Opinion
November 28, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Clabby, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The record reveals that the defendant gave three separate statements to the police. The second statement, which was audiotaped, was suppressed by the hearing court on the ground that it was made involuntarily. On this appeal, the defendant's principal contention is that his first statement was involuntary because he was under the influence of consciousness-altering drugs (i.e., cocaine and alcohol). However, intoxication alone is insufficient to render a statement involuntary (see, People v Roth, 139 A.D.2d 605). Only where it is demonstrated that the defendant was intoxicated to a degree of mania or of being unable to understand the meaning of his statements is suppression warranted (see, People v. Cureton, 139 A.D.2d 756; People v. Roth, supra). Moreover, the hearing court's determination regarding the voluntariness of a statement is accorded great deference and will not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous (see, People v. Roth, supra; People v. Armstead, 98 A.D.2d 726). In this case, the hearing court found that the detective who administered the Miranda warnings and took the statement was an "extremely competent, credible and capable detective". The detective testified that the defendant appeared normal at the time of questioning and did not convey the impression that he was under the influence of any drugs. Accordingly, we discern no basis in the record before us for disturbing the hearing court's determination that the first statement was given voluntarily.
We similarly reject the defendant's contention that his third inculpatory statement should have been suppressed because it was tainted by the involuntariness of his second statement. Where there is a definite, pronounced break between the making of two statements which is sufficient to remove any taint arising from the prior statement, the subsequent statement is properly admissible (see, People v. McIntyre, 138 A.D.2d 634 ; People v. Steed, 133 A.D.2d 433). In this case, there was a 3 1/2-hour time lapse between the second and third statements, during which time the defendant received medical treatment for alleged withdrawal symptoms. In our view, the circumstances of this interval sufficed to purge the taint (see, e.g., People v Mahoney, 122 A.D.2d 815).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit (see, People v. Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56; People v. Donald, 107 A.D.2d 818; see also, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Lawrence, J.P., Spatt, Sullivan and Balletta, JJ., concur.