Opinion
2011-11-10
Randall D. Unger, Bayside, for appellant.Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Matthew T. Murphy of counsel), for respondent.
Randall D. Unger, Bayside, for appellant.Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Matthew T. Murphy of counsel), for respondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Daniel Conviser, J. at hearing; Wayne M. Ozzi, J. at jury trial and sentencing), rendered September 8, 2010, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to a term of 7 years, unanimously affirmed.
The court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress a revolver recovered from his impounded car. The police conducted a proper inventory search, which was supported by sufficient documentation. The search produced a “meaningful inventory list” ( People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d 252, 256, 771 N.Y.S.2d 64, 803 N.E.2d 385 [2003] ), even though the searching officer did not record every item he released to defendant's sister ( see
People v. Black, 250 A.D.2d 494, 673 N.Y.S.2d 414 [1998], lv. denied 92 N.Y.2d 922, 680 N.Y.S.2d 463, 703 N.E.2d 275 [1998] ), and we do not find there were any deficiencies of any kind that would warrant suppression of the revolver. Regardless of whether the officer suspected that contraband might be present, there was no evidence that the search was conducted as a ruse to discover incriminating evidence ( see Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d at 256, 771 N.Y.S.2d 64, 803 N.E.2d 385). Defendant did not preserve his argument that the police improperly impounded his car, and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternate holding, we reject it on the merits.
The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ), particularly when viewed in light of the statutory presumption of possession by all occupants of a vehicle ( see Penal Law § 265.15[3] ). Moreover, defendant was the owner, driver, and sole occupant, and the evidence, even without the automobile presumption, warrants the inference that he knew there was a firearm in his car ( see People v. Reisman, 29 N.Y.2d 278, 285–286, 327 N.Y.S.2d 342, 277 N.E.2d 396 [1971], cert. denied 405 U.S. 1041, 92 S.Ct. 1315, 31 L.Ed.2d 582 [1972] ).
Defendant's remaining claims do not warrant reversal.