Opinion
4-22-0888
07-27-2023
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAQUESHA S. RAMEY, Defendant-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Knox County No. 21CF9 Honorable Richard H. Gambrell, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HARRIS JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: (1) The trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress her statements to the police and, even assuming error occurred, the alleged error was harmless. (2) The trial court did not err by allowing the admission of other-crimes evidence at defendant's trial. (3) Defendant failed to establish that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence.
¶ 2 Following a jury trial, defendant, Maquesha S. Ramey, was found guilty of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2020)) and sentenced to 65 years in prison. She appeals, arguing the trial court erred by (1) denying her motion to suppress statements she made to the police after she invoked both her right to remain silent and her right to an attorney, (2) allowing the admission of other-crimes evidence at her trial and failing to provide a limiting instruction to the jury regarding such evidence, and (3) imposing an excessive prison sentence. We
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 In January 2021, the State charged defendant with three counts of first degree murder (id. § 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2)) in connection with the shooting death of Rachel Likes in Galesburg, Illinois, on January 4, 2021. It also filed a notice of intent to seek a life sentence, alleging:
"1. The murder was committed in a cold, calculated[,] and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme[,] or design to take a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result therefrom [citation]; and
2. The murder was committed as a result of the intentional discharge of a firearm by the defendant from a motor vehicle and the victim was not present within the motor vehicle [citation]." See id. § 9-1(b)(11), (b)(15).
¶ 5 The State's theory of the case was that toward the end of December 2020, defendant and her boyfriend, Michael Hubbard, ended their relationship. Following their break-up, defendant traveled to Mississippi to visit relatives and purchased a gun. On January 4, 2021, defendant returned to Galesburg, disguised herself with a wig, and drove to Hubbard's residence. There, she encountered Likes, Hubbard's new girlfriend, whom she shot and killed before fleeing the scene.
¶ 6 A. Pretrial Proceedings
¶ 7 In October 2021, defendant filed a motion to suppress statements she made to the police shortly following the shooting during two recorded interviews, occurring on January 4 and 5, 2021. Defendant alleged the shooting occurred at approximately 5 p.m. on January 4 and that she was "quickly developed as a suspect in the case." The same night, defendant turned herself in and was questioned by Detectives Mark McLaughlin and Timothy Spitzer for approximately an hour and a half, beginning at 9:40 p.m. According to defendant, the detectives read her the Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) and she agreed to speak with them, denying any involvement in the shooting. Defendant alleged, however, that after approximately 15 minutes, and following challenges to her veracity, she invoked both her right to remain silent and her right to an attorney through the following statements:
" 'Okay, I don't have nothing else to say. You can call his baby mama and get me a lawyer. Because if you're going to sit here and tell me that *** if you didn't see no car on camera, or ya'll got no proof of any of this, y'all need to let me go.' "
Defendant maintained that questioning by the detectives continued and, approximately 20 minutes into the interview, she again asserted her right to remain silent by "telling the detectives to charge her if they are going to but she has nothing else to say." Defendant argued the detectives ignored all of her invocations of her rights and impermissibly continued with the interrogation, requiring the suppression of the remainder of her statements.
¶ 8 In December 2021, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. Recordings of both of defendant's interviews were played at the hearing.
¶ 9 At the outset of the first interview on January 4, 2021, the detectives read defendant the Miranda warnings and she agreed to speak with them. Initially, defendant denied any involvement in the shooting and maintained that she had been traveling to Illinois from Mississippi at the time that the shooting occurred. Defendant reported that she did not arrive in Galesburg until after 5 p.m. She indicated that she had been having difficulties with Hubbard, that she had been "running" from him, and that Hubbard had done the same "s*** to his baby mama." The detectives confronted defendant with inconsistencies in her story and evidence that contradicted her statements, including that her vehicle was captured on security cameras outside her residence much earlier in the day and that security cameras showed her vehicle leaving her residence shortly before the shooting. Approximately 15 minutes into the interview, and after the detectives told defendant her vehicle was described as being at the scene of the shooting, defendant made the first statement alleged in her motion:
"Okay, I don't have nothing else to say. You can call his baby mama and get me a lawyer. Because if you're going to sit here and tell me that *** if you didn't see no car on camera, or y'all got no proof of any of this, y'all need to let me go."
¶ 10 Detective McLaughlin responded, stating, "I'm telling you, I saw it on the housing camera." Defendant then stated, "That's the housing camera. You said that my car left housing at the time of the shooting. So listen to me if my car-what gun am I going to shoot with?" The interview continued with defendant denying involvement in the shooting and maintaining that she did not possess or carry a gun.
¶ 11 Approximately five minutes later, Detective McLaughlin asked defendant if she knew Likes's child was in the car at the time of the shooting, and he questioned who was with defendant in her car. Defendant then stated, "If you're going to charge me, go ahead. If not, I don't [unintelligible] nothing else, alright [unintelligible]." Detective McLaughlin responded to defendant, stating as follows: "I'm not gonna sit here and make you talk if you don't wanna talk. But I'm trying to give you your chance to talk. If everyone else is gonna talk, it's not fair if everyone else talks and you don't get a chance to talk." Following McLaughlin's statement, defendant again denied that she possessed a gun. As the interview continued, defendant ultimately admitted her involvement in the shooting. She indicated she knew Likes had been involved with Hubbard, asserted she intended to scare Likes, and stated she was "guilty" and that she "retaliated" against Likes. Defendant also reported that it was Likes who pulled out a gun. She asserted she grabbed the gun from Likes and the shooting was an accident.
¶ 12 Evidence at the suppression hearing showed the January 5, 2021, interview was conducted the next morning, after defendant asked to speak with the detectives. At the beginning of the interview, the detectives read defendant the Miranda warnings, and defendant agreed to speak with them. She reported that she wanted to talk to the detectives because things were not "adding up." During the interview, defendant reported that she went to Hubbard's residence to get her son's clothing. While there, she and Likes wrestled over the gun, and she took the gun from Likes. Defendant estimated that the gun went off three times during that scuffle. She further stated that she "waved the gun" and it was possible the gun went off when she was waving it. Defendant maintained that the gun belonged to Hubbard and that she tossed the gun out of her car window as she left the scene. As she drove away, Likes was talking to her, and Hubbard was "pulling up."
¶ 13 In opposition to defendant's motion to suppress, the State presented testimony from both Detective McLaughlin and Detective Spitzer. McLaughlin testified defendant's reference to a lawyer during the first interview was "hard to understand at the time" and did "[n]ot really" make sense to him. Neither McLaughlin nor Spitzer understood defendant to be asking for a lawyer. Additionally, McLaughlin testified that defendant's initial comment that she had nothing else to say was made "all together" with other statements and that defendant "continued speaking." Regarding her second, similar comment, he stated that nothing in defendant's body language or the context in which her statement was made indicated she did not want to talk. Further, she continued to speak with the detectives after the comment was made.
¶ 14 The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress her statements. In setting forth its decision, the court stated it was accepting as correct defendant's description of her recorded statements as set forth in her motion to suppress. The court found defendant's reference to a lawyer during her January 4, 2021, interview was ambiguous and "not a clear request for an attorney." It also found that defendant never clearly invoked her right to remain silent, stating as follows:
"In fact, [defendant] spoke mostly unsolicited for lengthy periods of time on both days. During which she seemed to suggest at various points that any shooting was the result of self-defense or perhaps done by [Hubbard] *** or that any shooting that took place was an accident.
So I didn't see any point in either of the interviews where there was an invocation of the defendant's right to remain silent. And on both days, the defendant had been advised of her rights under Miranda prior to any sort of custodial interrogation."
¶ 15 Prior to trial, defendant also filed an amended motion in limine. Relevant to this appeal, she asked the trial court to bar the State from referencing or eliciting testimony about her prior conviction. Specifically, she sought to exclude references that she was a felon and on probation in both her recorded interviews with the police and in 911 calls she made after the shooting. She also sought to exclude testimony from her probation officer, Jonna VanArsdale, "regarding a pass [VanArsdale] provided to allow defendant to travel to Mississippi." In January 2022, the court conducted a hearing and denied defendant's requests. The court stated as follows:
"[A]s far as the testimony of *** VanArsdale, that testimony which I'm figuring is going to be limited to the fact that [defendant] was on probation and that she was authorized to travel to the State of Mississippi by her probation officer is not unduly prejudicial, and it might be material to issues that are properly before the Court, and Ms. VanArsdale wouldn't need to go into any of the details other than the mere
fact that [defendant] was on probation, and that would explain why she was asking for and receiving permission to leave the state.
Similarly, the audio portions where statements are made apparently by the defendant as to the fact that she's been convicted of a felony-and the particular statements aren't contained in the motion-but the fact that she's a felon or was on probation at the time that she was making the statements, the motion is denied as to that information. If-as I understand it, they are statements made by the defendant to law enforcement and to try to excise those words which are not in themselves inflammatory or prejudicial would require some sort of audio editing of what I assume will be audio tapes or recordings, and so those aspects of the amended motion in limine are denied as well."
¶ 16 B. Defendant's Jury Trial
¶ 17 In January 2022, defendant's jury trial was conducted. The State's evidence showed defendant and Hubbard had been in a dating relationship which ended following a fight between the two on December 25, 2020. Thereafter, Hubbard began dating Likes. At approximately 4:58 p.m. on January 4, 2021, Likes was shot to death inside her vehicle while it was parked outside of Hubbard's residence. Her four-year-old son was in the backseat of the car at the time of the shooting. Likes was shot multiple times, suffering gunshot wounds to her right index finger, left eye, chest, and left leg. Nine defects consistent with bullet holes were found on the driver's side of her vehicle. A bullet also went through the front window of Hubbard's residence. One 9-millimeter cartridge case was located on the ground underneath the driver's door of Likes's vehicle.
¶ 18 Hubbard testified that just prior to 5 p.m. on January 4, 2021, he was on his way home. As he got close to his street, he heard gunshots. He then saw a dark-colored car pulling away from the scene. Evidence showed defendant owned a dark-colored Chevrolet Malibu.
¶ 19 After the shooting, defendant twice called 911. Recordings of the calls were played for the jury. They showed that at 5:33 p.m., defendant called 911 and stated that family members informed her Hubbard told the police that she had "done something to his girlfriend." Defendant further reported that her probation officer "gave her a pass to go to Mississippi," she was "still out of town" and was supposed "get back today," but she had a flat tire on her car. Defendant maintained she was "out of the state" and had "not came back." According to defendant, she and Hubbard had been "broken up since *** Christmas day," and she was trying to figure out why people were telling her Hubbard said she "did something to his girlfriend." The 911 operator told defendant that an officer would return her call.
¶ 20 Defendant called 911 a second time at 5:41 p.m., and her call was forwarded to Lieutenant Darrin Worsfold of the Galesburg Police Department. Defendant told Worsfold that people were telling her that her "name ran across the scanner for something with *** Hubbard." Worsfold responded that the police needed to talk with defendant and asked if she was in town. Defendant asserted that she was not in town and told Worsfold to call her probation officer. She stated her probation officer gave her "a pass" to go out of town with her family, and she was supposed to be returning from out of town that day. Defendant maintained she was "on the *** highway trying to get back." Worsfold asked defendant for her phone number so that an investigator could call her. Defendant questioned why an investigator needed to speak with her and asked if Worsfold could call her probation officer instead. Worsfold responded that defendant's name came up in an investigation and, as a result, the investigator would have questions for her whether she was involved or not. Defendant then provided her phone number.
¶ 21 The State presented testimony from Jonna VanArsdale, who stated she was defendant's probation officer in December 2020. In May 2020, defendant "was transferred to [her] caseload" from Mississippi. On December 28, 2020, defendant called VanArsdale and requested "a travel permit" for December 29, 2020, to January 3, 2021, so that she could visit her grandmother in Waynesboro, Mississippi. VanArsdale gave defendant permission to travel.
¶ 22 The State's evidence further showed that on January 4, 2021, at 12:52 p.m., approximately four hours before the shooting, defendant was captured on surveillance video returning to her residence in Galesburg with two of her children. At 4:40 p.m., she was captured on camera leaving her residence with hair that was longer in appearance compared with images from earlier in the day. At 4:49 p.m., she drove away from her residence in a dark-colored Chevrolet Malibu. Defendant's Chevrolet Malibu was later discovered by the police behind a warehouse. Inside the vehicle, the police found a "Glock Modular Optic System," a Glock magazine loader, and three spent 9-millimeter cartridge cases.
¶ 23 During a search of defendant's residence, the police found a pink wig box with a wig inside and, in a bathroom trash can, packaging for a wig cap. Approximately two months after the shooting in March 2021, a Galesburg resident found a red DoorDash bag at the bottom of a ditch as he was cleaning up his property. Inside the bag, the police discovered a wig; a Glock gun case that contained a model 45 9-millimeter Glock handgun; two boxes of ammunition; two Glock magazines; and eight spent 9-millimeter cartridge cases. The State's firearms expert testified that the cartridge case recovered from the scene of the shooting, the three cartridge cases recovered from defendant's Malibu, and the eight cartridge cases recovered from the DoorDash bag were all fired from the same gun-the Glock firearm discovered inside the DoorDash bag.
¶ 24 The Glock firearm was registered to an individual named Deondre McGill of Gulfport, Mississippi. Information recovered from defendant's cell phone and Facebook account showed she communicated with McGill on January 2, 2021. Messages between the two indicated that they met in person and that defendant paid McGill money. In messages to defendant, McGill indicated defendant could pay him via "cash app" and that he had "some accessories for [her]."
¶ 25 Digital evidence in the case also showed that defendant searched Hubbard's name on Facebook 24 times between December 25, 2020, and January 3, 2021. On December 31, 2020, a video was created on defendant's phone that showed a Glock handgun on someone's lap. On January 2, 2021, defendant made several Internet searches related to that type of firearm. On January 3, 2021, a video of defendant firing what appeared to be a Glock handgun was created on defendant's phone. Additionally, on the afternoon of January 4, 2021, prior to the shooting, defendant watched several YouTube videos that provided information on how to "install" a bald cap and wig. At 1:20 p.m. on January 4, 2021, defendant sent a message to one of her contacts, stating, "I'm in town cuz *** don't tell anybody I'm back." At 4:46 p.m., she sent a photo of herself in a wig and a mask to one of her contacts.
¶ 26 As part of its case, the State also presented and played for the jury portions of defendant's recorded statements to the police on January 4 and 5, 2021.
¶ 27 Defendant testified on her own behalf. She stated she was born and raised in Waynesboro, Mississippi, and had family who continued to reside there. In August 2019, she moved to Galesburg. Defendant had three children and described herself as an "entrepreneur." One of her jobs included working for DoorDash. From August to December 2020, defendant was in a relationship with Hubbard. Defendant testified she and Hubbard had obtained a marriage license, and although they did not complete the necessary steps to become legally married, she considered herself married to Hubbard. She admitted to "obsessing" over Hubbard following their December 2020 break-up.
¶ 28 Defendant acknowledged traveling to Mississippi with her children at the end of December 2020. She testified she obtained permission from her probation officer to make the trip and that her "pass" to travel extended from December 29, 2020, to January 4, 2021. While in Mississippi, defendant purchased a gun from McGill, whom she described as an old friend. She maintained she intended to sell the gun to some Illinois gang members.
¶ 29 On January 4, 2021, defendant returned to Galesburg with two of her children, arriving between 11:30 a.m. and noon. She visited a "hair store" and purchased a lace-front wig. Defendant stated she had recently cut her hair short and "wanted to try something different and pick [herself] up." She owned two other wigs but had not had a lace-front wig before. Defendant returned to her residence at approximately 12:50 p.m. She admitted messaging her cousin and asking him not to tell anyone she was in town, stating she did not want to be bothered. That afternoon, defendant watched several videos to learn how to "install" her new wig.
¶ 30 At some point, defendant decided to go to Hubbard's residence to retrieve her son's clothing, give Hubbard some of his mail, and discuss their relationship. When she left her residence, she was wearing her new wig. The gun she obtained from McGill was still in her car on the passenger seat. Defendant denied that, at that time, she knew about Likes or had any intention of harming anyone. At Hubbard's residence, defendant encountered Likes, who identified herself as Hubbard's girlfriend. While defendant and Likes were speaking, Hubbard arrived at the scene. Defendant testified she and Hubbard exchanged words and then she "grabbed the firearm." According to defendant, Hubbard "snatched the firearm out of [her] hand and the wig off of [her] head." She stated the gun went off three or four times as Hubbard took it from her. Defendant then drove away in her car, hearing additional gunshots as she left. Defendant denied that she was the one who shot Likes.
¶ 31 After the shooting, defendant drove around and received a call from a family member who told her Hubbard was saying she was "involved in a shooting." Defendant acknowledged making phone calls to the police. At the time she made the calls she was "scared" and "trying to avoid responsibility." She also testified that while her car was parked behind the warehouse, Hubbard's "foot soldier" came to her car "to collect any gun evidence that was there from the gun firing off." Defendant claimed the man picked up the cartridge cases that were in her car and grabbed the gun box.
¶ 32 Defendant further acknowledged that she previously provided statements to the police that contradicted her trial testimony. She explained that she made the statements because she was trying to protect Hubbard and because she was scared of him and what he might do to her family.
¶ 33 Ultimately, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. It also found proven allegations that defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death to another; the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme, or design to take a human life; and the murder was committed as a result of defendant's intentional discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle.
¶ 34 C. Posttrial Proceedings and Sentencing
¶ 35 In February 2022, defendant filed a posttrial motion for a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Relevant to this appeal, she challenged both the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress her statements to the police and the denial of her motion in limine to bar evidence that she was a felon and on probation. In March 2022, the court denied defendant's posttrial motion and conducted her sentencing hearing.
¶ 36 Defendant's presentence investigation report (PSI) showed she was 27 years old. Her criminal history included a 2019 conviction in Mississippi for theft, also described in the PSI as "[e]mbezzlement," for which she was sentenced to five years' probation.
¶ 37 Regarding defendant's upbringing and family history, the PSI showed defendant's parents were never married. She resided with her mother, whom she described as abusive, until the age of five, when she entered the Mississippi foster care system. Defendant lived "back and forth between her mother's home and foster care" until the age of 14, when she was permanently removed from her mother's care. Defendant then remained in foster care until the age of 18. In 2019, defendant moved to Galesburg, "hoping to build a relationship with her father"; however, the two ultimately "never formed any kind of a relationship." Defendant reported that her father had substance abuse issues and her mother, who passed away in 2019, had both substance abuse and mental health issues.
¶ 38 According to the PSI, defendant dropped out of high school in the tenth grade. She reported having "a lot of trouble in school" and "being enrolled in behavior modification classes." She was suspended several times for fighting. In 2011, defendant obtained her general equivalency degree. Defendant stated she took online classes, which "earn[ed] her enough credits for two years of college." Prior to her arrest, defendant worked for DoorDash. In 2017, she worked for an employer called Howard Industries. She also "assist[ed] an uncle preparing taxes during [the] tax season in 2020."
¶ 39 The PSI further showed defendant had three children, ages 8, 6, and 2. She reported suffering from mental health issues "her entire life" and having been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, conduct disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, bipolar disorder, and depression. The PSI stated defendant had problems controlling her anger, experienced suicidal thoughts, and made attempts at suicide "throughout her entire life." Since her January 2021 arrest, defendant had been placed on suicide watch multiple times.
¶ 40 Defendant maintained she also had substance abuse issues and that she was under the influence of drugs at the time of the offense. At age 10, she began smoking marijuana and thereafter continued with daily use of the drug. Since the age of 21, she used cocaine on a daily basis and frequently took Ecstasy pills. Defendant reported that she spent between $400 to $500 a week on drugs and that she was "a drug addict."
¶ 41 Finally, the PSI showed that following her arrest, defendant remained incarcerated in the Knox County jail. Her jail record showed she had "been on lock down for threatening an inmate, cursing at the guards, and getting into a fight with another inmate."
¶ 42 The record reflects that at sentencing, the trial court considered a victim impact statement from Likes's sister and testimony from two of defendant's relatives. Defendant's greataunt, Gwendolyn Donaldson, testified that defendant's parents were both drug addicts and that, as a child, defendant suffered abuse and was placed in foster care. Donaldson had the opportunity to know defendant as an adult and never observed defendant to demonstrate any violent tendencies. She stated defendant was raising her three young children and had made attempts to better herself. Donaldson asserted defendant had enrolled in culinary school, that she was a good mechanic, and she worked for DoorDash. She also recalled occasions when defendant had been helpful to others.
¶ 43 Defendant's great-uncle, Calvin Hawthorne, testified similarly, stating he did not know defendant to be violent and describing how she had helped him after he underwent eye surgery.
¶ 44 Defendant also provided a statement in allocution. She acknowledged that "[o]n January the 4th of 2020 [ sic ], [she] took a life," and stated there was "no excuse for [her] actions." She apologized to Likes, stating, "I'm sorry I held a gun and pulled the trigger that took your life." She further offered apologies to Likes's family members, stated that she was "taking full responsibility" for her actions, and asserted that what she did was wrong.
¶ 45 The trial court sentenced defendant to a total of 65 years in prison. Specifically, it imposed a 35-year sentence for one count of first degree murder, merging the three murder counts together, and imposed a 30-year firearm enhancement. The court stated the applicable aggravating factors included that defendant's actions caused or threatened serious harm, that defendant had a history of prior criminal activity, the need for deterrence, and that defendant committed a felony offense while on probation. It found no mitigating factors applied. In setting forth its decision, the court stated that defendant's statement in allocution was the first time during the case it heard defendant express any remorse for her actions. It also noted that the shooting occurred in a neighborhood while Likes's child was in the car, and that one of the bullets entered Hubbard's residence. The court pointed out that someone in the house or Likes's child could have been shot. It referenced testimony from defendant that, while on probation, she was using drugs in Mississippi and that she had purchased the gun. The court further stated as follows:
"I know that I heard evidence that you called in and indicated that you were still in Mississippi when the police were looking for ya. So I don't think that this was just a random spur-of-the-moment type of crime. And if it were, then I would be considering something closer to the mandatory minimum, but at the time you committed this offense and took that young lady's life, you were on probation, and you were violating that probation. So you have some criminal history. Granted, not a whole lot, [but] you were under a court order not to possess a firearm, and obviously, you took a number of steps to acquire the firearm and the ammunition,
[and] to figure out how to fire it ***."
¶ 46 In April 2022, defendant filed a motion to reconsider her sentence. She argued the trial court erred with respect to its findings as to the factors in aggravation and mitigation and that it imposed an excessive sentence. In September 2022, the court denied the motion.
¶ 47 This appeal followed.
¶ 48 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 49 A. Motion to Suppress
¶ 50 On appeal, defendant first argues the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress her recorded statements to the police. She contends that during her January 4, 2021, interview, she (1) twice invoked her right to remain silent by telling the interviewing detectives that she had" 'nothing else to say'" and (2) once invoked her right to an attorney by asking the detectives to get her a lawyer. Defendant contends the detectives ignored and failed to" 'scrupulously honor'" her invocations, requiring the suppression of all of her subsequent statements recorded on both January 4 and 5, 2021.
¶ 51 "A trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is reviewed under a two-part standard." People v. Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 75, 202 N.E.3d 283. "Factual findings by the trial court will be reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, but the ultimate legal determination as to whether suppression is warranted is reviewed de novo." Id.
¶ 52 The United States Supreme Court's decision in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, prohibits the admission at trial of statements made by a suspect during a custodial interrogation "unless the prosecution demonstrates that the suspect has been warned of the right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney." Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 77. "A suspect may waive these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). "Where the defendant challenges the admissibility of an inculpatory statement by filing a motion to suppress, the State bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statement was voluntary." Id. ¶ 84.
¶ 53 Regarding the right to counsel, the United States Supreme Court has held that "if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation." Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 ("If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."). Whether a suspect has invoked his right to counsel is an objective inquiry. Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59. By contrast, the cessation of questioning is not required when a suspect makes only an "ambiguous or equivocal" reference to an attorney, "in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel." (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 459.
¶ 54 Similarly, an interrogation must cease once the suspect indicates a desire to remain silent. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74. "[A]ny statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion ***." Id. at 474.
¶ 55 However, "[o]nce the right to remain silent has been waived, it can be invoked only by a defendant's positive assertion that he wants to remain silent." People v. Patterson, 217 Ill.2d 407, 445, 841 N.E.2d 889, 910-11 (2005). A suspect may invoke his right to silence "either verbally or through conduct that clearly indicates a desire to end all questioning." People v. Hernandez, 362 Ill.App.3d 779, 785, 840 N.E.2d 1254, 1259 (2005). "If verbal, the individual's demand to end the interrogation must be specific." Id. (finding the defendant had invoked his right to silence during police questioning when, after being informed of his rights and asked whether he wished to talk, the defendant responded," 'No, not no more' "). Like a request for counsel, invocation of the right to silence must be unambiguous and unequivocal. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381-82 (2010). Additionally, "[t]he statement must be examined in the factual context of its utterance." People v. Milner, 123 Ill.App.3d 656, 660, 463 N.E.2d 148, 152 (1984).
¶ 56 As noted, defendant contends that during her January 4 interview, she invoked her rights to counsel and to remain silent by requesting an attorney and twice expressing that she had "nothing else to say." We disagree and find defendant did not clearly and unequivocally invoke either right.
¶ 57 At the outset of the January 4 interview, the detectives read defendant the Miranda warnings, and she agreed to waive her rights and submit to questioning. Defendant spoke with the detectives for over 15 minutes before commenting as follows:
"Okay, I don't have nothing else to say. You can call his baby mama and get me a lawyer. Because if you're going to sit here and tell me that *** if you didn't see no car on camera, or y'all got no proof of any of this, y'all need to let me go."
The record reflects defendant's comments were made after the detectives began to challenge her version of events. Given these circumstances, defendant's statement that she had "nothing else to say" could be viewed as an assertion that she had no additional or alternative information to provide the detectives in response to their challenge. Neither the language used by defendant nor her actions during the interview necessarily establish that she wanted all questioning to end.
¶ 58 Additionally, defendant's reference to a lawyer, when considered in context with her other comments, could be viewed as a statement meant to challenge to the detectives' assertion that they had incriminating evidence against her. After referencing a lawyer, defendant commented, "if you didn't see no car on camera, or y'all got no proof of any of this, y'all need to let me go." Instead of seeking to terminate questioning, defendant's comments appear to be an attempt to argue with the detectives and deny their assertions. Her comments also indicate that she was attempting to persuade the detectives of her purported innocence, as well as Hubbard's possible involvement in the shooting. Notably, defendant's reference to a lawyer was made in connection with a comment about Hubbard's "baby mama." Minutes prior to making the challenged statements, defendant stated: "Everything that's going on with me right now[,] [Hubbard] just did this s*** to his baby mama."
¶ 59 Defendant maintains that approximately five minutes after the above comments, she again informed the detectives that she had "nothing else to say." Initially, we note that portions of this second pertinent comment were unintelligible. However, even assuming that her statement was, as alleged, similar to her first comment, it does not reflect a clear and unequivocal invocation of her right to remain silent. Instead, it could be viewed as an expression that she had already provided all of the information she wanted to provide on the subject being discussed and that she had no further explanation for what had occurred.
¶ 60 Additionally, even assuming that defendant had invoked both her right to counsel and her right to remain silent during her January 4 interview and the trial court erred by not ordering the suppression of statements defendant made on that date, no error occurred with respect to the admission of defendant's January 5 statements.
¶ 61 "It is well established *** that the right to the assistance of counsel during interrogation may be subsequently waived despite an initial request therefor." People v. Aldridge, 79 Ill.2d 87, 92, 402 N.E.2d 176, 179 (1980). As noted, interrogations must cease after a suspect expresses his desire for counsel "unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). Courts apply a two-part inquiry to determine whether a suspect's statements that are made following a request for an attorney are admissible. People v. Woolley, 178 Ill.2d 175, 198, 687 N.E.2d 979, 990 (1997). "The preliminary inquiry is whether the accused, rather than the police, initiated further discussion after invoking the right to counsel." Id. To do this, "the accused must make a statement that evinces a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The second inquiry is "whether the accused's subsequent waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and intelligent." Id. at 199. "The question at this juncture is whether the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that the accused reopened dialogue with the police, shows that the accused knowingly and intelligently waived his right to the presence of counsel during questioning." Id.
¶ 62 Additionally, in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102-03 (1975), the Supreme Court held that its decision in Miranda did not "create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning" of a suspect after an invocation of the right to remain silent. Instead, it stated that "the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his 'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored.' "Id. at 104.
"In deciding this question, courts should consider whether (1) the police immediately halted the initial interrogation after the defendant invoked his right to remain silent; (2) a significant amount of time elapsed between the interrogations; (3) a fresh set of Miranda warnings were given prior to the second interrogation; and (4) the second interrogation addressed a crime that was not the subject of the first interrogation." People v. Nielson, 187 Ill.2d 271, 287, 718 N.E.2d 131, 142
(1999) (citing Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-05).
Further, in People v. Brownell, 79 Ill.2d 508, 519, 404 N.E.2d 181, 187 (1980), our supreme court interpreted the foregoing language from Mosley as "including] only the statement obtained as a result of not honoring the defendant's right to cut off questioning," stating it did not think the Supreme Court "intended that all subsequent statements are to be excluded." (Emphasis omitted.)
¶ 63 In this case, defendant's two interviews took place on consecutive days. The January 5 interview was initiated by defendant and occurred at approximately 8:30 a.m., roughly 10 hours after her January 4 interview had ended. At the outset of the January 5 interview, defendant was reread the Miranda warnings, waived her rights, and clearly expressed a desire to speak with the detectives. The trial court below accurately characterized defendant as speaking "mostly unsolicited for lengthy periods of time" during the interview. Under these circumstances, we find defendant's January 5 statements were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made and therefore admissible.
¶ 64 Moreover, we find that the admissibility of defendant's January 5 statements renders any possible error in the admission of her January 4 statements harmless. "In determining whether a constitutional error is harmless, the test to be applied is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error at issue did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Patterson, 217 Ill.2d at 428. Our supreme court has set forth three different approaches for determining whether a constitutional error amounts to harmless error:
"(1) focusing on the error to determine whether it might have contributed to the conviction, (2) examining the other evidence in the case to see if overwhelming evidence supports the conviction, and (3) determining whether the improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative or duplicates properly admitted evidence."
Id.
¶ 65 Here, during her January 5 interview, defendant provided an account of the shooting that was similar to the account she provided on January 4, only more detailed. Defendant placed herself outside Hubbard's residence when the shooting occurred. Like she did during her January 4 interview, defendant maintained that she encountered Likes outside Hubbard's residence, reported that Likes was the one with the gun, asserted she took the gun from Likes, stated that she left the gun at the scene, and maintained that Hubbard was arriving on the scene as she was leaving. Ultimately, the inculpatory statements defendant provided to the police on January 4 were largely duplicated during her January 5 interview.
¶ 66 Additionally, the record otherwise reflects that the State presented strong evidence of defendant's guilt. Its evidence showed defendant and Hubbard had recently ended their romantic relationship, and after their break-up, defendant traveled to Mississippi, where she purchased a gun. On January 4, defendant returned to Galesburg but asked a relative not to tell anyone that she was in town. Just prior to the shooting, defendant was captured on security cameras leaving her residence after having altered her appearance by donning a wig. A vehicle similar in appearance to defendant's vehicle was observed at the scene of the shooting. Cartridge cases ejected from the gun that defendant purchased in Mississippi were found at the scene of the shooting and in defendant's car. The gun was located in a ditch inside a DoorDash bag that also held a wig and additional cartridge cases that had been ejected from the gun. Evidence in the case established defendant worked as a DoorDash driver. After the shooting, defendant attempted to hide her vehicle and falsely claimed to be out of town.
¶ 67 Accordingly, under the facts presented, even if defendant's January 4 statements were improperly admitted, given the admissibility of her January 5 statements and the strength of the State's evidence, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 68 B. Other-Crimes Evidence
¶ 69 Defendant next argues she was denied her right to a fair trial due to the improper admission of other-crimes evidence, i.e., evidence that she was on felony probation at the time of the underlying offense. Specifically, she challenges (1) the testimony from her probation officer that she was given permission to travel out of state in December 2020 and (2) statements during both the recordings of her 911 calls and her interviews with the police that referred to her probation and the permission she received to travel. Defendant maintains evidence that she was on felony probation had no relevance to the charged offenses and, thus, it should not have been admitted. She also argues the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury not to consider the challenged evidence as evidence of her propensity to commit crimes.
¶ 70 "Evidence of other crimes is admissible if it is relevant for any purpose other than to show the defendant's propensity to commit crime." People v. Pikes, 2013 IL 115171, ¶ 11, 998 N.E.2d 1247. In particular, other-crimes evidence is "admissible to show modus operandi, intent, motive, identity, or absence of mistake with respect to the crime with which the defendant is charged." Id. Such evidence may also be admitted "when it constitutes a continuing narrative of the circumstances attending the entire transaction" (People v. Carter, 362 Ill.App.3d 1180, 1189, 841 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (2005)) or "to demonstrate the defendant's consciousness of guilt" (People v. Abernathy, 402 Ill.App.3d 736, 753, 931 N.E.2d 345, 359 (2010)).
¶ 71 "However, even where relevant, the evidence should not be admitted if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect." Pikes, 2013 IL 115171, ¶ 11. Ultimately, the trial court has discretion regarding the admissibility of other-crimes evidence, and its ruling will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. ¶ 12. An abuse of discretion will be found where "the trial court's decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 125, 106 N.E.3d 944.
¶ 72 In this instance, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in finding the other- crimes evidence was admissible at trial. First, evidence showed that the gun used in the offense was registered to an individual in Mississippi, with whom defendant was in communication. Testimony from VanArsdale, defendant's probation officer, was relevant to establishing that defendant traveled to Mississippi, where the State alleged she purchased the gun, and the dates of her travel.
¶ 73 Citing this court's decision in People v. Pitts, 257 Ill.App.3d 949, 629 N.E.2d 770 (1994), defendant argues VanArsdale's testimony was not necessary to establish either that she traveled to Mississippi or when she traveled. Specifically, she argues the circumstances of her travel were sufficiently established through other evidence the State presented, including surveillance video that showed the date of her return to Galesburg, "cell site" evidence indicating defendant's location on the date of the offense, her statements to detectives, and Facebook correspondence indicating she was in Mississippi.
¶ 74 In Pitts, the State sought to introduce testimony from the defendant's probation officer to prove the defendant's address, arguing such evidence "was relevant for the limited purpose of proving identity." Id. at 953. The facts showed the State rejected an offer from the defendant to stipulate to his address and also intended to present testimony from the defendant's building manager to confirm both the defendant's address and that a key found in the victim's apartment unlocked the defendant's door. Id. The trial court allowed the probation officer's testimony and instructed the jury that it "could only be considered for the issue of defendant's identity." Id. On review, this court determined the trial court erred, stating as follows:
"The building manager's testimony was required in order to prove the key fit [the] defendant's door lock. This testimony convincingly proved that [the] defendant lived at the address in question. The only conceivable purpose in presenting the probation officer's testimony was to advise the jury of [the] defendant's criminal past. Where there is no question as to [the] defendant's identity, it is reversible error to admit evidence of other crimes for the purpose of identifying [the] defendant." Id.
¶ 75 We find Pitts distinguishable. VanArsdale's testimony was not utilized to prove an issue that was not in question. Rather, that testimony, along with other evidence presented by the State, helped establish material facts relevant to the State's case, including defendant's opportunity to obtain the murder weapon prior to the shooting. Unlike in Pitts, defendant does not contend that, here, there was any offer to stipulate to her travel or her location on any particular date. Additionally, the other evidence utilized to establish her travel, which defendant argues included her own statements both to the police and in correspondence with others, is not of the same character as the other evidence relied upon in Pitts to otherwise establish that defendant's identity.
¶ 76 Also, as argued by the State, the issue of defendant obtaining permission from her probation officer to travel was also relevant to her consciousness of guilt. "A false exculpatory statement is probative of a defendant's consciousness of guilt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Milka, 211 Ill.2d 150, 181, 810 N.E.2d 33, 51 (2004). In this case, immediately after the shooting, defendant falsely claimed that she was out of town or out of state when the shooting occurred. She called 911 to report that she heard her name was being brought up in connection with an investigation involving Hubbard and, significantly, she attempted to direct the police to her probation officer to establish an alibi. Defendant's attempts to rely on the permission she received from her probation officer to travel were, as the State argues, an effort to "obfuscate the investigation" into the shooting. The record reflects that defendant made similar statements when interviewed by the detectives. Defendant's false and contradictory statements to law enforcement in the immediate aftermath of the shooting, including her references to her probation officer, were clearly relevant to establishing her guilt.
¶ 77 Moreover, as indicated by the trial court, the prejudicial effect of the challenged evidence was limited and did not outweigh its probative value. In particular, although evidence showed defendant was on probation or felony probation, no reference was made to her specific underlying conviction or the circumstances of that offense. Also, defendant's assertion on appeal that her "felony probation permeated the trial" is not supported by the record.
¶ 78 As noted, defendant also complains that the trial court did not provide a limiting instruction regarding the other-crimes evidence to the jury. "A limiting instruction reduces any prejudice created by admitting other-crimes evidence." People v. Young, 381 Ill.App.3d 595, 601, 887 N.E.2d 649, 654 (2008). This court has previously stated that "[b]ecause of the significant prejudice to a defendant's case that the admission of other crimes evidence usually risks, *** trial courts should not only [give a limiting instruction] at the close of the case, but also orally from the bench (unless defendant objects) at the time the evidence is first presented to the jury." People v. Denny, 241 Ill.App.3d 345, 360-61, 608 N.E.2d 1313, 1324 (1993). However, we have also declined to find that the court's failure to give a limiting instruction sua sponte was plain error (id. at 360) and have otherwise held the trial court has "no independent duty to tender such an instruction" (People v. Cregar, 172 Ill.App.3d 807, 822, 526 N.E.2d 1376, 1387 (1988)); see People v. Musitief 201 Ill.App.3d 872, 877, 559 N.E.2d 520, 525 (1990) (stating the trial court does not have an obligation to sua sponte give an other-crimes limiting instruction).
¶ 79 Here, defendant offers no argument that she requested any limiting instruction with respect to the other-crimes evidence. We decline to find reversible error because the trial court did not sua sponte provide a limiting instruction, particularly where, as here, the State presented strong evidence of defendant's guilt and the record does not reflect any significant prejudice to defendant from the challenged evidence.
¶ 80 C. Sentence
¶ 81 Finally, on appeal, defendant argues her 65-year prison sentence was excessive. To support her claim, she contends the trial court overlooked or ignored several factors in mitigation, including her minimal criminal background, history of substance abuse and mental health issues, difficult upbringing, employment history and support of her young children, and expression of remorse. Defendant contends her sentence should be reduced to the mandatory minimum sentence of 45 years in prison or that the matter be remanded for resentencing.
¶ 82 The Illinois Constitution provides "[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. "This constitutional mandate calls for balancing the retributive and rehabilitative purposes of punishment, and the process requires careful consideration of all factors in aggravation and mitigation." People v. Daly, 2014 IL App (4th) 140624, ¶ 26, 21 N.E.3d 810.
¶ 83 "The trial court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence, and its sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference." People v. Alexander, 239 Ill.2d 205, 212, 940 N.E.2d 1062, 1066 (2010). A court's sentencing determination must be based "on the particular circumstances of each case, considering such factors as the defendant's credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age." People v. Fern, 189 Ill.2d 48, 53, 723 N.E.2d 207, 209 (1999). "[A] reviewing court may not modify a defendant's sentence absent an abuse of discretion." People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382, ¶ 36, 959 N.E.2d 656. "A sentence will be deemed an abuse of discretion where the sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alexander, 239 Ill.2d at 212.
¶ 84 Further, "the seriousness of the offense, rather than any mitigating evidence, is the most important factor in sentencing." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Wheeler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160937, ¶ 38, 126 N.E.3d 787. "A reviewing court will presume that the trial court considered all relevant factors and any mitigating evidence presented [citation] and may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed these factors differently." Id. "A sentence within the statutory guidelines provided by the legislature is presumed to be proper." Id.
¶ 85 Here, the parties agree that defendant in this case faced a sentence of 45 years to life in prison. Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2020). For that offense, the Unified Code of Corrections provides for a sentencing range of 20 to 60 years in prison. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2020). Where certain aggravating factors are present, including the ones found by the jury in this case, the trial court may sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment. Id. § 5-8-1(a)(1)(b); 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11), (b)(15) (West 2020). Also, if the defendant is found to have discharged a firearm that proximately caused the death of another, a firearm enhancement of 25 years up to a term of natural life in prison must be added to the sentence imposed by the court. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2020).
¶ 86 As set forth above, the trial court in this case sentenced defendant to a total of 65 years in prison-a 35-year sentence for first degree murder with a 30-year firearm enhancement. When imposing defendant's sentence, the court found the applicable aggravating factors included (1) that defendant's actions caused or threatened serious harm, (2) that defendant had a history of prior criminal activity, (3) the need for deterrence, and (4) that defendant committed a felony offense while on probation. The court's comments further reflect that it relied on the seriousness of the offense, including that the evidence did not reflect the murder was a "spur-of-the-moment type of crime." We find no error in the court's considerations.
¶ 87 The State presented evidence that defendant was upset by her break-up with Hubbard, and evidence that suggested planning and forethought by defendant regarding the shooting. Defendant obtained a firearm and ammunition following the break-up, attempted to conceal her return to Galesburg on January 4, and altered her appearance before going to Hubbard's residence with the firearm. Additionally, as the trial court pointed out, the shooting occurred in a residential area while Likes's four-year-old child was in the car. A bullet also struck Hubbard's residence, threatening serious harm to the individuals present inside.
¶ 88 Although on appeal, defendant argues her lack of significant criminal history should have been deemed mitigating, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that it was, instead, aggravating and not supportive of a more lenient sentence. While a statutory mitigating factor is that "[t]he defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present crime" (id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(7)), the statutory aggravating factors include that "the defendant has a history of prior delinquency or criminal activity" (id. § 5-5-3.2(a)(3)). In this instance, defendant, in fact, had a history of criminal activity, in that she had a prior felony conviction for theft, for which she was sentenced to five years' probation. Defendant was on probation for that prior offense at the time of the shooting, which is also a statutory aggravating factor. Id. § 5-5-3.2(a)(12). Additionally, evidence at defendant's trial suggested several ways in which she was noncompliant with her probation.
¶ 89 Defendant also argues that additional mitigating factors that the trial court overlooked or ignored include her drug addiction and her mental health issues. Initially, we find that the record does not support a finding that the court overlooked or ignored any of the evidence presented to it by the parties. Moreover, the court was not required to find either of these circumstances mitigating. As this court has noted, drug addiction is not an explicit statutory factor in mitigation or aggravation and "a history of substance abuse is a 'double-edged sword' that the trial court may view as a mitigating or aggravating factor." People v. Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 105, 126 N.E.3d 703. Similarly, "a defendant's mental or psychological impairments are not inherently mitigating," as such impairments could be viewed as demonstrative of "possible future dangerousness." (internal quotation marks omitted.) Wheeler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160937, ¶ 44. Nothing in the arguments presented by defendant on appeal persuades us that the court abused its discretion by not finding either defendant's substance abuse or her mental health issues to be mitigating.
¶ 90 Defendant further points to her statement in allocution and expressions of remorse for the crime as mitigating evidence weighing in her favor. We note, however, that the trial court was not required to accept defendant's statements that she was remorseful without question. Further, the court's comments in this instance suggest that it had doubts about defendant's sincerity. Again, the record reflects no abuse of discretion by the court.
¶ 91 Finally, defendant additionally points to evidence that she had an unstable and abusive upbringing, as well as evidence showing she had a history of employment and supporting her three young children. However, none of these factors was entitled to any greater weight than the aggravating factors relied upon by the trial court, nor do they necessarily require the imposition of lesser sentence.
¶ 92 As noted above, the trial court has broad discretionary powers when determining a defendant's sentence. In this instance, the record does not support a finding that the court abused its discretion, and the sentence it imposed was neither "greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, [n]or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alexander, 239 Ill.2d at 212.
¶ 93 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 94 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 95 Affirmed.