Opinion
June 27, 1988
Appeal from the County Court, Suffolk County (Seidell, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Although the offenses charged in the indictment arose out of two separate sexual assaults, they were properly joined for trial pursuant to CPL 200.20 (2) (c) and the court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant's pretrial motion for severance under CPL 200.20 (3). The defendant failed to adequately set forth the manner in which he would be prejudiced by trying all the charges together (see, People v Lane, 56 N.Y.2d 1; People v Cunningham, 110 A.D.2d 708; People v Stewart, 105 A.D.2d 858).
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds pursuant to CPL 30.30 and 30.20 Crim. Proc., and the US and NY Constitutions. However, the People answered ready for trial within the statutory period and at all adjourned dates. Moreover, any alleged failure by the People to provide prompt and full discovery would not require dismissal of the indictment under CPL 30.30 (see, People v Runion, 107 A.D.2d 1080; People v Cole, 90 A.D.2d 27, appeal after remand 112 A.D.2d 472). Nor does the defendant substantiate his assertions of prejudice in denigration of his constitutional rights as the result of any delay in bringing his case to trial. Accordingly, the County Court's denial of the defendant's speedy trial motion was proper (see, People v Dean, 45 N.Y.2d 651, rearg denied 46 N.Y.2d 940; see also, People v Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442).
The County Court's determination that Police Officer Richard Little had probable cause to arrest the defendant is fully supported by the record (see, People v Farinaro, 101 A.D.2d 891, order vacated 106 A.D.2d 516, amended 110 A.D.2d 653; People v Bittner, 97 A.D.2d 33; People v Crosby, 91 A.D.2d 20, lv denied 59 N.Y.2d 765). The detailed description of the assailant which was broadcast over the police radio, and which Little had first double-checked with the detectives who were with one of the victims, substantially matched the defendant who had been observed by Little walking along a road near the scene of the second assault.
The defendant's contention that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his statements to the police were voluntary is without merit (see, People v Williams, 62 N.Y.2d 285) The statements were made after the defendant had been advised and readvised of his Miranda rights, and there is no evidence that the statements were obtained through the use of physical force (see, People v Sanchez, 133 A.D.2d 384, lv denied 70 N.Y.2d 960; People v Chalos, 111 A.D.2d 827, lv denied 66 N.Y.2d 918; People v Alver, 111 A.D.2d 339). Nor is there anything in the record which would indicate that the lineup procedures used by the police were unduly suggestive (People v Rodriguez, 124 A.D.2d 611).
Viewing the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
The sentence imposed was neither harsh nor excessive (see, People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Kunzeman, J.P., Kooper, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.