Opinion
1998-09382
Argued October 15, 2002.
November 25, 2002.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Weber, J.), rendered September 29, 1998, convicting him of burglary in the third degree (two counts), attempted burglary in the third degree (two counts), and possession of burglar's tools, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Robert C. Mitchell, Riverhead, N.Y. (James H. Miller III of counsel), for appellant.
Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Guy Arcidiacono of counsel; Thomas L. Gallivan and Nora E. Deveau on the brief), for respondent.
Before: MYRIAM J. ALTMAN, J.P., GLORIA GOLDSTEIN, LEO F. McGINITY, WILLIAM F. MASTRO, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was unequivocal, voluntary, and intelligently made (see People v. Smith, 92 N.Y.2d 516, 520; People v. Slaughter, 78 N.Y.2d 485, 491; People v. Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d 12, 21, cert denied 459 U.S. 1178). The trial court undertook a sufficient searching inquiry of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the dangers and disadvantages of giving up the fundamental right to counsel were impressed upon him (see People v. Smith, supra at 520; People v. Slaughter, supra at 491; People v. Sawyer, supra at 21). Further, the trial court apprised the defendant of the risks and dangers of self-representation, and thus properly granted his request to proceed pro se (see People v. Vivenzio, 62 N.Y.2d 775; People v. El, 250 A.D.2d 395).
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt under the second count of the indictment for burglary in the third degree is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05; People v. Bynum, 70 N.Y.2d 858; People v. Fryar, 276 A.D.2d 641). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of that count beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
ALTMAN, J.P., GOLDSTEIN, McGINITY and MASTRO, JJ., concur.