Opinion
F071478
03-02-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEVIN RINTYE, Defendant and Appellant.
Tutti Hacking, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Kelly E. LeBel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Kern Super. Ct. No. DF011696B; Imperial Super. Ct. No. JCF28294)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Colette M. Humphrey, Judge. Tutti Hacking, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Kelly E. LeBel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Levy, Acting P.J., Kane, J. and Smith, J.
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INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Devin Rintye pled no contest to a violation of Penal Code section 4501 and admitted a prior strike, in exchange for dismissal of a section 667, subdivision (a), allegation and an agreed upon term of imprisonment. Rintye subsequently sought to withdraw his plea; the trial court denied the motion and Rintye contends the denial constitutes error. We disagree and affirm.
Further references to code sections are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. --------
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On August 23, 2013, Rintye was an inmate in Kern Valley State Prison. On that day, he and another inmate, Matthew Maga, attacked another inmate, Randy Hall, in the recreational yard. Rintye and Maga each struck Hall with both of their fists. Hall was attempting to fight them off.
Correctional Officer Jorge Fernandez ordered Rintye and Maga to stop and lay down on the ground. They ignored Fernandez's order, so Fernandez deployed a chemical grenade. Rintye and Maga continued to attack Hall, despite the chemical grenade, so Fernandez deployed a second chemical grenade. Hall got away and Maga and Rintye chased him. Fernandez launched a third chemical grenade, after which Rintye "proned out" or laid down on the ground.
Sergeant Reyes Gallardo also saw Rintye and Maga attack Hall. Gallardo noted that Maga made "stabbing-like motions" and made contact with Hall's upper torso. Correctional Officer Louis Castro, Jr. saw Maga throw an unknown object towards a gravel area. The object was recovered and found to be seven and one-quarter inches long, sharpened to a point, and made of metal. The handle was black, melted plastic. The object was determined to be a weapon. Hall was bleeding on his upper and lower torso; he had 16 wounds.
Correctional Officer Mario Lozano investigated the assault. Lozano stated that Hall had three stab wounds to his abdomen; a stab injury to the left forearm; two stab wounds on the left shoulder; and three stab wounds on his back. Hall was transferred to Kern Medical Center for care and treatment.
Rintye was charged with assault of a fellow inmate by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, a violation of section 4501. Rintye's 2007 conviction for manslaughter involving use of a firearm was alleged as a strike prior pursuant to section 667, subdivisions (c) through (j), and a section 667, subdivision (a) prior.
On December 19, 2014, pursuant to a plea agreement, Rintye pled no contest to a violation of section 4501 and admitted that his manslaughter conviction constituted a prior strike under section 667, subdivision (c) through (j). In exchange, Rintye was to receive the low term of two years, doubled for the section 4501 offense, plus two years consecutive for an unrelated offense, for a total of six years. In addition, the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement was to be dismissed.
Subsequently, Rintye filed a motion to withdraw his plea. The People opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Rintye had failed to establish good cause to withdraw the plea.
Rintye was sentenced on March 5, 2015, in accordance with the plea agreement. Rintye filed a timely notice of appeal and obtained a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
Rintye contends that he was coerced into accepting the plea agreement, which benefitted his codefendant, Maga, and consequently, Rintye maintains the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his plea. We disagree with his assertions.
Motion to Withdraw Plea
A motion to withdraw a plea may be made "at any time before judgment" and must demonstrate good cause for the withdrawal. (§ 1018; People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 585.) "'Good cause' means mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress or any other factor that overcomes the exercise of free judgment and must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. [Citation.] The grant or denial of such a withdrawal motion is 'within the sound discretion of the trial court and must be upheld unless an abuse thereof is clearly demonstrated.'" (People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 917; People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.) Furthermore, guilty pleas resulting from a plea bargain "'should not be set aside lightly and finality of proceedings should be encouraged.'" (People v. Weaver (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 131, 145-146.)
Here, Rintye signed a written advisement of rights and plea form, which specified that he was entering a plea to a violation of section 4501 and that he would be sentenced to a term of two years, doubled, for that offense. The plea form also includes an acknowledgement of a prior conviction. Both Rintye and his attorney signed the form. At the plea hearing, the trial court stated:
"Mr. Rintye, it's my understanding you're going to plead guilty or no contest to count one, you are going to admit you have a prior strike conviction. I've indicated I'm going to give you a low term sentence, which is four years, consecutive to the sentence you're currently serving. [¶] You also had another sentence you were serving consecutive; that's going to convert to one-third the midterm of that sentence, consecutive. So that will become a lesser sentence consecutive to this. The total of those two sentences together, will be six years, consecutive to the sentence you originally received."
Subsequent to these comments by the trial court, Rintye had several questions about the term of the sentence and the impact on his current sentence. The trial court answered all of Rintye's questions and thoroughly explained the sentence and the calculation of the sentence. The trial court then proceeded to inquire of Rintye if he had reviewed and signed the plea form; discussed his rights with his attorney; and was giving up his rights as noted in the plea form. Rintye responded "Yes" to each inquiry. The trial court also asked Rintye if he had "any other questions" before entering a plea; Rintye responded "No."
Rintye later moved to set aside his plea, claiming in the motion he felt "pressured" by Maga to accept the plea agreement because Rintye feared for his personal safety and that the agreement helped Maga, but harmed Rintye "disproportionately."
Analysis
Rintye's contention that he was coerced into taking the plea bargain has no evidentiary support in the record. Rintye initialed the plea form and affirmatively represented before entering his plea that he was doing so "freely and voluntarily, without fear or threat" to himself. The only evidentiary support offered for the claim of coerciveness in the trial court came in the form of a declaration from defense counsel, submitted with the motion to withdraw the plea. Defense counsel asserted that Maga and Rintye were in the same correctional facility and transported to court together; thus, Rintye felt coerced to enter into the plea agreement.
Defense counsel's declaration, however, is nothing more than hearsay and is not competent evidence supporting a claim of coercion; there was no declaration signed by Rintye and Rintye never testified to any coercion at the motion to withdraw the plea. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) Moreover, defense counsel's declaration is simply speculation based upon Maga's mere presence in the same location as Rintye; Rintye presented no competent evidence whatsoever in the trial court that Maga ever verbally or physically threatened him or that he, Rintye, was coerced by Maga into accepting a plea agreement.
If Rintye is contending the coerciveness of the plea bargain arises from the fact that it was a "'package deal'" that both he and Maga had to accept, as also was asserted in the motion to withdraw the plea, again the record is devoid of evidence that both Maga and Rintye had to accept a plea agreement for either to accept. The mere assertion of a "'package deal'" in a motion to withdraw a plea does not constitute evidence of such an arrangement. The transcript of the plea hearing does not indicate that the plea is contingent on both defendants accepting a plea; the plea advisement form contains no indication it is contingent on both defendants entering into an agreement. The trial court in all likelihood did not discuss the factors outlined in In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, at pages 288 through 290, because the record did not disclose that acceptance of a plea from Rintye was contingent on acceptance of a plea from Maga and vice versa.
Regardless, the totality of the circumstances supports the trial court's finding that the plea was freely and voluntarily made by Rintye. There was a factual basis for Rintye's plea and the respective sentences reflect the role Rintye and Maga each played in the assault on Hall. Two correctional officers testified they saw Rintye strike Hall with his fists. Maga was observed making stabbing-like motions toward Hall and then throwing a weapon aside. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Maga pled no contest to a violation of section 4501, with a section 12022.7 enhancement and admitted a prior strike conviction. In exchange, Maga received a sentence of 16 years, to be served consecutive to the sentence for which he currently was imprisoned. By contrast, Rintye received a term of four years, consecutive, for his role in the assault on Hall.
As for Rintye's contention on appeal that the trial court was improperly involved in the plea negotiations, we review such a claim for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, 578.) Once again, there is no evidence to support this assertion. Rintye cites to the trial court's comments of giving an indicated sentence, the low term, as grounds it was improperly involved in the bargaining process.
The plea hearing discloses that Rintye did not plead to all the charges and allegations filed against him; as part of the plea agreement, the district attorney moved to dismiss the section 667, subdivision (a) allegation.
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea, Rintye stated, "This deal was with the court, it wasn't with the D.A. I was under the impression I was going to deal with you, the court." The trial court responded, "I don't know what that means. You entered into a plea bargain, I took a waiver and you were told what the consequences of the plea were."
The plea agreement includes as part of the agreement that Rintye receive a term of two years, doubled, for the section 4501 offense. Rintye confuses a lawful indicated sentence with judicial involvement in plea bargaining. A trial court properly may give a defendant an indicated sentence, which reflects the trial court's considered judgment as to the proper punishment. (People v. Clancey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 576.) A trial court may not offer a defendant more lenient treatment or another inducement to enter a guilty plea. (Id. at p. 575.) There is no record evidence to support Rintye's claim that the trial court negotiated a plea bargain as opposed to giving a lawful indicated sentence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.