Opinion
F071916
01-24-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MANUEL ANTHONY RIOS, Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas W. Casa, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Lewis A. Martinez and Ian Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. BF157641A)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John R. Brownlee, Judge. Thomas W. Casa, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Lewis A. Martinez and Ian Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Kane, Acting P.J., Poochigian, J., and Smith, J.
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INTRODUCTION
Appellant Manuel Anthony Rios was convicted of unlawfully taking a vehicle without consent of the owner, a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), and possession of a billy club in violation of Penal Code section 22210. It also was found true that Rios had suffered a prior serious felony conviction and served a prior prison term. He contends the trial court erred prejudicially in the admission of evidence and his convictions must be reversed. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Crystal Rios owned a blue 2006 Chevy Cobalt in September 2014. She went to Las Vegas on September 26, 2014, leaving her car at her apartment. She did not give anyone permission to drive her car while she was away, and she took her car keys with her but left a spare set in her apartment. When Crystal returned on September 28, 2014, her car was missing. She reported the car as stolen to the police department.
Crystal Rios is appellant's sister. We refer to Crystal by her first name to avoid confusion with appellant.
On October 8, 2014, Bakersfield Police Officer Christopher Bagby and his partner, Detective Murphy, were on patrol when they spotted Crystal's car; Rios was driving. Rios was stopped and detained by the officers; there were keys in the ignition. The vehicle was searched and an 18-inch baseball bat, partially concealed under the driver's seat, was found. The bat was wrapped in black electrical tape and positioned with the handle pointing out so that it was accessible from the driver's seat. Bagby believed the baseball bat had been "improvised as a weapon" and constituted a billy club.
Bagby read Rios his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. Rios told Bagby he had borrowed the car from his sister and that Crystal reported it stolen because he failed to return the car on time. Rios admitted the bat was his and claimed he carried it for protection.
Crystal was contacted by the police and went to retrieve her car. One of the locks was broken and Rios's clothing was in the car. Crystal believed all sets of keys to the car were accounted for until Bagby returned the set of keys that were in the car when Rios was stopped by officers.
After Rios was released on bail, he telephoned his other sister, Monique Hadley, and asked her to convince Crystal to say the bat belonged to her. He told Hadley it was so he would receive less time.
Charges were filed against Rios on December 4, 2014. Prior to trial, Rios was arrested again when he was found to be in possession of another stolen vehicle.
The People filed a motion in limine seeking to introduce evidence that, after Rios was arrested for the current offenses, he subsequently was caught driving another vehicle without the owner's consent. The People argued that the subsequent offense showed a common scheme or plan in that each time Rios was caught he claimed to have permission from the owner to drive the car. The People also argued the subsequent offense established an absence of mistake or accident.
Rios opposed the motion in limine, contending the crimes were dissimilar. After taking the matter under submission, the trial court ruled the subsequent act was admissible to show a common scheme or plan.
A jury was empaneled on April 29, 2015. Crystal testified that she had given Rios rides in her car but had never given him permission to drive the car because, to her knowledge, Rios did not have a driver's license. Crystal denied the bat was hers, testifying she had seen the bat in Rios's possession. Rios had the bat with him on one occasion when Crystal gave him a ride.
Hadley testified about the phone call she received from Rios wherein he asked her to convince Crystal to claim the bat as hers. Hadley also testified that Crystal never let Rios use her car.
Kern County Sheriff's Deputy Andrew Bassett testified that on March 21, 2015, Bassett observed Rios driving a gold Honda Accord through a parking lot at a high rate of speed. Bassett followed to where the car stopped and made contact with Rios. Bassett noticed the car's ignition seemed to be broken with the keys stuck inside. Bassett asked Rios who the owner of the car was; Rios responded it was his "homegirl" Brianna's and he had permission to drive her car. Bassett determined the car was registered to Blanca Ruiz.
Ruiz shared the car with her husband, Juan Guzman. Neither Ruiz nor Guzman knew Rios and had not given him permission to drive their vehicle.
Rios's mother and grandmother testified on his behalf, claiming that Crystal had allowed Rios to use her car on numerous occasions and the bat did not belong to Rios.
On May 1, 2015, the jury found Rios guilty of violating Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), and Penal Code section 22210. In a bifurcated trial on May 4, 2015, the prior conviction and prior prison term enhancements were found true.
The trial court sentenced Rios to a total term of six years four months in prison. Rios filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
The sole issue raised by Rios in this appeal is a claim the trial court erred prejudicially in admitting, pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, the evidence regarding the subsequent act by Rios of taking a vehicle without the owner's permission. I. Admissibility of section 1101 evidence
References to code sections are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise specified.
Section 1101 precludes the admission of uncharged criminal conduct to prove a defendant's conduct on a specific occasion; however, such evidence is admissible to prove intent, knowledge, absence of mistake, or a common plan or scheme. (§ 1101; People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 393 (Ewoldt).) In order to establish a common plan or scheme, the uncharged conduct must be sufficiently similar to the charged offense to support an inference that both acts are manifestations of a common plan or design. (Ewoldt, supra, at pp. 401-402.) It is not necessary for the acts to be part of a single, continuing course of action. (Ibid.)
A trial court's decision to admit section 1101 evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 202.) The decision to admit section 1101 evidence will not be overturned unless the trial court has exercised its discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice." (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1004.) II. Sufficiently similar
Rios contends the charged offense and the uncharged offense were dissimilar in that: (1) in one, the victim was his sister, and in the other, the victim was unrelated to him; (2) he was found in the afternoon on the charged offense because the car was reported stolen, while he was stopped at night for speeding in the uncharged offense; (3) he attempted to evade police in the uncharged offense, but not the charged offense; and (4) he had keys to the car in the charged offense, but not the uncharged offense.
These minor differences between the charged offense and the uncharged act do not establish the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence to show a common scheme or plan. (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 402-403.) The common features need only indicate a common plan or design; it need only support the inference that Rios employed that plan in the charged offense. (Id. at p. 403.)
The similarities are that Rios waited until an owner was not in sight of their vehicle; took the vehicle without permission; drove the vehicle until stopped by law enforcement; and, when caught, Rios claimed to have permission to drive the car from a female owner. We find nothing arbitrary or capricious about the trial court's determination that there were similarities between the charged and uncharged offenses.
To the extent Rios argues the two offenses had to be connected to one another to be admissible, such a position is contrary to the holding in Ewoldt. (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 401-402.) Moreover, in People v. Green (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1485 (Green), cited by Rios in support of this contention, the appellate court addressed the aggregation of losses from grand theft for purposes of a sentencing enhancement, not section 1101. (Green, supra, at pp. 1489-1491.)
In People v. Sam (1969) 71 Cal.2d 194, also cited by Rios, the court found "no connecting link between the prior and present acts" (id. at p. 205) and concluded that uncharged act evidence was inadmissible in the involuntary manslaughter case. The concept that the uncharged act and charged offense had to be connected was specifically overturned and rejected in Ewoldt. (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 401-402.)
Although the trial court admitted the section 1101 evidence as tending to establish a common plan, it is judicial action and not judicial reasoning that is the subject of appellate review. (People v. Dawkins (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 991, 1004.) If the ruling is correct on any basis, even though not for the reasons stated by the trial court, the ruling is upheld. (Ibid.) The evidence also supports admission of the section 1101 evidence to prove intent or knowledge. In both the charged and uncharged offenses, Rios was aware that he did not own the car and, when stopped by law enforcement, falsely claimed to have permission from the female owner of the car. The similarities are relevant to prove that Rios knew he did not have permission to use Crystal's car and that his false claim to have permission was not a mistake. (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402, fn. 6.)
In the uncharged offense, Rios fabricated a female owner who purportedly gave permission. --------
Regardless, even if admission of the section 1101 evidence was an abuse of discretion, it is not reasonably probable the outcome would have been more favorable to Rios in the absence of the challenged evidence. (People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1018-1019.) The challenged evidence is only applicable to the Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) offense and, by Rios's own admission, he was in violation of that code section.
Rios told officers that he had borrowed Crystal's car but failed to return it on time. Rios was stopped more than a week after Crystal reported her car stolen. If someone gives a person permission to use their car, exceeding the scope of that permission constitutes a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a). (People v. Hutchings (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 294, 295; People v. Carr (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 74, 77-78; People v. Hutchins (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 64, 69-70.) By virtue of Rios's own admission, he was guilty of a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), and it is not reasonably probable excluding the section 1101 evidence would have affected the verdict.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.