Opinion
2013-03-6
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Qiydaar REDDICK, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Joshua M. Levine of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se. Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., District Attorney, Staten Island, N.Y. (Morrie I. Kleinbart and Michael Shollar of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Joshua M. Levine of counsel), for appellant, and appellant pro se. Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., District Attorney, Staten Island, N.Y. (Morrie I. Kleinbart and Michael Shollar of counsel), for respondent.
RANDALL T. ENG, P.J., REINALDO E. RIVERA, PLUMMER E. LOTT, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Collini, J.), rendered November 3, 2010, convicting him of rape in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, and aggravated criminal contempt, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial by the admission of certain uncharged crime evidence is unpreserved for appellate review ( seeCPL 470.05[2]; People v. Rios, 96 A.D.3d 978, 978, 946 N.Y.S.2d 499;People v. Torres, 96 A.D.3d 881, 882, 946 N.Y.S.2d 225), and, in any event, is without merit. The evidence provided relevant background information on the nature of the defendant's relationship with the complainant and the issuance of an order of protection, and the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice to the defendant ( see People v. Leeson, 12 N.Y.3d 823, 827, 880 N.Y.S.2d 895, 908 N.E.2d 885;People v. Delancey, 94 A.D.3d 1015, 1016, 942 N.Y.S.2d 170;People v. Laverpool, 52 A.D.3d 622, 622, 860 N.Y.S.2d 565). Moreover, the Supreme Court's instruction to the jury regarding use of this evidence limited any potential prejudice to the defendant ( see People v. Delancey, 94 A.D.3d at 1016, 942 N.Y.S.2d 170;People v. Rock, 65 A.D.3d 558, 559, 882 N.Y.S.2d 907).
In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( seeCPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053,cert. denied542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828;People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
The defendant's claim, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, that he was deprived of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel is based, in part, on matter appearing on the record and, in part, on matter outside the record and, thus, constitutes a “ ‘mixed claim[ ]’ ” of ineffective assistance ( People v. Maxwell, 89 A.D.3d 1108, 1109, 933 N.Y.S.2d 386, quoting People v. Evans, 16 N.Y.3d 571, 575 n. 2, 925 N.Y.S.2d 366, 949 N.E.2d 457,cert. denied––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 325, 181 L.Ed.2d 201). In this case, it is not evident from the matter appearing on the record that the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel ( cf. People v. Crump, 53 N.Y.2d 824, 440 N.Y.S.2d 170, 422 N.E.2d 815;People v. Brown, 45 N.Y.2d 852, 410 N.Y.S.2d 287, 382 N.E.2d 1149). Since the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance cannot be resolved without reference to matter outside the record, a CPL 440.10 proceeding is the appropriate forum for reviewing the claim in its entirety ( see People v. Freeman, 93 A.D.3d 805, 806, 940 N.Y.S.2d 314;People v. Maxwell, 89 A.D.3d at 1109, 933 N.Y.S.2d 386;People v. Rohlehr, 87 A.D.3d 603, 604, 927 N.Y.S.2d 919).
The defendant's remaining contentions, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit.