Opinion
KA 03-00070.
February 4, 2005.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Kenneth R. Fisher, J.), rendered June 20, 2002. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of burglary in the second degree and petit larceny.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed.
Present: Pigott, Jr., P.J., Hurlbutt, Gorski, Pine and Hayes, JJ.
Memorandum:
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him after a nonjury trial of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25) and petit larceny (§ 155.25). We reject defendant's contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence ( see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). "The credibility determinations of [Supreme] Court are entitled to great deference . . ., and there is no basis to conclude that the court failed to give the evidence the weight that it should be accorded" ( People v. Scott, 289 AD2d 974, 975, lv denied 97 NY2d 733; see People v. Woodworth, 8 AD3d 1010, lv denied 3 NY3d 683). Defendant further contends that he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial because the waiver was based on the court's allegedly erroneous Molineux ruling, which the court subsequently reversed during trial. Defendant failed to preserve his contention for our review ( see People v. Williams, 5 AD3d 1043, 1044, lv denied 2 NY3d 809; People v. Wegman, 2 AD3d 1333, 1334, lv denied 2 NY3d 747) and, in any event, it is without merit. There is no indication that the court's initial Molineux ruling, even if erroneous, caused defendant to waive his right to a jury trial ( see generally People v. Miller, 217 AD2d 810, 811, lv denied 86 NY2d 798). "Defendant waived his right to a jury trial in open court and in writing in accordance with the requirements of NY Constitution, art I, § 2 and CPL 320.10 (2) . . ., and the record establishes that defendant's waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent" ( Wegman, 2 AD3d at 1334).