Opinion
2014-01-15
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Arjenis PENA, appellant.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Allegra Glashausser of counsel), for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Ruth E. Ross, and Terrence F. Heller of counsel), for respondent.
Lynn W.L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Allegra Glashausser of counsel), for appellant. Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Ruth E. Ross, and Terrence F. Heller of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrus, J.), rendered April 21, 2011, convicting him of attempted murder in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial by the Supreme Court's alleged denigration of defense counsel is without merit. Although the court made some remarks which were less than favorable in the presence of the jury, the court's actions were provoked by defense counsel's persistent misconduct in disregarding the court's evidentiary rulings, and in arguing with the court over its rulings ( see People v. Marston, 71 A.D.3d 789, 895 N.Y.S.2d 751; People v. Serrano, 253 A.D.2d 531, 676 N.Y.S.2d 882). In any event, the court alleviated any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the remarks by instructing the jury not to infer from its remarks that it held any personal view about the defendant's guilt or innocence ( see People v. Moghaddam, 56 A.D.3d 801, 803, 868 N.Y.S.2d 152; People v. Marston, 71 A.D.3d at 790, 895 N.Y.S.2d 751).
“A granting of an adjournment for any purpose is a matter of discretion for the trial court” (People v. Muriel–Herrera, 68 A.D.3d 1135, 1136, 892 N.Y.S.2d 150). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying defense counsel's requests for adjournments to review certain materials ( see People v. Hearns, 33 A.D.3d 722, 821 N.Y.S.2d 907).
Furthermore, “[t]he trial court has broad discretion to limit cross-examination when questions are repetitive, irrelevant or only marginally relevant, concern collateral issues, or threaten to mislead the jury” (People v. Rivera, 98 A.D.3d 529, 529, 948 N.Y.S.2d 912). Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in limiting the defendant's cross-examination of certain prosecution witnesses ( see People v. Stevens, 45 A.D.3d 610, 611, 845 N.Y.S.2d 114).
The defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel ( see People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584; People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 146–147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400).
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).
The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review ( see CPL 470.05[2] ), and we decline to review them in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction. RIVERA, J.P., LEVENTHAL, HALL and ROMAN, JJ., concur.