Opinion
A149932
06-21-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SATTAR QURAISH, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. 219442)
Defendant Sattar Quraish entered a guilty plea to one count of robbery in exchange for the dismissal of eight other counts and the agreement from the prosecution that "[a]t the successful completion of probation in three years," Quraish would have the robbery conviction (a strike) replaced by a conviction of grand theft from the person (not a strike). While on probation, Quraish twice admitted he violated the terms of probation by engaging in criminal activity, and in each instance, the trial court ordered Quraish to serve time in custody, and reinstated and extended probation.
Upon completion of probation, Quraish filed a motion for specific performance of the plea bargain. The trial court denied the motion finding Quraish did not successfully complete probation. Quraish appeals, contending he successfully completed probation and is entitled to the benefit of the plea bargain. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The San Francisco County District Attorney filed a complaint charging Quraish with three counts of second degree robbery of three different victims, three counts of receiving stolen property, second degree burglary, grand theft by fraud, and acquiring access cards without the cardholder's or issuer's consent.
Three codefendants were also charged.
On January 17, 2013, Quraish and one of his codefendants reached an agreement with the prosecutor. Defense counsel stated the two defendants would plead guilty to one count of second degree robbery and, "[a]t the successful completion of probation in three years, both Mr. Quraish and [co-defendant] will come back to court and the 211 [second degree robbery] will be dismissed [under Penal Code section] 1385, nunc pro tunc, and nunc pro tunc in its place will be Penal Code Section 487(c), grand theft from the person as a felony." Quraish pleaded guilty to second degree robbery.
The trial court (Hon. Bruce E. Chan) continued sentencing until Quraish had DNA collected. The judge warned him that if he were arrested before he returned for sentencing, the agreement was off. He told Quraish, "Your attorney has done a very good job for you persuading the District Attorney to give you a chance to get the strike off your record. Both you and your co-defendants here, the only thing you've got going, in my mind, is the fact that you haven't been to prison before, and that you're young. But if you commit another offense I would have no hesitation to send you to prison. I don't say that very often, but it is true here."
At sentencing on February 14, 2013, the trial court (Judge Chan) suspended imposition of sentence and placed Quraish on three years formal probation with the condition he serve 353 days in county jail with credit for time served.
In August 2013, the District Attorney filed a motion to revoke probation after Quraish was arrested on August 16, 2013, with 15 baggies of marijuana and a scale in the trunk of his car. On August 27, 2013, Quraish admitted he violated the terms of probation by possessing marijuana for sale. The trial court (Hon. Philip J. Moscone) found Quraish in violation of probation. It reinstated probation with the modifications that he serve 60 additional days in county jail with 12 days of credit for time served, and that probation would expire February 26, 2016, a 10-day extension of probation.
In April 2014, the District Attorney filed another motion to revoke probation after Quraish was arrested again with marijuana, baggies, and a scale. This time he also gave a false name when questioned by the police. On May 2, 2014, Quraish admitted he violated the terms of probation, and his counsel stipulated the probation report and attached police report provided a factual basis for the admission. The trial court (Hon. Jeffrey S. Ross) accepted the admission and reinstated probation with the modifications that he serve an additonal six months in county jail with credit for time served of 18 days and that probation would expire March 7, 2016, another 10-day extension of probation. On June 20, 2014, the order of May 2 was recalled and modified to require Quraish serve 66 days in county jail (rather than six months) because he obtained his high school diploma. His probation period remained extended to March 7, 2016.
The probation report documented that Quraish was arrested on April 15, 2014, for possession of marijuana, transportation of marijuana, delaying a peace officer with false information, driving on a suspended license, and failure to yield on a left turn. Police officers had found Quraish at the scene of a car accident. The officers concluded he caused the collision by failing to yield to the other vehicle. Quraish gave his brother's name and date of birth, but the officers realized who he was. In a probation search of Quraish's car, which smelled strongly of marijuana, officers found a small scale and a backpack containing 103 grams of marijuana and baggies.
After the probation period expired, Quraish moved for specific performance of the plea bargain, arguing he successfully completed his probation as contemplated in the plea bargain. At the beginning of the hearing on the motion, the trial court (again, Judge Chan) stated it did not understand, after looking at the court's record, how Quraish met his side of the plea bargain. The court noted that Quraish admitted he was in violation for criminal behavior on two occasions. Each time Quraish admitted a probation violation based on criminal activity, he was ordered to serve time in county jail, and the probation period was extended.
Defense counsel argued the phrase "successfully complete probation" in the plea bargain simply meant that the probation period ends without either termination of probation "as unsuccessful such as . . . pleading to a new matter" or "revocation and a sentence to state prison or 1170(h)." He asserted, "I take no issue with the fact that Mr. Quraish committed and admitted violations of his probation. But the premise of the plea was that he successfully complete probation. And as I read that in what I see as the world of positive outcomes to probation, probation wasn't terminated unsuccessful and wasn't revoked. And in my mind . . . the only thing that's left is successful completion."
The trial court asked, "Are you saying then that absent specific language at the time of the negotiations that equated any modification for criminal behavior as being an act that is not success, that because that wasn't spelled out explicitly then the Court should reduce the conviction? [¶] Because I think that's been the practice or understanding here commonly that if you're on probation, to be successful means you don't get arrested and you don't get found in violation either after a contested hearing or admission." Defense counsel responded that plea bargains are contracts and the terms of the contract control.
The trial court denied Quraish's motion.
DISCUSSION
" 'A negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, and it is interpreted according to general contract principles. [Citations.]' [Citation.] ' "The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties. [Citation.] . . . ." [Citation.]' " (In re Timothy N. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 725, 734 (Timothy N.).) Interpretation of a plea agreement is based on an objective standard in which the defendant's reasonable beliefs control. (Ibid.) Since interpretation does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence in this case, we interpret the plea bargain de novo, the standard of review generally applied to contracts. (In re Ricardo C. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 688, 696.)
Here, the question is what would Quraish reasonably believe the phrase "successful completion of probation" meant when he agreed to the plea bargain? Quraish contends a reasonable defendant "would believe such a condition meant only that he finish his three year probation term," which he did, regardless of his performance on probation. We disagree.
In Timothy N., supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at page 727, Timothy, a juvenile, reached an agreement with the prosecutor that he would plead guilty to one count of burglary in exchange for the dismissal of five other counts and the promise that if Timothy " 'successfully complete[d] probation' the prosecutor would dismiss the residential burglary allegation and reduce the charge to a misdemeanor." As in the present case, the parties did not further define the phrase "successfully complete probation." The trial court found Timothy fulfilled all the conditions of probation except that he had not paid the full amount of victim restitution. It terminated jurisdiction finding Timothy " 'complied with all the terms and conditions and he has terminated probation entirely successfully.' " (Id. at pp. 727-728.) However, when Timothy moved to enforce the plea agreement, the trial court denied the motion on the ground he had not successfully completed probation because the restitution had not been fully paid. (Id. at p. 728.)
The appellate court reversed. After noting that the phrase " 'successfully complete probation,' " "appears to have no standard meaning and is ambiguous," the court reasoned, "resolving the ambiguity of the phrase 'successfully complete probation' in Timothy's favor, as we must, we conclude that Timothy would have reasonably believed that he would be deemed to have 'successfully complete[d] probation' if he completed his term of probation without having engaged in conduct that provided a basis for the court to revoke his probation. Timothy clearly met this standard." (Timothy N., supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 735.)
We agree with the reasoning of Timothy N. A defendant in Quraish's position would have reasonably believed he successfully completed probation "if he completed his term of probation without having engaged in conduct that provided a basis for the court to revoke his probation." (Timothy N., supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 735.) But Quraish did not meet this standard. He admittedly engaged in criminal conduct that provided a basis for the court to revoke his probation twice. It would not have been reasonable for Quraish to believe that "successful completion of probation" meant he could continue to engage in criminal conduct while on probation, serve additional time in county jail on two occasions because of that conduct, and have the probation period extended on two occasions because of that conduct.
Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's determination that Quraish was not entitled to enforcement of the plea bargain because he did not meet the requirement of "successful completion of probation."
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Miller, J. We concur: /s/_________
Kline, P.J. /s/_________
Stewart, J.