Opinion
570131/21
01-04-2022
The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Andy Reynoso, Defendant-Respondent.
Unpublished Opinion
The People appeal from an order of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Wanda L. Licitra, J.), dated January 13, 2021, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL 30.30.
PRESENT: Edmead, P.J., Hagler, Silvera, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Order (Wanda L. Licitra, J.), dated January 13, 2021, reversed, on the law, the accusatory instrument is reinstated, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings on defendant's speedy trial motion consistent herewith.
Defendant was arraigned on the misdemeanor complaint on November 4, 2019 and, pursuant to CPL 30.30(1)(b), the People had 90 days to be ready for trial. The People concede on this appeal that they are properly chargeable with 42 days of delay for the period between November 4, 2019 and December 16, 2019 and 40 days from January 15, 2020 to February 24, 2020, for a total of 82 days of includable time. The People argue, however, that in granting defendant's CPL 30.30 motion, Criminal Court erroneously charged them with 15 days of delay for January 1, 2020 to January 15, 2020. We agree with the People in part and conclude that the period January 1 to January 13, 2020 should have been excluded from speedy trial calculations.
As is relevant here, on November 25, 2019, the People still lacked a supporting deposition and were not ready for trial. The case was adjourned to January 13, 2020 for conversion. On December 16, 2019, the People filed with the court and served on defense counsel an off-calendar superseding information, supporting deposition and statement of readiness, thereby stopping the speedy trial clock. Thus, the period from December 16, 2019 to January 13, 2020 was excludable, notwithstanding that CPL 30.30(5) became effective on January 1, 2020. Contrary to the conclusion reached below, CPL 30.30(5), which requires that "[a]ny statement of trial readiness must be accompanied or preceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of [CPL] section 245.20," did not retroactively vitiate the People's statement of readiness made on December 16, 2019 (see People v Brown, 73 Misc.3d 131 [A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50965[U][App Term, 1st Dept 2021]; People v Freeman, 71 Misc.3d 138 [A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50470[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2021], appeal withdrawn 37 N.Y.3d 1027 [2021]; People v Jaquez, 71 Misc.3d 1110 [Sup Ct, NY County 2021]). When the period of January 1 to January 13 is excluded, the chargeable time is 84 days, which is within the statutory period of 90 days.
However, because Criminal Court limited its decision to this one period, finding it dispositive, and did not rule on any issue with respect to the includability or excludability of any other adjournment raised by defendant in the underlying speedy trial motion, we may not reach those issues under CPL 470.15 (see People v LaFontaine, 92 N.Y.2d 470, 474 [1998]; see also People v Freeman, 2021 NY Slip Op 50470[U]). As per defendant's request, the matter is therefore remitted to Criminal Court for a determination of the outstanding issues raised in defendant's motion to dismiss.
We have considered the People's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.