Opinion
May 29, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Agresta, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
At approximately 2:00 A.M. on September 30, 1982, the defendant was arrested in connection with the murder of Laura Evelyn. His arrest was based upon information given to the police by an informant who implicated the defendant as well as himself in the murder. While in police custody, the defendant confessed to being involved in the murder of 91-year-old Dunie Lewis during a burglary of her apartment. It is the Lewis murder from which the defendant's conviction stems. His confession to that crime came after the detective who had administered a polygraph test, with the defendant's consent, told the defendant that he "did not do very well on the test and that as far as [the detective] was concerned there were unresolved issues regarding the old woman".
The defendant contends that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him for the murder of Laura Evelyn because although the informant had personal knowledge of the crime, he was not a reliable source. Contrary to this contention, the informant was a reliable source for the purpose of providing the police with probable cause to arrest him. In addition to implicating the defendant, the informant also clearly implicated himself in the murder. This admission against the informant's own penal interest constituted reliable information for the purposes of supplying probable cause (see, People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 403; People v. Nelson, 125 A.D.2d 339; cf., People v McGriff, 130 A.D.2d 141). It is of no moment that the defendant was never prosecuted for the Evelyn murder. The subsequent events did nothing to remove the initial probable cause to arrest the defendant since they did not, standing alone, necessarily lead to the conclusion that the informant was unreliable. We note that the informant was eventually tried and convicted of the Evelyn murder, and his judgment of conviction was affirmed on appeal (see, People v. Coker, 135 A.D.2d 723).
We further note that there is nothing to indicate that the defendant's confession was coerced. He was not subjected to any prolonged or vigorous interrogation (cf., People v. Holland, 48 N.Y.2d 861), and his confession came after being given a polygraph test which he had consented to take and for which he had previously reviewed the questions to be asked. In addition, there was nothing improper in the comment the detective made to the defendant with respect to his performance on the polygraph test. The detective did not indicate to the defendant that he thought that the defendant was lying (cf., People v. Cavagnaro, 88 A.D.2d 938), there was no attempt to convey the infallibility of the machine (cf., People v. Leonard, 59 A.D.2d 1) and the detective did not browbeat the defendant with accusations of untruthfulness (see, People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 12). In light of the above, suppression of the defendant's confession was properly denied.
While it was error to admit the confessions of the codefendant Walker into evidence at their joint trial (Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186), the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see, Cruz v. New York, supra; People v. Hamlin, 71 N.Y.2d 750). At his trial, the defendant's own confession, which was both written and videotaped, was detailed, comprehensive, unrepudiated, and satisfactorily explained his part in the crime. Moreover, the defendant's statements, which were consistent with each other, provided crucial evidence which negated his affirmative defense to felony murder (see, Penal Law § 125.25).
We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit (CPL 470.05; People v. Holland, 48 N.Y.2d 861; People v Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105; cf., People v. Brown, 111 A.D.2d 248). Lawrence, J.P., Kunzeman, Kooper and Harwood, JJ., concur.