Opinion
June 29, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Pesce, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The trial court's Sandoval ruling, permitting cross-examination of the defendant regarding the underlying facts of a similar crime, did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Trial courts have broad discretion in determining whether the probative value of evidence of other crimes on the issue of the defendant's credibility outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice to him (People v Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 292; People v Lee, 115 A.D.2d 353). The court properly balanced the probative weight of the evidence (see, People v Gonzalez, 111 A.D.2d 870, 871, lv granted 66 N.Y.2d 763, revd on other grounds 68 N.Y.2d 424). Moreover, questioning concerning other crimes is not automatically precluded simply because the crime to be inquired about is similar to that charged (People v Pavao, supra, at 292). Here, the defendant's similar prior act involved the forcible theft of property and as such it was very probative on the question of credibility and demonstrated a willingness to deliberately further self-interest at the expense of society (see, People v Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 377; People v Smalls,
128 A.D.2d 907; cf., People v Johnson, 64 A.D.2d 907, affd 48 N.Y.2d 674).
Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant the defendant a one-week adjournment in order to procure a potential witness. The decision of whether to grant an adjournment is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court (People v Singleton, 41 N.Y.2d 402, 405). While the range of that discretion is to be more narrowly construed where the fundamental right to present witnesses is implicated, the trial court need not grant an adjournment where the moving party has failed to show diligence and good faith in attempting to procure the witness (see, People v Daniels, 128 A.D.2d 632; cf., People v Foy, 32 N.Y.2d 473, 476-478). In the instant case there has been no showing of diligence or good faith on the part of the defendant to insure Wayne Donovan's testimony at trial. The record discloses that the defendant did not even attempt to locate and contact Donovan in the approximately seven months which elapsed between the arraignment and the trial.
In addition to the dilatory tactics of the defendant, he further failed to show that the testimony of Donovan would be material or favorable to him (see, People v Singleton, supra, at 406; Matter of Anthony M., 63 N.Y.2d 270, 284). While the right to call witnesses in one's defense is fundamental, the defendant does not have the "right to delay his trial unreasonably regardless of reality" (People v Brabson, 9 N.Y.2d 173, 179, cert denied 369 U.S. 879). Thompson, J.P., Weinstein, Eiber and Sullivan, JJ., concur.