Opinion
April 13, 1992
Appeal from the County Court, Westchester County (Lange, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the statements made by him to the police were properly ruled admissible since there was no illegality in the procedures employed in effectuating his arrest for the brutal stabbing of a disabled man in the Yonkers Motor Inn during the early morning hours of October 17, 1985. The police clearly had probable cause to arrest the defendant based upon information provided by a local cab driver, who implicated the defendant in the murder. It is well settled that information provided by an identified citizen accusing another identified individual of committing a specified crime provides the police with probable cause to arrest (see, People v Lewis, 172 A.D.2d 775). Moreover, prior to the defendant's arrest, the police verified this information through an independent investigation which revealed the existence of the defendant's bloodied fingerprint inside the hotel room (see, People v Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398). Additionally, we find without merit the defendant's contention that these statements should have been suppressed because the police identified him through the use of fingerprints that should have been sealed pursuant to CPL 160.50 because that provision was not designed to immunize a defendant from the operations of law enforcement official's investigatory use of fingerprints (see, People v Patterson, 78 N.Y.2d 711; People v Gilbert, 136 A.D.2d 562).
Viewing the circumstantial evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, and giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom, we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The facts from which the inference of guilt is drawn, when perceived as a whole, are inconsistent with the defendant's innocence and exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis (see, People v Lewis, 64 N.Y.2d 1111; People v Benzinger, 36 N.Y.2d 29). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we find that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court adequately informed the jury of its responsibility in a case based wholly on circumstantial evidence. The use of the words "moral certainty" is not required, so long as the jury is instructed in substance that "the inference of guilt is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence" (People v Sanchez, 61 N.Y.2d 1022, 1024; People v Harden, 174 A.D.2d 691). In this case, the court's charge was sufficient in this regard.
We further reject the defendant's contention that the sentence was unduly harsh and excessive. The trial court properly exercised its discretion in light of the brutal and deliberate nature of the crime (People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80; People v Mejia, 166 A.D.2d 675).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Sullivan, J.P., Lawrence, Eiber and O'Brien, JJ., concur.