Opinion
2015-05-20
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Joshua RICHARDSON, appellant.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Heidi Bota of counsel; Bianca Harlow on the brief), for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Sholom J. Twersky of counsel; Gregory Musso on the brief), for respondent.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Heidi Bota of counsel; Bianca Harlow on the brief), for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove and Sholom J. Twersky of counsel; Gregory Musso on the brief), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, ROBERT J. MILLER, and JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.
Appeals by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Murphy, J.), both rendered April 5, 2010, convicting him of robbery in the first degree under Indictment No. 1105/06, and robbery in the second degree under Indictment No. 1321/06, respectively, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences.
ORDERED that the judgments are affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the record demonstrates that the sentencing court made an independent determination regarding whether he should be treated as a youthful offender and adequately placed on the record its reasons for denying him youthful offender status ( seeCPL 720.20[1]; People v. Rudolph, 21 N.Y.3d 497, 974 N.Y.S.2d 885, 997 N.E.2d 457; cf. People v. Evans, 126 A.D.3d 721, 5 N.Y.S.3d 467; People v. Then, 121 A.D.3d 1025, 994 N.Y.S.2d 420). Under the circumstances of this case, including the seriousness of the crimes and the defendant's failure to complete certain programs offered as a condition of youthful offender treatment, including absconding from one program and remaining a fugitive for many months, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant youthful offender treatment ( see People v. Almonte, 122 A.D.3d 870, 995 N.Y.S.2d 511; People v. Booker, 111 A.D.3d 759, 974 N.Y.S.2d 794).
That portion of the sentence which imposed concurrent terms of postrelease supervision was not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).