Opinion
February 4, 1999
Appeal from the County Court of Albany County (Sheridan, J.).
On February 2, 1995, the remains of Karie Jean Hammond (hereinafter decedent) were discovered on a bike path in the Village of Menands, Albany County. She had been missing since August 1994, and it was ultimately established that she died as a result of multiple stab wounds. On February 10, 1995, defendant, decedent's boyfriend, confessed to inflicting these wounds. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of murder in the second degree ( see, Penal Law § 125.25) and sentenced to a prison term of 25 years to life. Defendant appeals.
We affirm. Defendant contends that his oral and written statements to police were the product of a custodial interrogation for which no Miranda warnings were given. Whether a suspect is in custody is a factual issue to be resolved after applying an objective standard of whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have believed that he or she was free to leave the presence of police ( see, People v. Centano, 76 N.Y.2d 837, 837-838; People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234, 240; People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589, cert denied 400 U.S. 851). Upon our review of the suppression hearing, we are satisfied that the questioning of defendant did not constitute a custodial interrogation for which Miranda warnings were required.
The record reveals that on February 9, 1995, two Town of Colonie Police investigators traveled to North Carolina to question defendant about decedent's death. The next morning, these investigators, along with three North Carolina law enforcement personnel, went to his home and requested to speak to him about decedent. It is undisputed that defendant voluntarily accompanied them to the local police station where he was interviewed by the Town of Colonie investigators only. No physical restraints were placed on defendant at any time; he was offered, and accepted, something to drink and never requested to leave the station. Four hours into the interview, in which he voluntarily participated, defendant made an oral admission that he had stabbed decedent on August 24, 1994.
At this time, defendant was promptly given Miranda warnings, which he waived. Thereafter, he signed a detailed, written statement in which he confessed to stabbing decedent, leaving her on the bike path bleeding and moving to North Carolina 11 weeks later. Given these facts, defendant's suppression motion was properly denied ( see, People v. Hayden, 250 A.D.2d 937, 938-939, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 880; People v. Van Amburg, 243 A.D.2d 845, 846, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 898; People v. Pristell, 204 A.D.2d 801, 801-802, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 970). The fact that he was a suspect in decedent's homicide when questioned does not, in and of itself, establish that he was in custody ( see, People v. Basso, 140 A.D.2d 448, 449-450; People v. Sampson, 134 A.D.2d 706, 708, affd 73 N.Y.2d 908; People v. Goodrich, 126 A.D.2d 835, 836, lv denied 69 N.Y.2d 880), nor does the fact that four hours elapsed between his arrival at the station and his oral admission ( see, People v. Hayden, supra, at 938; People v. Hofmann, 238 A.D.2d 716, 719, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 940).
We also disagree with defendant's claimed violation of CPL 710.70 (3), which permits a defendant to relitigate the issue of the voluntariness of a statement before the jury. Here, County Court quite properly gave defendant "two bites at the apple" within the strictures of CPL 710.70 Crim. Proc. (3) when it permitted the jury to assess the voluntariness of both the oral and written statements. Defendant contends that CPL 710.70 (3) was not complied with because the jury was not permitted to consider whether the Town of Colonie investigators had jurisdictional authority to arrest him in North Carolina. Significantly, no statutory provision authorizes a jury to consider the jurisdictional authority of an arresting police agency ( see generally, People v. Hamlin, 71 N.Y.2d 750; 761). Indeed, this is a legal issue for the court, not the jury, to resolve ( see, e.g., People v. Sterling, 209 A.D.2d 1006, 1006-1007, lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 914; People v. Dawson, 166 A.D.2d 808, 810, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 876; People v. Daniels, 159 A.D.2d 513, 514, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 786; People v. Medina, 146 A.D.2d 344, 350-351, affd 76 N.Y.2d 331). CPL 60.45 (2) (b) (ii) and CPL 710.70 Crim. Proc. (3) authorize jury consideration of constitutional arguments traditionally associated with the voluntariness of a confession, which include Miranda and 5th Amendment arguments ( see, People v. Hamlin, supra, at 761; People v. Sterling, supra, at 1006-1007; People v. Conklin, 145 A.D.2d 20, 24, lv denied 74 N.Y.2d 738) and are applicable in the instant case only insofar as defendant urges that his statements were the result of a custodial interrogation in the absence of Miranda warnings. As noted, County Court properly instructed the jury to consider this issue.
We next find unavailing defendant's contention that County Court erred in declining to charge the jury with criminally negligent homicide as a lesser included offense. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, as we must ( see, People v. Martin, 59 N.Y.2d 704, 705), no reasonable view of it could support a finding that he was unaware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk of death caused by his actions, namely, the repeated and forceful stabbing of decedent ( see, People v. McFadden, 246 A.D.2d 558, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 928; People v. Barclift, 140 A.D.2d 615; cf., People v. Heide, 206 A.D.2d 875, affd 84 N.Y.2d 943). An autopsy revealed that decedent received 10 sharp wounds to the back, arm and rib cage and a pathologist testified that death was in fact caused by "[m]ultiple stab wounds to the * * * chest and back". According to the pathologist, while the autopsy clearly revealed instances of 10 separate stab wounds to decedent's bones, it was impossible for her to determine if any additional wounds were inflicted to soft tissue because the body was badly decomposed when discovered. Significantly, the pathologist also testified that considerable force was utilized to inflict these wounds as the knife "went quite a distance" into decedent's body, i.e., the knife "actually went through the bone into the body of the vertebra".
Defendant's remaining contentions have been reviewed and none warrant reversal of his conviction.
Cardona, P. J., Peters, Spain and Graffeo, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.