Opinion
238 KA 17-01153
04-29-2022
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jennifer N. PRYOR, Defendant-Appellant.
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (THOMAS G. SMITH OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (SCOTT MYLES OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (THOMAS G. SMITH OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (SCOTT MYLES OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND WINSLOW, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her upon a jury verdict of manslaughter in the first degree ( Penal Law § 125.20 [1] ), arising from an incident in which she repeatedly stabbed her husband, causing his death. Contrary to defendant's contention, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Gordon , 23 N.Y.3d 643, 649, 992 N.Y.S.2d 700, 16 N.E.3d 1178 [2014] ), we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to disprove defendant's justification defense (see generally Penal Law §§ 25.00, 35.00 ; People v. Bleakley , 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ). Furthermore, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson , 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley , 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). The jury was entitled to credit the testimony of the People's witnesses and to consider the many inconsistencies between defendant's testimony at trial and her statements to medical personnel and the police, among others, and we perceive no reason to disturb the jury's credibility determinations in that regard (see People v. Tetro , 175 A.D.3d 1784, 1788, 109 N.Y.S.3d 776 [4th Dept. 2019] ). The jury was also entitled to conclude that the physical evidence failed to support defendant's versions of the events during and preceding the fatal stabbing, and we are satisfied that the jury's rejection of the justification defense was not contrary to the weight of the evidence (see generally People v. Goley , 113 A.D.3d 1083, 1084, 977 N.Y.S.2d 847 [4th Dept. 2014] ).
We reject defendant's contention that Supreme Court erred in declining to allow her to introduce her videotaped exculpatory statements in their entirety in response to the prosecutor's cross-examination of her (see People v. Jimenez-Gomez , 198 A.D.3d 443, 444, 155 N.Y.S.3d 157 [1st Dept. 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1146, 159 N.Y.S.3d 336, 180 N.E.3d 500 [2021] ; People v. Williams , 217 A.D.2d 713, 713, 217 A.D.2d 713, 630 N.Y.S.2d 91 [2d Dept. 1995], lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 1026, 644 N.Y.S.2d 160, 666 N.E.2d 1074 [1996] ), and we conclude that there was no violation of the rule of completeness (see generally People v. La Belle , 18 N.Y.2d 405, 410-411, 276 N.Y.S.2d 105, 222 N.E.2d 727 [1966] ). "By simply broaching a new issue on cross-examination, a party does not thereby run the risk that all evidence, no matter how remote or tangential to the subject matter opened up, will be brought out on redirect. Rather, the trial court must limit the inquiry on redirect to the ‘subject-matter of the cross-examination [which] bear[s] upon the question at issue,’ " and "the trial court should normally ‘exclude all evidence which has not been made necessary by the opponent's case in reply ’ " ( People v. Melendez , 55 N.Y.2d 445, 452, 449 N.Y.S.2d 946, 434 N.E.2d 1324 [1982] ). Consequently, the prosecutor's use of portions of defendant's statements to impeach her credibility in this case did not entitle defendant to introduce her entire statements to bolster her own credibility (see People v. Ramos , 70 N.Y.2d 639, 640-641, 518 N.Y.S.2d 783, 512 N.E.2d 304 [1987] ).
Defendant objected on only one of several occasions on which she alleges that the prosecutor impermissibly questioned her about her pretrial silence, and thus her contentions with respect to the remaining instances of such questioning are not preserved for our review (see People v. Thomas , 169 A.D.3d 1451, 1451, 92 N.Y.S.3d 818 [4th Dept. 2019] ; People v. Boop , 118 A.D.3d 1273, 1273, 987 N.Y.S.2d 527 [4th Dept. 2014], lv denied 24 N.Y.3d 1082, 1 N.Y.S.3d 9, 25 N.E.3d 346 [2014] ). In any event, defendant's contentions with respect to both the preserved and unpreserved instances of questioning lack merit. The general rule that a prosecutor may not use a defendant's pretrial silence to impeach his or her trial testimony does not apply where, as here, " ‘a defendant speaks to the police and omits exculpatory information which he [or she] presents for the first time at trial’ " ( People v. Harris , 57 A.D.3d 1523, 1524, 871 N.Y.S.2d 523 [4th Dept. 2008], lv denied 12 N.Y.3d 817, 881 N.Y.S.2d 24, 908 N.E.2d 932 [2009] ; see People v. Smith , 187 A.D.3d 1652, 1654, 132 N.Y.S.3d 498 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1054, 140 N.Y.S.3d 870, 164 N.E.3d 957 [2021] ; see generally People v. Savage , 50 N.Y.2d 673, 680-682, 431 N.Y.S.2d 382, 409 N.E.2d 858 [1980], cert denied 449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 577, 66 L.Ed.2d 475 [1980] ).
The sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.