Opinion
07-458.
Decided December 19, 2007.
Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, By Shamika Taylor, Assistant District Attorney, Harold Dee, Esq., For Defendant.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant, having been arraigned in the Tarrytown Justice Court on July 25, 2007, stands accused of alleged violations of Section 1192 subdivisions (2) and (3) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL). The People filed a Supporting Deposition, sworn to by Tarrytown Police Officer David Kapica, as well as a Bill of Particulars which collectively allege that on July 13, 2007 at approximately 5:25 p.m. defendant operated a 2000 Honda, New York State license plate number CF939L, southbound on East Sunnyside Lane in Tarrytown, New York. The People further allege that defendant was arrested on this same date and, within one hour of his arrest, a chemical test was performed upon him which revealed that defendant had a Blood Alcohol Content ("BAC") of 0.13 of one percent.
On November 14, 2007 defendant filed an Omnibus Motion seeking, inter alia, dismissal of the charges on grounds of legal insufficiency. Defendant asserts that East Sunnyside Lane, upon which defendant is alleged to have operated a vehicle in an intoxicated state, is not a public highway, private road open to motor vehicle traffic or parking lot within the statutory definition of VTL § 1192(7) as this location was constructed for and initially exclusively served private dwellings. In support of this contention, defendant provides a sworn affidavit of Joseph M. Santore, the General Manager of the Tarrytown House which states, in relevant part:
The Tarrytown House Estate and Conference Center is comprised of 10 buildings on 26 acres in the Village of Tarrytown The Tarrytown House is centered on two 19th century mansions the oldest of which is known as the King House built in 1840 The larger grey castle like mansion is known as Biddle House [I]n 1963 the estate was sold to visionary entrepreneur Robert Schwartz who opened the property in 1964 as the nation's first commercial conference center. The property has operated for 43 years as a high level executive conference center for Fortune 200 companies.
VTL § 1192(7) is silent as to whether a roadway's past or present use is controlling for the purpose of determining whether a location falls within the definition of the statute. Defendant relies upon this absence to advance his contention that East Sunnyside Lane's historical construction and prior use as a wholly private road precludes it from being defined presently as a public road.
The People submitted opposition papers wherein they defend the legal sufficiency of the charges. The People assert that the property has not served as a family residence since 1963. Additionally, the People identify the road leading onto the property of the Tarrytown House upon which defendant is alleged to have operated his vehicle as presently open to and regularly accessed by the public. The People argue that the plain meaning of the language of VTL § 1192(7) mandates this Court to determine the sufficiency of the charges based upon the property's current use.
For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.
LEGAL ANAYSIS
An integral element of Driving While Intoxicated ("DWI") offenses is operation of a motor vehicle on a public highway, a private road open to motor vehicle traffic or in a parking lot. VTL § 1192(7). Whether a person can properly be charged with the offense of DWI is dependant, therefore, upon the status of the roadway upon which the vehicle operation occurs. The VTL specifically defines the terms public highway, private road and parking lot.
VTL § 134 broadly defines a public highway as "any highway, road, street, avenue, alley, public place, public driveway or any other public way." A highway is defined as the "entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular traffic." VTL § 118.
The VTL defines private road as "every way or place in private ownership and used for vehicular travel by the owner and those having express or implied permission from the owner, but not for other persons." VTL § 133. The statute specifically excludes any areas of private property comprising all or part of property on which a one or two family residence is situated for purposes of a DWI offense being charged. VTL § 1192(7).
The term parking lot is defined by VTL § 1192(7) as "any area or areas or private property, including a driveway, near or contiguous to and provided in connection with premises and used as a means of access to and access from a public highway to such premises and having a capacity for the parking of four or more vehicles."
Courts have previously considered whether DWI charges are appropriate in certain locales. A DWI conviction has been upheld where a driver's vehicle came to a stop on a private road or other private location where there was adequate circumstantial proof that the driver had operated the vehicle in an intoxicated condition on a public highway, private road open to motor vehicle traffic or parking lot prior thereto. See, People v. Saplin, 122 AD2d 498, 505 NYS2d 460 (3d Dept. 1986). A DWI conviction has also been found appropriate where a defendant operated a vehicle in the parking lot of a commercial establishment during non-business hours. See, People v. Hampton, 176 Misc 2d 405, 673 NYS2d 485 (Suffolk Co. Dist. Ct. 1997), See also, People v. Tornatore, 125 Misc 2d 400, 479 NYS2d 462 (Nassau Co. Dist. Ct. 1984).
This Court must determine whether defendant's operation of a motor vehicle while in an allegedly intoxicated state occurred on a public highway, private road open to motor vehicle traffic, or in a parking lot within the statutorily proscribed meaning of the VTL. It is uncontroverted that the property upon which the defendant operated his vehicle previously served as two single family dwellings. However, it is equally clear that from about 1963 until the present time, the property has been utilized as a conference center.
The plain meaning of a statute's language must be interpreted so as to give effect to the clear and unambiguous meaning of its words. See, Masters Cars, Inc. v. Walters, 95 NY2d 395, 718 NYS2d 7 (2000), see also, Doctors Council v. New York City Employees' Retirement Systems, 71 NY2d 669, 529 NYS2d 732 (1988). Defendant asserts that the property's historical use is controlling with respect to whether East Sunnyside Lane is a public highway, private road open to motor vehicle traffic or a parking lot for purposes of a DWI offense. Defendant offers neither statute nor case law to support such a reading of the law.
An extensive review of case law reveals no decisions which articulate that in order to be classified as a "roadway", as defined in the context of a DWI prosecution, the parcel upon which the vehicle was operated must have been used as a public highway, private road open to motor vehicle traffic or parking lot for all time or for any particular length of time. To read such a requirement into the statute would undermine a fair number of DWI prosecutions on the irrelevant basis that at some remote historical time the "roadway" was private property or otherwise not open to the public for any purpose. Certainly this would be the result in Tarrytown and in other venues throughout Westchester County where many presently public roads, private roads open to motor vehicle traffic, and parking lots were historically a part of privately held farms and estates. To read a longevity requirement into the statute would not only be illogical, it would controvert the plain language of the statute. In construing a statute, the Court must apply a practical reading rather than an implausible interpretation unsupported by and contrary to the plain wording of the statute itself. See, Masters Cars Inc. v. Walters, 95 NY2d 395, 718 NYS2d 7 (2000). The only reasonable reading of the statute is for the Court to consider defendant's conduct in relation to the current status of the location on which he is alleged to have operated a vehicle in an intoxicated state.
Defendant concedes, as he must, that the alleged offenses occurred on the driveway of the Tarrytown House which currently serves a conference center comprised of ten buildings and which is routinely used as a meeting place for executives for Fortune 200 companies. The Court finds that this location is a roadway, particularly a private road open to motor vehicle traffic, as defined by the VTL § 1192(7). Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss the pending misdemeanor information is denied in its entirety.
Defendant's application for Sandoval, Dunaway and Huntley hearings are each granted and such hearings shall be conducted prior to trial. Defendant's Omnibus Motion is denied in all other respects.
The parties are directed to appear for a pre-trial conference on January 16, 2008. This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.