Opinion
A131803
02-17-2012
In re Richard L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Richard L., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 80044)
Appellant, Richard L., appeals the amount of restitution prescribed by the juvenile court in its dispositional order. The court's calculation of the restitution awards included a 10 percent administrative fee in addition to the amounts awarded to the two victims in this case. Appellant contends that the imposition of these fees is unauthorized by statute and must be stricken. Respondent agrees the fees are improper, but maintains appellant is not entitled to relief because he failed to dispute the amount below and thus forfeited his appellate claim. We conclude the fees are improper and must be stricken from the court's dispositional order.
BACKGROUND
In November 2009, the San Mateo County District Attorney filed a four-count petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 regarding appellant. A jurisdictional hearing commenced in October 2010.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
According to testimony given on the first day of the jurisdictional hearing, in November 2009, a group of four to six people arrived at a house party held at South Grant Street in San Mateo. They had not been invited, and did not know the host. When asked to leave by the host and his older brother, Christopher L., the group refused, and the confrontation quickly escalated. The evidence indicates that appellant struck two people, including Christopher L., with beer bottles.
At the beginning of the second day of the jurisdictional hearing, appellant admitted to two of the four counts, these being felony assault of Christopher L. with a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), to which special allegations were attached and also admitted, and felony battery of Andrew C. in violation of Penal Code section 243, subdivision (d). The court sustained the petition as to these two counts.
The probation report to the court prior to the disposition hearing stated that the victims had suffered lacerations to the face, neck, and head, and had been taken to the hospital. Christopher L. had a lacerated carotid artery that required surgery. Andrew C. had received a total of 12 sutures to repair three lacerations.
As part of its disposition order, the court ordered that appellant pay restitution to the victims for their medical expenses, which the court found amounted to $36,988.39 for Christopher L. and $218.93 for Andrew C. The court also ordered appellant to pay administrative fees amounting to 10 percent of each restitution amount - $3,698.89 and $21.89, respectively. Appellant did not object to these administrative fees, which are the subject of this appeal.
Appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
The Court of Appeal reviews a challenge to the amount of victim restitution for abuse of discretion. (People v. Taylor (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 757, 761, italics added; see also In re K.F. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 655, 661.) If, however, "the propriety of a restitution order turns on the interpretation of a statute, a question of law is raised, which is subject to de novo review on appeal." (People v. Williams (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 142, 146; see also In re Alexander A. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 847, 852.) Appellant's challenge to the restitution order relates to the court's authority to award the administrative fees altogether under the relevant statute, section 730.6. Therefore, he raises a purely legal issue of statutory interpretation that is resolved by de novo review.
II.
Respondent first argues in one sentence and without legal citation that appellant's "claim is forfeited." Generally, " '[e]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.' " (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) Accordingly, this argument is waived and does not merit further consideration. We add only that, as appellant points out, generally there is an exception to this rule in adult criminal matters for unauthorized sentences that "could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case. Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such error is 'clear and correctable' independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing." (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.) This same reasoning applies here. (See In re Josue S. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 168, 172-173 [applying Scott's reasoning regarding forfeiture of a probation issue in a juvenile case].)
III.
Appellant argues, and the government agrees, that the juvenile court lacked statutory authority to impose the 10 percent administrative fees related to its order of restitution to the victims. We agree as well.
As a minor and a ward of the court pursuant to section 602, appellant's restitution obligations are governed by section 730.6. (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1131.) Restitution is generally divided into two categories: victim restitution, which involves compensation for the victim's actual loss, and restitution fines, which are not directly related to the victim's loss. (§ 730.6, subs. (a)(2)(A) - (B); 3 Witkin, Cal. Crim. Law (3d ed. 2000) Punishment, § 97, p. 152.) But, while section 730.6, subdivision (q) allows for the "imposition] [of] a fee to cover the actual administrative cost of collecting the restitution fine, not to exceed 10 percent of the amount ordered to be paid," the statute is conspicuously silent regarding the imposition of fees to cover costs related to victim restitution. (§ 730.6, subd. (q), italics added.)
As used throughout, "fee" refers to the 10 percent administrative fees imposed by the court in this particular case, apparently pursuant to section 730.6, subdivision (q). The term, as used here, does not include fees and court costs incurred by victims themselves that might be directly included in a victim's compensatory award. (See In re Imran Q. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1316, 1320-1321.)
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When interpreting a statute, we "first . . . look to the words of the statute themselves." (MacIsaac v. Waste Management Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1082.) "[A]lthough the words used by the Legislature are the most useful guide to its intent, we do not view the language of the statute in isolation. [Citation.] Rather, we construe the words of the statute in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose." (MacIsaac, at p. 1083.) Here, we do not see, and the parties do no refer, to anything in the language or purpose of section 730.6 that indicates anything other than that the Legislature's omission of an administrative fee for restitution ordered was a deliberate choice. In such a circumstance, we do not "insert what has been omitted" into a statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858; see also People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1010 ["when the drafters of a statute have employed a term in one place and omitted it in another, it should not be inferred where it has been excluded"].)
It is also apparent that this omission was not an oversight when section 730.6 is properly contextualized. In 1994, the Legislature amended the laws regarding restitution by adult offenders and, at the same time, "amended the Welfare and Institutions Code to provide parallel restitution requirements for juvenile offenders." (People v. Birkett (1999) 21 Cal.4th 226, 240 & fn. 15.) The statutes that govern adult offenders' restitution obligations explicitly authorize fees when either restitution fines or victim restitution are imposed. (Pen. Code, §§ 1202.4, subd. (l) & 1203.1, subd. (l).) Had the Legislature intended to permit fees in addition to victim restitution in juvenile cases, it would have expressly done so, as it did with respect to adult offenders.
The 10 percent administrative fees in the present case accompany awards of victim restitution—not a restitution fine. The juvenile court here awarded restitution to compensate the victims for their medical expenses, which section 730.6, subdivision (h)(2) recognizes as actual loss. As such, there is no statutory basis for attaching administrative fees to appellant's victim restitution obligations.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court had no authority to impose the 10 percent administrative fees contained in its dispositional order. It is ordered to modify its dispositional order to strike these administrative fees and forward the modified order to all appropriate authorities. Its dispositional order is otherwise affirmed.
Lambden, J. We concur: Kline, P.J. Richman, J.