Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. SCS200083, Kerry Wells, Charles R. Gill and Edward P. Allard, Judges.
McDONALD, J.
Juan Perez appeals a judgment following his jury conviction of arson of an inhabited structure (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (b)). On appeal, he contends his federal constitutional right to due process of law was violated because the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he was competent to stand trial.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2006, Perez lived in an apartment in National City. On January 27, he went to the office of Cynthia Garcia, the property manager. He carried a red five-gallon gas container and requested her business card.
On January 28, a Latino man in his 30's with a big beard and "a lot of hair" (presumably Perez) knocked on the door of Antonio Aguilar, who lived in one of the apartments, and told Aguilar to "come out because I'm going to start it." Aguilar left his apartment and watched as the man ignited a blanket hanging from the balcony of a second-floor apartment.
At about 10:30 a.m. that day, Perez rang Garcia's doorbell and told her to call 911, explaining (in Spanish): "I turn on the fire in the apartment." When Garcia asked him why, Perez replied, "because; just because." Garcia then called 911 to report the fire. Perez waited outside her office for the police to arrive.
National City Police Officer Antonio Ybarra arrived at the scene and evacuated the apartments near the fire. After receiving certain information, Ybarra contacted and searched Perez. Ybarra found a "big" lighter, a pack of cigarettes, and a book of matches with five or six matches missing.
National City Chief Fire Marshall Donald Condon investigated the fire and found burn marks on the carpet of one of the two apartments burned. The carpet burn marks suggested an accelerant was poured on the carpet and then ignited. He smelled a slight odor of gasoline. A red plastic gasoline can and a torch were found in the apartment. Condon believed the fire had been intentionally set by use of an accelerant.
Perez was charged with arson of an inhabited structure (§ 451, subd. (b)). Before trial, the trial court suspended criminal proceedings on three occasions to conduct section 1368 hearings, finding at each hearing that Perez was competent to stand trial on the criminal charge. At trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of witnesses substantially as described above. Perez testified in his defense, admitting he started the fire in his apartment and then went to the office and told Garcia to call 911. He explained he started the fire because he "called immigration a long time before that and they told [him] they could not respond" and he "was in danger for [his] life and [he] wanted the police to come right away and the fire department." Perez testified: "They wanted to kill me." But when his counsel asked him to explain who "they" were, the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to that question. Perez testified he did not intend to harm anyone by starting the fire.
The jury found Perez guilty of arson of an inhabited structure. The trial court sentenced him to the lower term of three years in prison. Perez timely filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Competency to Stand Trial Generally
"Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and state law prohibit the state from trying or convicting a criminal defendant while he or she is mentally incompetent. [Citations.]" (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 846.) "Both federal due process and state law require a trial judge to suspend trial proceedings and conduct a competency hearing whenever the court is presented with substantial evidence of incompetence, that is, evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning the defendant's competence to stand trial. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 847.)
"Competency under federal law requires sufficient present ability to consult with one's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against one." (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 401, citing Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402.) In a competency hearing, the emphasis is on a defendant's capacity to consult with counsel and to comprehend the proceedings. (Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 448.) "If a defendant is incompetent, due process considerations require suspension of the criminal trial until such time, if any, that the defendant regains the capacity to participate in his defense and understand the proceedings against him." (Ibid.)
"Similarly, under state law a defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, he or she is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of the defense in a rational manner. (§ 1367.)" (People v. Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 401.) A defendant is presumed "mentally competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent." (§ 1369, subd. (f).)
Section 1367, subdivision (a), provides: "A person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while that person is mentally incompetent. A defendant is mentally incompetent for purposes of this chapter if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner."
Section 1369, subdivision (f)'s presumption of a defendant's competency does not violate a defendant's federal constitutional right to due process of law. (Medina v. California, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 452-453.)
On appeal, we review the record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support a finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial. (People v. Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 425-426.) Evidence is substantial if it is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (Id. at p. 425.) We view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences from the evidence, most favorably to support the finding. (Id. at p. 426; People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131.)
II
Perez's Competency to Stand Trial
Perez contends his federal constitutional right to due process of law was violated because the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding that he was competent to stand trial.
A
1. First Hearing.
On March 6, 2006, the trial court conducted the first hearing on Perez's competency to stand trial. The parties stipulated to, and the court received in evidence, the March 3 evaluation report of Hector Vera, a forensic psychologist who personally interviewed Perez on February 16 but did not perform any psychological testing. Perez told Vera that he had smoked "crystal" (presumably methamphetamine) every day for the seven-month period prior to the charged offense and also consumed about eight to 12 beers each day. Perez stated that at the time of his arrest he was under the influence of amphetamines and alcohol. Perez denied having any current delusions, psychotic symptoms, or auditory or visual hallucinations. However, Vera reported Perez "believes that somebody was performing witchcraft rituals [on] him, and nobody believes him." Perez explained he believed his roommates were performing witchcraft on him to hurt him. He claimed he began hearing voices that they would kill him if he did not leave the apartment. The only way he could get rid of the witchcraft spell was to burn the apartment.
Vera reported that although Perez's "insight and judgment regarding the instance is poor," Perez's "organization of thoughts was linear and coherent, with rational responses to the questions asked." Nevertheless, Vera concluded Perez's insight was adequate and Perez "expressed a good motivation to cooperate with his attorney in his own defense." Vera found that Perez had a normal mental state during the interview, did not exhibit any psychotic symptoms, and "is not suffering from any severe mental illness that might impede his ability to participate in his legal defense." Vera further found that Perez appeared to have an understanding of the charges against him and was willing to work with his counsel. Perez was cooperative and socially appropriate and communicated his defense in a rational manner. If Perez exhibited confusion in the past, it could have been because of a substance-induced psychotic episode. However, since he has been drug-free during his incarceration, he now has a normal mental state. Vera concluded Perez was "competent to proceed to trial" and has "the ability to consult with his attorney." Based on Vera's March 3 report, the trial court found Perez was competent to stand trial.
2. Second Hearing.
On July 20, the trial court conducted a second hearing on Perez's competency to stand trial. After Perez waived his right to a jury trial on the issue of his competency, the trial court received in evidence a May 18 report by Vera and an April 17 report by Francisco Gomez, a forensic psychologist.
Vera's May 18 report was based on a May 4 personal interview with Perez and review of certain records but without any psychological testing. Perez again denied having any auditory or visual hallucinations or perceptual disturbances of any kind. However, he again described hearing voices in the past. He claimed voices were telling him, "Get out of here." The verbal orders were coming from little speakers and minute cameras scattered on the walls of his apartment. He called police and immigration officials regarding the voices, but nobody believed him. He decided to burn his apartment to get the attention of police and get rid of the commanding voices. Vera found that Perez "has a more normal mental status than three months ago." Vera concluded that although Perez's explanation of the incident is bizarre and he lacks insight about his behavior, Perez was "able to develop trust and recall events," and was "coherent and able to make rational judgments" and "process strategies for his legal defense." Vera concluded: "[Perez's] present mental status is not interfering with his capacity to cooperate in a rational manner in his legal defense." Vera further stated: "[Perez's] thinking behind the defense is rational and satisfies the law of logic." Vera believed Perez was competent to stand trial and clearly has "the ability to consult with his attorney in a rational manner."
Gomez's April 17 report was based on an April 14 interview with Perez, review of Vera's first report and other records, and certain psychological tests. Perez denied he currently suffered from hallucinations, delusions, paranoia, or mania. Although Perez stated he smoked crystal methamphetamine for seven months prior to his arrest, he denied using it on the day of (and several days prior to) the incident. Perez described the incident substantially in the same manner as stated above, albeit apparently in greater detail. He does not believe he should be punished for his crime because he was saving the earth from destruction by destroying the transistors that were spying on him. Gomez concluded Perez's thinking is clearly delusional and not based in reality. Gomez stated: "In spite of being incarcerated several months and not abusing drugs for many months[,] [Perez] still believes that he was being followed and that transistors were in the wall of his house." Gomez found that Perez apparently suffered from a major mental illness and drug dependence and "[h]is psychiatric symptoms affect his judgment, social interactions, ability to problem-solve and think rationally." At the time of Perez's alleged offense, he was psychotic. Gomez concluded: "[B]ecause of Mr. Perez's delusion that he was working to help the world[,] he is unable to assist his attorney in his defense. Mr. Perez will not accept a guilty plea under any circumstances, no matter how light the sentence, because he feels he is not guilty."
Gomez's report summarizes Perez's description of events leading up to the incident as follows: "Mr. Perez's main points are that he believes that he has knowledge of an impending disaster in the U.S. similar to 9/11. He reports that several months prior to being arrested he began noticing people following and watching him. He reports that they stopped for sometime when he made a call to the police reporting that a meteor was going to hit downtown. His phone call was ignored by the police, but not by those following him. He reports that after making the call that he did not notice anyone following him anymore. He believes that the phone call scared the people watching him. However, a short time [later] he discovered transistors in the walls of his house that were monitoring his actions and telling him to get out and leave. He believed that drugs may have [possibly] been stored in the wall. Shortly after he was offered half a million dollars to leave the house. He reported that he could not take the money because it would imply that he was involved with their scheme and he did not want to get involved. Mr. Perez also told his property manager and roommates about his fears of being watched and an impending disaster. They reported that he was crazy. Because Mr. Perez felt like he was being ignored and voices were telling him to light [sic] the building, he decided to get rid of the transistors by lighting the building on fire. He also felt it would alert the police to his concerns."
Perez's counsel argued the court should accept Gomez's report, rather than Vera's report, because Vera did not perform any psychological testing. His counsel also argued that Perez was not competent to stand trial because his belief that burning down the apartment was defensible because of the voices was completely irrational and therefore Perez could not assist him in a rational manner in presenting his defense. His counsel argued: "I think that Dr. Gomez hit it right on the head, which is that so long as Mr. Perez feels this way about his defense and about his conduct, so long as that's the illness and the defect that he's laboring under in analyzing his conduct, he can't assist me in a rational manner . . . ."
The prosecutor argued: "[J]ust because [Perez's] position regarding his involvement and his culpability is irrational, that does not mean he is not able to assist [his counsel] in his defense. We do believe he understands the nature of these proceedings and that he understands his own status." Accordingly, the prosecutor believed there was a sufficient basis for the court to find Perez was currently competent to stand trial.
Based on the evidence and counsel's arguments, the trial court found that Perez was competent to stand trial. The court stated: "I can . . . appreciate that Mr. Perez's explanation . . . is not rational." However, the court explained: "[B]ased on the standards that are set for me to make the determination as to whether or not Mr. Perez is competent to stand trial, it doesn't go to that issue alone as to whether or not his explanation of the alleged acts is rational or irrational, but, rather, it goes to the issues associated with being able to assist his attorney and to comprehend his own status and capability of understanding the nature and purpose of the charge. . . . I believe that [the] preponderance of the evidence leads to the conclusion that Mr. Perez is competent to stand trial for these charges."
3. Third Hearing.
On October 13, the trial court conducted a third hearing on Perez's competency to stand trial. The parties stipulated to, and the court received in evidence, Vera's October 13 evaluation report. Vera personally interviewed Perez on September 29 and reviewed Gomez's April 17 report and other records. Perez described the incident substantially in the same manner as stated above. Vera's findings and conclusions remained substantially the same as in his two prior reports described above. Regarding Gomez's findings, Vera stated his opinion that Gomez appeared to blend Perez's mental status at the time of the incident with his current mental status or ability to stand trial. Vera found that Perez's "current mental status is not interfering with his capacity to cooperate with his legal defense" and Perez "is willing to cooperate with his lawyer." Vera concluded: "[Perez's] mental status is not interfering with his capacity to stand trial. [¶] . . . Mr. Perez is competent to proceed to trial. In the best of my knowledge, it appears that he does have the ability to consult in a rational manner with his attorney." Based on Vera's October 13 report, the trial court found Perez was competent to stand trial.
B
Perez asserts the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding at each of the three hearings that he was competent to stand trial. He argues that because he continues to have delusional beliefs regarding the incident, he cannot assist his counsel in preparing a "rational defense." However, in so arguing, Perez misconstrues the applicable standard for competency to stand trial, as discussed in part I, ante. In support of his proffered description of that standard, he cites People v. Tomas (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 75, in which the court stated: "The sanity requirement is satisfied only if an accused person is able to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or her, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing a rational defense. [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 88, italics added.) However, neither Tomas, nor the supporting cases cited in Tomas, expressly dealt with the issue of whether the defendant was able to describe, or otherwise assist in preparing, a rational defense (i.e., an explanation of events that was not irrational). Rather, it appears Tomas's generalized statement of the competency standard was, unfortunately, an inaccurate attempt to restate the section 1367 standard for competency. Section 1367, subdivision (a), provides: "A defendant is mentally incompetent for purposes of this chapter if, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner." (Italics added.)
We conclude section 1367 does not mandate a finding a defendant is incompetent if he or she is unable to present counsel with a "rational defense." Rather, for a defendant to be found competent, the defendant must be able to rationally assist his or her counsel (in addition to understanding the nature of the criminal proceedings). Therefore, even though a defendant's current explanation of an incident may be implausible, irrational, or the result of a delusional or psychotic episode, that explanation does not necessarily preclude the defendant from having the present ability to rationally assist his or her counsel in preparing a defense.
Furthermore, Perez does not cite, and we are unaware of, any decision by the United States Supreme Court holding that a defendant must be able to assist his or her counsel in presenting a "rational defense" for the defendant to be found competent to stand trial in accordance with the federal constitutional right to due process of law. Rather, the United States Constitution requires for a defendant's competency only the sufficient present ability to consult with his or her counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him or her. (People v. Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 401; Dusky v. United States, supra, 362 U.S. at p. 402.) Therefore, if a defendant is presently able to consult with his or her counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, the fact that a defendant may have an irrational and/or delusional explanation for the incident does not preclude a finding he or she is competent to stand trial.
For purposes of this opinion, we need not, and do not, address the question of whether section 1367's definition of competency differs in substance from that required by the due process clause of the United States Constitution. In the circumstances of this case, we nevertheless conclude there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings that Perez was competent to stand trial under either standard, to the extent they differ.
In the circumstances of this case, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding at each of the three hearings that Perez was competent to stand trial. Although Perez presumably believed at the time of the incident, and continued to believe during the criminal proceedings against him, that he needed to burn his apartment to stop the witchcraft and/or the voices he heard, that continuing irrational and delusional belief did not necessarily preclude him from assisting his counsel in the conduct of his defense in a rational manner or consulting with his counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. (§ 1367, subd. (a); People v. Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 401; Dusky v. United States, supra, 362 U.S. at p. 402.) We disagree with Perez's assertion that "[h]olding fast to a delusional, psychotic belief regarding a defense prevents a defendant from assisting counsel in a rational manner." Rather, as Vera concluded, and the trial court implicitly found, Perez was able and willing to rationally assist his counsel even though he continued his irrational and delusional explanation of the incident.
Vera found that Perez had a normal mental state during his interviews, did not exhibit any psychotic symptoms, and did not suffer from any severe mental illness that might impede his ability to participate in his legal defense. Vera further found that Perez appeared to have an understanding of the charges against him and was willing to work with his counsel. Perez was cooperative and communicated his defense in a rational manner. Vera concluded that although Perez's explanation of the incident was bizarre and he lacked insight about his behavior, Perez was able to recall events, was coherent, and able to make rational judgments and process strategies for his legal defense. Vera concluded: "[Perez's] present mental status is not interfering with his capacity to cooperate in a rational manner in his legal defense." In each of his three reports, Vera concluded Perez was competent to stand trial and had the ability to consult with his attorney in a rational manner. We conclude that Vera's findings and conclusions provide substantial support for the trial court's finding at each of the three hearings that Perez was competent to stand trial.
Perez apparently does not challenge the trial court's implicit finding that he was able to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings against him (in addition to being able to rationally assist his counsel). (§ 1367, subd. (a).) In any event, we conclude Vera's reports provide substantial evidence to support that particular finding by the court.
Perez's statements to Vera that his counsel did not understand him and hired a doctor who thought he was "crazy" do not necessarily show he was incompetent to stand trial. Furthermore, People v. Bolden (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 375, cited by Perez, is inapposite and does not persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion. In Bolden, unlike in this case, both psychiatrists concluded, and the trier of fact found, that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. (Id. at p. 378.) In this case, we reviewed the record for, and found, substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings that Perez was competent to stand trial. Because there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings that Perez was competent to stand trial, the court did not violate his federal constitutional right to due process of law.
Because it occurred after Perez's three pretrial competency hearings, we do not consider Perez's citation to his trial testimony that he did not understand why the trial court precluded him from fully explaining his story.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., HUFFMAN, J.