Opinion
December 14, 1970
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated June 2, 1970, which granted defendants' separate motions to suppress their confessions, etc., after a hearing. As to defendant Shuman, order reversed, on the law and the facts, and motion denied. As to defendant Pounds, order reversed, on the law and the facts, and motion remanded to the Criminal Term for a further hearing at which the People shall adduce such further evidence as they may be advised bearing on the grounds for the seizure and detention of Pounds by the police for interrogation, including but not limited to what precipitated their search for him at Mrs. Banks' apartment. In our opinion the reasonableness of a detention for interrogation purposes is measured by standards less than those requiring probable cause for arrest. Accordingly, if any reasonable basis exists for suspecting a person of having committed or participated in the commission of a crime or for attributing to that person some questionable relationship with respect thereto, the police should not be frustrated in pursuing their investigation to the point of detention and interrogation either on the spot or at the police station as long as such detention and interrogation are not tantamount to an arrest within the purview of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If such reasonable basis short of probable cause exists, a detention and interrogation which follows would, in our opinion, be lawful and proper. In such event, absent involuntariness, a confession obtained in the course thereof would be admissible and could not be considered the product of illegality, even under the rationale of Morales v. New York ( 396 U.S. 102), or the result of indiscriminate invasions of privacy and wholesale roundups and harassment of innocent persons of which the court in Davis v. Mississippi ( 394 U.S. 721, 726) was apprehensive. In our opinion, sufficient evidence was adduced by the People to warrant a conclusion that they could, if afforded a further opportunity to do so, establish what has been hereinabove noted to be within the purview and design of the remand herein ordered. We are also of the opinion, predicated on our review of the record, that defendant Pounds was capable of understanding the Miranda warnings ( Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436) and that they were meaningfully given to him. As for defendant Shuman, we agree with the Criminal Term that (1) his appearance for interrogation was voluntary, (2) he was not unlawfully detained and (3) his confession was voluntarily obtained. We do not agree that his confession was the tainted fruit of the poisonous tree and inadmissible, even if Pounds' confession were considered the product of an illegal detention. In our opinion, the confessions and statements elicited from both defendants were not so interdependent as to warrant carrying over the taint of illegality from Pounds to Shuman. Nor do we agree that the police found it necessary to rely on what they ascertained from Pounds to interrogate Shuman, which was the thrust of the Criminal Term's conclusion that Shuman's confession was tainted. In any event, we are of the opinion that Shuman had no standing to invoke the exclusionary rule predicated on any illegality to which Pounds may have been subjected or on any violation of Pounds' constitutional rights, assuming such to have been the fact (see People v. Cefaro, 21 N.Y.2d 252, on rearg., revd. on other grounds 23 N.Y.2d 283; People v. Cardaio, 30 A.D.2d 843; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-488; Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 174; Jacobs v. Warden, 367 F.2d 321). Christ, P.J., Munder, Latham, Kleinfeld and Brennan, JJ., concur.