Opinion
H025281.
10-22-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JESUS ARMANDO QUINTERO, Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Jesus Armando Quintero pled guilty to possession of cocaine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351) and admitted an enhancement for serving a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) after the court denied his motion to suppress evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5. He contends on appeal that the court erred in denying his suppression motion because the traffic stop in this case was unlawful. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2002, narcotics teams in Santa Cruz and Monterey counties were investigating Jose Luis Rodriguez, whom they suspected of selling drugs. On May 6, 2002, Monterey Police Officer Stephen McMahon was informed that Rodriguez might be traveling from Santa Cruz County to Monterey County that day. He was further informed that the suspect might be traveling in a white Mitsubishi Montero.
On the afternoon of May 6, 2002, Officer McMahon was in his patrol car along Highway 1 between Fort Ord and Seaside when he saw a white Mitsubishi Montero traveling south with two occupants. He followed the car for three miles on the freeway with other cars between his car and the Montero. The cars were all traveling between 60 and 65 miles per hour. McMahon moved up until there was only one car between him and the Montero.
At Del Monte Avenue, the Montero took the freeway exit. McMahon followed, with one car still in between. The speed limit posted on the off ramp was 45 miles per hour. As the three cars proceeded down the exit ramp past the posted speed limit sign, McMahon looked at his speedometer, which read 55 miles per hour. The two vehicles in front of him were going the same speed. Officer McMahon determined the Montero was speeding and he activated his lights. The Montero indicated a right turn and started to pull into a right turn lane. The other car went by and McMahon was then right behind the Montero.
The Montero made a right turn and then made another immediate right into a parking lot. As it came to a stop with McMahon directly behind it, Rodriguez jumped out of the passenger side of the car and ran away. Defendant, who was the driver, remained in the car. McMahon approached with his handgun drawn and ordered defendant out of the car and on the ground. He then handcuffed defendant and waited for backup.
After other officers had arrived on the scene, McMahon went over to the Montero and looked inside the vehicle from the drivers side. He saw a white powdery substance strewn over the passenger seat, and a white plastic bag on the passenger side floorboard. He then went around to the passenger side and he could see that the plastic bag contained two brick-shaped packages wrapped in black electrical tape. One of the packages had the top cut open. Based on his training and experience, McMahon believed that the white powdery substance on the seat was cocaine, and that the packages were bricks of cocaine. He then placed defendant under arrest for possession of cocaine for sale and for transportation of cocaine. Other officers had caught up with Rodriguez, who was also arrested.
An information filed May 31, 2002, charged defendant with possession of cocaine for sale and transportation of cocaine. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11352.) It also alleged that the cocaine weighed more than one kilo and that defendant had a prior conviction for possession of cocaine for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11370.4, subd. (a), 11370.2.) An amended information added an allegation that defendant had served a prior prison term. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)
On July 9, 2002, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5. On July 17, 2002, the superior court held a hearing and denied the motion.
On October 2, 2002, defendant entered a plea of guilty to possession of cocaine for sale and admitted the enhancement for serving a prior prison term. On November 5, 2002, the court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years, and imposed an additional one year for the enhancement. The other charges were dismissed.
ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the police had no reasonable basis for initiating the traffic stop and that all subsequent observations were tainted by the initial illegality. (Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 488.) Therefore the denial of his suppression motion must be reversed and he must be allowed to change his plea.
"The standard of appellate review of a trial courts ruling on a motion to suppress is . . . [that] [w]e defer to the trial courts factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment." (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
Defendant points out that Officer McMahon testified he did not have any radar equipment to measure the speed of the Montero, and there was no way he could "lock on" to the Montero to determine its speed on the off ramp because there was another car in between. Furthermore all three cars were reducing speed as they proceeded down the off ramp. McMahon further testified that the Montero was not endangering the safety of persons or property at the speed at which it was traveling down the exit ramp. Defendant contends that these facts do not support a reasonable suspicion that the Montero was speeding, in violation of the Vehicle Code.
On the other hand, McMahon testified that he had been a police officer for 13 years, and was a patrol officer for five and a half years, during which time he had made "hundreds" of traffic stops for speeding. On May 6, 2002, he was driving a standard patrol vehicle with a calibrated speedometer. The speed limit of 45 miles per hour was clearly posted at the beginning of the exit ramp. He looked at his speedometer as the cars were passing the 45 mile per hour sign and his speedometer read 55 miles per hour. Even though there was a car in between him and the Montero, he was able to determine that they "were all traveling about the same speed" because he was not gaining on them as they were proceeding along the exit ramp. He determined that the Montero was exceeding the posted speed limit, and as the Montero pulled over to make a right turn he pulled in behind it with his lights activated.
"As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 810.) "The Fourth Amendment requires only reasonable suspicion in the context of investigative traffic stops." (United States v. Lopez-Soto (9th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3d 1101, 1105.) Here Officer McMahons experience and visual observations of the posted speed limit, his own speedometer and the cars in front of him provided "specific and articulable facts" supporting a reasonable suspicion that the Montero was exceeding the posted speed limit. (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893.) The fact that McMahon did not have radar equipment and could not "lock on" to the Montero is not determinative. An officer is entitled to rely on his training and experience in drawing inferences from his observations, so long as those inferences are " `grounded in objective facts and capable of rational explanation. " (United States v. Lopez-Soto, supra, 205 F.3d at p. 1105.)
The cases relied on by defendant are distinguishable. In People v. Butler (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 602, the court found there was no reasonable basis for police stopping a car with tinted glass. Under the Vehicle Code tinted glass could be legal or illegal depending on whether its installation was in accordance with federal safety standards. The court stated that the tinted glass did not "raise[] a reasonable suspicion of illegality" sufficient to justify a stop, without additional facts suggesting that the particular tinted glass was illegal. (Id. at p. 607.) Mere speculation, the court said, "may not properly support an investigative stop." (Ibid.) In United States v. Mariscal (9th Cir. 2002) 285 F.3d 1127, police in a parked car made a traffic stop after observing the defendant make an unsignaled turn. However, state law provided that a signal was required only if " `other traffic may be affected by the movement. " (Id. at 1131.) In Mariscals case there was no evidence of any other traffic on the road. The court concluded that the traffic stop was a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the objective facts could not have constituted a vehicle code violation. Therefore the officers "suspicions cannot be reasonable." (Id. at p. 1130.)
Unlike Butler and Mariscal, here the objective facts and observations by Officer McMahon did support a reasonable suspicion that the Montero was violating the vehicle code by traveling in excess of posted speed limits. Furthermore, an otherwise objectively reasonable traffic stop is not made unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the police motive was to investigate suspected drug activity. (Whren v. United States, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 813.) The subjective intentions of the police officers play "no role" in the ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis. (Ibid.)
Because we find that the traffic stop was constitutionally reasonable, we do not address the Peoples argument that the stop was independently justified by the fact that there was an INS warrant for Rodriguezs arrest and the fact that defendant was on probation with a search clause permitting the search of his vehicle.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: WUNDERLICH, J. MIHARA, J. --------------- Notes: All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.