate due process unless the suggested inference is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury].)
However, the instruction's compliance with due process does not resolve whether the instruction complied with statutory requirements. We will address that issue next.
2. The Instruction Was Not "Substantially" in the Form of Section 1127c , but Any Error Was Harmless
Section 1127c provides:
"In any criminal trial or proceeding where evidence of flight of a defendant is relied upon as tending to show guilt, the court shall instruct the jury substantially as follows:
"The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime that has been committed, is not sufficient
in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, the jury may consider in deciding his guilt or innocence. The weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.
"No further instruction on the subject of flight need be given." (Italics added.)
Defendant contends that the instruction given by the trial court contained a "substantive modification" of the language governed by statute. There is some merit to this contention. The statutory language refers to evidence of flight "immediately after the commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime that has been committed." (§ 1127c.) In other words, the statutory language refers to flight that occurs after one of two specific events: commission of a crime or accusation of a crime. The modified instruction in this case, however, referred to flight before a different event: discovery of the crime. We cannot say the language of the instruction given by the trial court was "substantially" in the form of section 1127c.
However, we hold any error harmless. As we explained above, the evidence surrounding defendant's flight gave rise to a reasonable - if not strong - inference defendant harbored consciousness of guilt. The potential significance of the flight evidence was a matter of common sense, which the jury would have understood even without the flight instruction. (Cf. People v. Mason, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 941.) Consequently, we are confident that the jury would have drawn the same inferences from the flight evidence whether the flight instruction was given or not. That is, the jury's consideration of the flight evidence was not adversely affected by the instruction. Therefore, we do not find it reasonably probable that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result if his objection to the flight instruction had been sustained. In fact, if defendant's objection had been sustained, the jury would not have been told that flight evidence, by itself, was insufficient to support a conviction.
III. Defendant has not Shown Reversible Error in the Court's Ruling Concerning Defense Counsel's Ability to Argue Third Party Culpability to the Jury
A. Background
Before trial, the prosecution moved to exclude evidence of third party culpability. The prosecution acknowledged defendant could "claim that he did not commit the murder" and "that an unknown, unidentified individual committed this crime." But the prosecution opposed the defense blaming any "specific individual."
The prosecution's motion noted that a "possible second suspect was potentially identified" but the suspect "did not provide a statement to law enforcement[,] invoking his 5th Amendment rights" and "all items tested for DNA were negative for this individual."
At argument on the motion, the prosecutor identified the second "suspect" as Carlos Morales (Morales). But the prosecutor argued that the only evidence concerning Morales was that Sanchez had seen him "near or around the garage area" on Monday (the day before the body was found). The prosecutor also asserted that his best recollection was that Morales was not identified as a contributor in any DNA tests. The prosecutor argued that absent additional evidence tying Morales to the crime, there was not sufficient evidence "that would allow mention or really pointing the finger at him."
Defense counsel argued that Morales's presence near the garage on Monday was relevant. Counsel contended that the prosecution was using defendant's connection to the garage against him. Therefore, the fact that other individuals were around the garage was highly relevant.
The court asked defense counsel whether he had an offer of proof that would link Morales to the actual perpetration of the crime. Defense counsel did not cite anything beyond the fact that the body was tampered with after death.
The court ruled that witness testimony that Morales was near the area where the victim's body was ultimately found was relevant and would be admitted. Initially, the court found that based on the defense's offer of proof, "third party culpability and arguments consistent thereto are not at issue in this case. And the Court will preclude any argument of third party culpability ...." But later, when the court announced its ruling, it said, "The Court will allow that evidence [of Morales's presence near the garage] to be presented but will monitor the arguments closely based on offers of proof and what transpires in the presentation of evidence to determine whether third party culpability arguments can be presented to the jury." (Italics added.) The court then asked defense counsel whether he had any comments or questions. Defense counsel responded:
"No, Your Honor. Not at this time. I think if there's any issue, obviously, but in a case like this and discussing what the argument is ultimately going to entail, certain things may be premature before we have heard the evidence, so I think given that consideration - and I know the primary concern was involving that one gentleman Carlos Morales. I'd submit."
Defense counsel did not argue that Morales was responsible for Ramirez's death at closing argument.
B. Analysis
1. The Court Reserved the Issue of Whether Defense Counsel Could Argue Third Party Culpability in Closing Argument
Defendant contends the court improperly prevented counsel from arguing Morales was responsible for Ramirez's death. We disagree with defendant's characterization of the court's ruling. The court expressly permitted testimony that Morales had been seen near the garage on Monday and otherwise excluded evidence of third party culpability. But the court reserved ruling on whether defense counsel could argue third party culpability in closing. Though the court initially indicated it would not permit argument of third party culpability, it ultimately ruled: "The Court will allow that evidence [of Morales's presence near the garage] to be presented but will monitor the arguments closely based on offers of proof and what transpires in the presentation of evidence to determine whether third party culpability arguments can be presented to the jury." (Italics added.) Defense counsel's comments after the court's ruling indicate he understood that the issue was being reserved pending the presentation of evidence.
While the court reserved its determination as to whether third party culpability arguments could be presented to the jury until after "the presentation of evidence," nothing in the record indicates defense counsel actually sought to present a third party culpability argument after the close of evidence. Consequently, there is nothing in the record showing the court actually prevented defense counsel from arguing third party culpability.
Defendant argues the evidence at trial ultimately "established a stronger link between Morales and the garage than the prosecutor's offer of proof foreshadowed." But the court had clearly indicated it was willing to consider "what transpires in the presentation of evidence" in determining whether to allow argument on third party culpability. Defendant did not pursue that option after the close of evidence.
2. Even if Defense Counsel had Properly Raised and Preserved the Issue Below, We Would Find No Error
Even if the court had unequivocally ordered defense counsel not to argue Morales was responsible for Ramirez's death, we would not find error. A trial judge has a duty "to control all proceedings during the trial, and to limit ... the argument of counsel to relevant and material matters ...." (§ 1044.) Under that authority, a trial judge may "confin[e] counsel's factual argument to the record." (People v. Modesto (1967) 66 Cal.2d 695, 708, disapproved on another point by Maine v. Superior Court of Mendocino County (1968) 68 Cal.2d 375, 383, fn. 8.)
That "another person had a motive or opportunity to commit the crime, without more, is irrelevant because it does not raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt ...." (People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 558.) At best, the evidence concerning Morales may have shown he had an "opportunity" to commit the murder. Consequently, the evidence concerning Morales was irrelevant, as noted in cases like Brady. (See ibid.) Because defendant's theory of third party culpability and the evidence on which it was based were immaterial, the trial court could properly preclude counsel from arguing it. (See § 1044.)
IV. Substantial Evidence Supported the Jury's Verdict
Finally, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support his second degree murder conviction.
First, defendant argues that no "direct evidence whatsoever was presented indicating that [he] committed the homicide at issue." But "[t]he People, of course, may rely on circumstantial evidence to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime charged and to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed it. [Citations.]" (People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 424-425.) This rule applies to murder. (See, e.g., People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 369-370.)
Defendant contends there is not "one scintilla of evidence that [defendant] had any motive to kill Ramirez, or that they argued ...." But the prosecution is not required to prove motive. (People v. Larrios (1934) 220 Cal. 236, 251.) The prosecution is required to prove malice, but that requirement can be satisfied by evidence "defendant assaulted [the] decedent with a dangerous weapon in a manner endangering life and resulting in death" unless justification or heat of passion are shown. (People v. Harmon (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 308, 311 (Harmon).) Here, there was evidence that the cause of Ramirez's death was eight stab wounds to the throat. This constitutes sufficient evidence the decedent was assaulted "with a dangerous weapon in a manner endangering life and resulting in death." (Ibid.) And evidence of defendant's flight, false statements, shoes with stains of the victim's blood, and presence with the victim days before her death in the same clothes she was ultimately found with, raised an inference that defendant was the culprit. Because there was evidence "defendant assaulted [the] decedent with a dangerous weapon in a manner endangering life and resulting in death ..." (ibid.), and no evidence of justification or heat of passion, there was sufficient evidence of malice.
Additionally, Clara told police she saw defendant with blood on his hands in the garage days before the body was found.
Defendant's remaining arguments to do not alter this conclusion. He argues that his DNA was not proven to be on the bloodstained carpet, the cords tied around Ramirez's body, the knife handle or blade, or the chair in the garage. These observations do not warrant reversal. Surely, the prosecution's case could have been bolstered by additional DNA evidence. But that does not negate the fact that other substantial evidence pointed to defendant as the killer in this case.
Defendant argues the "miniscule" amount of the victim's blood on his shoes was not consistent with multiple stab wounds to the victim's main arteries. He contends that it was reasonable to infer the blood was transferred while he walked through the garage. Defendant claims his proposed inference "need not be more reasonable tha[n] the inference that the blood was deposited during the act of killing; it is sufficient that it is merely a reasonable interpretation of the evidence." (Original italics.) Not so. Defendant confuses the standard for a jury to convict in the trial court with our standard of review as an appellate court. " ' "Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. " ' " 'If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment." ' [Citations.]" ' [Citation.]" (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.)
Defendant similarly argues that his persistent denial of knowing whose body was found in the garage, and that his flight after the fact are both "consistent with" innocence. Of course, the same can be said of all circumstantial evidence: A theoretical possibility remains that the circumstances could be reconciled with the defendant's innocence. However, the fact " ' " ' "that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment." ' [Citations.]" ' [Citation.]" (People v. Rodriguez, supra 20 Cal.4th at p. 11.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
POOCHIGIAN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
HILL, P.J. /s/_________
MEEHAN, J.