Opinion
Docket No. CR-020054-22BX
07-05-2023
The People of the State of New York, v. Angel Quinones, Defendant.
For the People: Michael Luterzo, Assistant District Attorney, Office of the Bronx District Attorney For the Defendant: Michael Barsky, Esq.
Unpublished Opinion
For the People: Michael Luterzo, Assistant District Attorney, Office of the Bronx District Attorney
For the Defendant: Michael Barsky, Esq.
Carmen A. Pacheco, J.
Defendant moves for an order (i) dismissing the accusatory instrument under CPL § 30.30(1)(b) and (ii) dismissing the accusatory instrument on Constitutional Speedy Trial grounds under CPL § 30.20.
For the reasons set forth herein, defendant's motion is denied in its entirety.
Factual and Procedural History
Defendant was arraigned on November 7, 2022 and charged with Penal Law §§ 120.00(1) (assault in the third degree) and 240.26 (harassment in the second degree). On February 4, 2023, the People filed a Certificate of Compliance ("CoC") and Statement of Readiness ("SoR"). On February 15, 2023, on the record, the People announced their readiness for trial by declaring their witnesses were accessible within a reasonable time and an Assistant District Attorney ("ADA") was available to try the case. In response to the court's inquiry, defendant confirmed receipt of the CoC and SoR.
As to the CoC, defendant objected to the People's request to declare it valid. Defendant argued that the People failed to exchange Giglio material. The People countered by stating that their obligation to turnover Giglio material was not triggered since they did not intend to call police officer witnesses. After hearing both arguments, the court directed the parties to file a joint letter with the court before the next appearance date listing when the parties conferred and discovery disputes, if any. See CPL § 245.35(1). Consequently, the matter was adjourned to March 6, 2023 for a discovery conference.
On March 6, 2023, when the discovery conference was to be held, the parties failed to submit a joint discovery letter. Instead, defendant requested a motion schedule which request suspended the CPL § 30.30 speedy trial clock. In keeping with their request, defendant moved under CPL §§ 30.30(1)(b) and 30.20 to dismiss the accusatory instrument alleging that the People did not fulfill their discovery obligations within the speedy trial time.
Defendant contended that the People's discovery production was barren of any Giglio material. Defendant averred that Giglio material should be provided regardless of the People's intent to call a police officer as a witness. The People's failure to produce the Giglio material forecloses defendant's ability to determine whether to call an officer to testify. Moreover, such evidence could possibly negate defendant's guilt or support a potential defense.
Defendant also noted that for the first time they realized that the People failed to serve the written SoR on February 4, 2023. Consequently, the People's failure to serve the SoR prevented them from announcing their readiness for trial within the statutory CPL § 30.30 time. In response, the People admitted that they inadvertently failed to serve the SoR due to an error when deleting files from the shared OneDrive folder. The People contended that erasure of the file was unintentional. Moreover, the People maintain that defense counsel should have alerted the People of the missing SoR instead of waiting for the speedy trial time to elapse.
In opposition, the People maintain that their discovery obligations were satisfied since they do not intend to call any officers to testify. The People stand firm on evidence of professional misconduct for non-testifying officers is not required to be turned over. Moreover, impeachment material applies only to testifying witnesses.
Legal Analysis
The purpose of CPL § 30.30 is to "insure prompt prosecutorial readiness for trial" and to "discourage prosecutorial inaction." People v. Brown, 28 N.Y.3d 392 (2016). CPL § 30.30(1)(a) requires the People to be ready within "six months of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony", while CPL 30.30(1)(b) requires readiness within 90 days in misdemeanor cases, less excludable time. People v. Alvia, 78 Misc.3d 1228(A) (Crim. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2023); CPL § 30.30(1)(b); see CPL § 1.20 (16-17); cf. CPL § 30.30(5)(b); People v. Stirrup, 91 N.Y.2d 434 (1998) (criminal action in DAT "must be deemed to have commenced on the date the defendant first appears in a local criminal court in response to a ticket."). For speedy trial purposes, calculation begins on the day after arraignment. People v. Stiles, 70 N.Y.2d 765 (1987).
Moreover, the People are deemed ready for trial once they file a proper CoC and declare their readiness. CPL § 245.50(3); People v. Fortty, 78 Misc.3d 1229(A) (Crim. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2023). A CoC filed by the People may only be deemed valid if filed after "due diligence and making reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery, the prosecutor has disclosed and made available all known material and information subject to discovery." CPL § 245.50(1). Absolute compliance and discovery disclosures prior to filing a CoC is not required under the statute. People v. Alvia, 78 Misc.3d 1228(A) (Crim. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2023) citing People v. Gonzalez, 68 Misc.3d 1213(A) (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2020) ("absence of certain discovery items from the disclosure memorialized in the original CoC (such as the scratch complaint report, an updated disclosure letter pertaining to a detective, and the resume of an expert) does not vitiate the original certificate."). However, once the People file a CoC and SoR, the court may order the prosecutor and defense counsel to confer and resolve diligently existing discovery disputes. CPL § 245.35.
Simultaneously with the filing of a valid CoC, the People must announce their readiness for trial after "bring[ing] the case to a point where it may be tried." People v. England, 84 N.Y.2d 1, 4 (1994). "[T]he statement 'ready for trial' contemplates more than merely mouthing those words." Id. "To be effective, a statement of readiness must be communicated on the record at a time when the People are truly ready to proceed." People v. Carter, 91 N.Y.2d 795, 798 (1998). Furthermore, the People can declare their readiness for trial either by making a statement of readiness on the record or by "written notice of readiness sent... to both defense counsel and the appropriate court clerk, to be placed in the original record." People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 337 (1985). Moreover, the statute envisages present readiness not a prognostication of future readiness. People v. England, 84 N.Y.2d 1, 4 (1994).
Consequently, a hollow declaration that the People are prepared to present their case is insufficient to satisfy the readiness requirement under the statute. People v. Brown, 28 N.Y.3d 392, 404 (2016). In People v. Brown, the Court of Appeals established two elements to establish trial readiness by the People.
"First, there must be "'either a statement of readiness by the prosecutor in open court, transcribed by a stenographer, or recorded by the clerk or a written notice of readiness sent by the prosecutor to both defense counsel and the appropriate court clerk'" (id., quoting People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 337, 486 N.Y.S.2d 888, 476 N.E.2d 287 [1985]). Second, "the People must in fact be ready to proceed at the time they declare readiness" (id.). In other words, "[t]o be effective, a statement of readiness must be communicated on the record at a time when the People are truly ready to proceed" (People v. Carter, 91 N.Y.2d 795, 798, 676 N.Y.S.2d 523, 699 N.E.2d 35 [1998]). "The statute contemplates an indication of present readiness, not a prediction or expectation of future readiness." (Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d at 337, 486 N.Y.S.2d 888, 476 N.E.2d 287).Id. at 403-404. Moreover, the People bear the burden of creating a record concerning post readiness delays in order for the court to determine who should be charged the time. People v. Stirrup, 91 N.Y.2d 434, 440 (1998). However, when the People's inaction directly implicates their ability to proceed to trial the time will be chargeable to them. Consequently, should the People's unexcused delays exceed the statutory time prescribed under CPL § 30.30(1), the court is obligated to grant a motion to dismiss. CPL § 30.30. Conversely, initially the defendant carries the burden of demonstrating that the People statutory time has elapsed when it files a motion to dismiss on those grounds. People v. Luperon, 85 N.Y.2d 71 (1995).
Additionally, defendant must notify or alert the People of any potential defects or deficiencies in the certificate as soon as practicable. CPL § 245.50(4)(b), (c). CPL §§ 245.50 does not define the term "as soon as practicable." There is no bright-line definition of the word "practicable." People v. Lanfair, 78 Misc.3d 371 (Crim. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2023). Hence, it is within the court's province to determine whether defendant acted reasonably and promptly under the circumstances when objecting to the CoC. That determination can only be made on a case-by-case basis by considering "the length of the delay; the underlying charges; the nature of the discovery violation; whether the violation is obvious, and susceptible to easy detection, or obscure, and more likely to escape notice; whether there is evidence that the defense knew or should have known the error; the volume of discovery in the case; and the applicability of any statutory deadlines." People v. Lanfair, 78 Misc.3d 371, 375 (Crim. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2023). Clearly, there is no bright-line definition of the word "practicable." Id. at 375.
When defects or deficiencies are not resolved, any challenges to the CoC must be raised by written motion . CPL § 245.50(4)(a). However, defendant cannot sit idly and "wait while the speedy trial clock ticks loudly in the background." People v. Ramirez, 75 Misc.3d 931, 935 (Crim. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2022). Moreover, should defense counsel "lie in wait" until the People's CPL § 30.30 time has expired, they run the risk of not having the information necessary for hearings and trial. People v. Ferrer, 72 Misc.3d 1212(A) (Crim Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2021).
Giglio Material for Non-Testifying Officers
Defendant's contention that the People are required to turn over Giglio material for all police officers contradicts legal authority. In Giglio v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that the Government violated a defendant's constitutional right to due process when the prosecutor did not disclose its witness was promised leniency in return for his testimony. Giglio v. US, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
In 2020, the New York legislature imposed additional discovery requirements on the People by enacting CPL Article 245 to obviate the practice of "trial by ambush" and expedite the discovery process. Before the enactment of CPL Article 245 there was no uniformity as to the timeliness of disclosure, thus concealing from defendants evidence against them until the eve of trial. People v. Adrovic, 69 Misc.3d 563 (Crim. Ct. NY Cnty. 2020). Today "the prosecutor's obligations to provide discovery under the current statutes are so broad as to virtually constitute 'open file' discovery, or at least make 'open file' discovery the far better course of action to assure compliance." Donnino, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Criminal Procedure Law § 245.10 . Consequently, the "People's specific discovery obligations under CPL § 245.20 (1)(k)(iv) go beyond the Supreme Court's mandate in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)." People v. Pennant, 73 Misc.3d 753 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2021); People v. Edwards, 74 Misc.3d 433 (Crim. Ct. NY Cnty. 2021) (CPL 245.30(1)(k)(iv) exceeds the People's Brady/Giglio obligations since the CPL mandates that the People turn over impeachment documents and information regardless of the evidence's materiality).
"When presented with a question of statutory interpretation, a court's primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature." Matter of Marian, 36 N.Y.3d 44, 49 (2020). To vivify the Legislature's intent, the "statutory language is generally construed according to its natural and most obvious sense, without resorting to an artificial or forced construction." McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92 ; see People v. Wallace, 31 N.Y.3d 503, 507 (2018). "[T]he clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof." People v. Pabon, 28 N.Y.3d 147, 152 (2016). "[W]hen the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it should be construed so as to give effect to the plain meaning of the words used." People v. Jones, 26 N.Y.3d 730, 733 (2016). Additionally, a statute must be read in juxtaposition with "words that define or delimit the reach of the statutory provision." People v. Hedgeman, 70 N.Y.2d 533, 539 (1987). Consequently, under the plain language of CPL § 245.20(1)(k), the statute is broad and requires the People to turn over "[a]ll evidence and information... known to the police or any other enforcement agencies acting on the governments behalf in the case." A different conclusion would render "one part meaningless" and "should be avoided", Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 515 (1991), since the statute should be read as a whole "its various sections must be considered together with reference to each other." Matter of New York County Lawyers' Assn. v Bloomberg, 19 N.Y.3d 712, 721 (2012).
Although CPL 245.20 augmented the People's Brady/Giglio obligations, the legislature limited impeachment disclosure to testifying prosecution witnesses. CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv). Specifically, under CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv), the People are mandated to disclose "all evidence and information, including that which is known to police or other law enforcement agencies acting on the government's behalf in the case, that tends to impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness." Id. Clearly, 245.20(1)(k)(iv) confines the People's obligation to provide impeachment evidence and information only for a "testifying prosecution witness." Id. Undoubtedly, the legislature could have extended the People's obligation to all witnesses but instead explicitly narrowed the automatic disclosure of impeachment evidence and information to "testifying prosecution witness[es]." Id; People v. Edwards, 77 Misc.3d 740 (Crim. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2022) (noting that the legislature could have easily extended the People's Giglio obligation to all witnesses but decided not to).
Accordingly, under CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv) the People are only required to turnover impeachment evidence for police officers they intend to call as witnesses. To compel the People to provide impeachment material for all officers involved in a case would expand the People's obligations in contravention of the legislative intent and the provisions of CPL § 245.20(1)(k)(iv). See People v. Diaz, 77 Misc.3d 727 (Crim. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2022).
For these reasons, the People were not required to turn over Giglio material under CPL § 245.20(1)(k).
Statement of Readiness for Trial
The Court finds that the People properly proclaimed their readiness for trial. The People filed a written SoR on February 4, 2023 with the court via the Electronic Document Delivery System. On February 15, 2023, the People announced, in open court on the record, that they filed a CoC and SoR off-calendar. The People maintained their readiness for trial since their witnesses were available to testify within a reasonable time and an ADA was able to try the case. In response, defendant conceded receipt of the CoC and SoR. However, defendant avers that while drafting the instant motion the shared folder did not contain the People's SoR. The People admit that the SoR was inadvertently deleted from the shared OneDrive folder. However, defendant failed to alert the People of the missing SoR until after the filing of the instant motion and expiration of the CPL § 30.30 time.
The People's obligation to be ready for trial encompasses two requirements. People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331 (1985). First, readiness requires "either a statement of readiness by the prosecutor in open court, transcribed by a stenographer, or recorded by the clerk or a written notice of readiness sent by the prosecutor to both defense counsel and the appropriate court clerk." People v. Chavis, 91 N.Y.2d 500, 505 (1998). Second, the People must communicate their readiness when they are truly ready to proceed. People v. Carter, 91 N.Y.2d 795 (1998). "The People's declaration of readiness is 'presumed truthful and accurate' and 'a defendant who challenges such a statement must demonstrate that it is illusory.'" People v. Williams, 73 Misc.3d 1091, 1100 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. 2021). In contrast, when a new trial is ordered, the People cannot be deemed ready until they re-announce their readiness. People v. Wilson, 86 N.Y.2d 753 (1995); People v Dushain, 247 A.D.2d 234 (1st Dept. 1998).
Here the People stated their readiness for trial "in open court, transcribed by a stenographer" on February 15, 2023 without any objection from defense counsel. People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 337 (1985); People v. Chavis, 91 N.Y.2d 500, 505 (1998). The People acted in good faith since the omission of the SoR from the shared OneDrive folder was caused by a technical error and inadvertent oversight. See People v. Nelson, 75 Misc.3d 1203(A) (Crim. Ct. NY Cnty. 2022) (unknown technical error prevented the body-work camera from being shared with defense counsel through eDiscovery). "Inadvertent errors or omissions will not automatically invalidate a COC and SOR." People v. Pondexter, 76 Misc.3d 349, 353 (Crim. Ct. NY Cnty. 2022).
Moreover, defendant fails to provide any proof that the SoR misstated the People's position as to their readiness for trial or that the SoR was excluded from the OneDrive folder in bad faith. See People v. Carter, 91 N.Y.2d 795 (1998). A statement of readiness mailed to the wrong address was deemed valid. Id.; see also People v. Miller, 2023 WL 3608106, (Crim. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2023) (SoR valid when sent to wrong email address). Moreover, SoR service on defense counsel at an incorrect address was effectuated when the People failed to "have actual notice that the address was incorrect prior to service of the" SoR. People v Tejada, 59 Misc.3d 422, 424 (Crim Ct. Bronx Cnty. 2018).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the People's declaration of their readiness for trial, through the written SoR and in open court on the record with defendant present, was within the statutory CPL § 30.30 speedy trial time and not illusory. The court therefore denies defendant's motion in its entirety.
This constitutes the decision of the court.