Opinion
2015NY066835
04-13-2016
The People of the State of New York v. Christopher Outerbridge, Defendant.
For the People:Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., New York County District Attorney, by A.D.A. Samantha LiTrentaFor the Defendant:Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem, Inc., by Matthew W. Knecht, Esq.
For the People:Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., New York County District Attorney, by A.D.A. Samantha LiTrentaFor the Defendant:Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem, Inc., by Matthew W. Knecht, Esq.
Defendant, charged with unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, Penal Law § 165.05(1), and criminal mischief in the fourth degree, Penal Law § 145.00(3), moves to do dismiss for facial insufficiency, arguing that the information fails to sufficiently plead defendant's identity as the perpetrator.
The Court finds that the information is facially sufficient as to the count charging a violation Penal Law § 165.05(1); the motion to dismiss that count is accordingly DENIED. However, the information is facially insufficient as to the count charging a violation of § 145.00(3). The motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to that count only.
Defendant also moves to dismiss certain post-arrest statements. As to that, the Court orders a Huntley/Dunaway hearing. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. The Allegations
According to the information, the complainant owned a 2000 Nissan minivan. On October 9, 2015, the complainant parked the Nissan on a Manhattan street and placed the key to the Nissan in his bedroom. At 3:00 a.m. on October 11, the complainant noticed that the key to the Nissan was missing. He also discovered that the car was no longer where he had parked it. The car was valued at $4,800, and when the complainant found it, it was "totaled." Defendant and the complainant were the only people with access to the complainant's bedroom between October 9 and October 11, 2015. B. Legal Proceedings Defendant was arraigned October 15, 2015, on a misdemeanor complaint charging him with unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, Penal Law § 165.05(1), criminal mischief in the fourth degree, Penal Law § 145.00(3), and unlicensed driving, in violation of VTL § 509(1). The Court released the defendant and adjourned the case for conversion. Defendant filed this motion on February 2, 2016, by which time the Court had already granted the People's oral motion to dismiss the VTL § 509(1) count. The People, given until March 9 to respond to the motion to dismiss, declined to do so. The matter has been sub judice since March 9. II. THE INFORMATION
The information provides that the complainant is the owner of [a] 2000 Nissan Quest Minivan and the defendant did not have permission or authority to take, possess, drive or damage the car. ... [The complainant] observed that on or about October 9, 2015, the key to the above-described car was in [the complainant's] bedroom at his home in New York County. ... On or about October 11, 2015, at approximately 3 AM, he observed that the key was no longer in his bedroom. ... [H]e and the defendant are the only people with access to [the complainant's] bedroom.III. DISCUSSION
[O]n or about October 9, 2015, at approximately 10 AM, the complainant parked the above described car [on a street] in New York County. ... [O]n or about October 11, 2015, at approximately 3 AM, he observed that the car was no longer parked [where he had left it]. ...
[T]he value of the ... car is $ 4,800 and [it] was totaled.
Here, the inferences to be drawn from the facts alleged in the information lead reasonably, albeit circumstantially, to the conclusion that the defendant drove the complainant's car without the complainant's permission. They do not, however, lead to the conclusion that the defendant damaged that car, let alone that he did so recklessly. A. Facial Sufficiency as to Identity
An information serves the same role in a misdemeanor prosecution that an indictment serves in a felony prosecution: It ensures that a legally sufficient case can be made against the defendant. People v. Dumay, 23 NY3d 518 ( 2014); People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133, 138-39, 517 N.Y.S2d 927, 930-31, 511 N.E.2d 71, 74 (1987). Accordingly, an information must set forth "nonhearsay allegations which, if true, establish every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof." Kalin, 12 NY3d at 228-29, 906 N.E.2d at 383, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 655 (citing People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677, 679, 685 N.Y.S.2d 409, 708 N.E.2d 165(1999) and CPL 100.40 (1)(c)), emphasis added. This is known as "the prima facie case requirement." Kalin, 12 NY3d at 229, 906 N.E.2d at 383, 878 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
The prima facie case requirement does not necessitate that the information allege facts that would prove a defendant's identity beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Jennings, 69 NY2d 103, 115, 512 N.Y.S2d 652, 657, 504 N.E.2d 1079, 1084 (1986). But, nevertheless, there must be a reasonable basis for concluding that the defendant before the court is the person who committed the charged offense or offenses. See, e. g., People v. DeFreitas, 48 Misc 3d 569 (Crim Ct NY County 2015).
The defendant's identity can be circumstantially pled, and that allegation will be sufficient as long as "the court reviewing it finds that there is reasonable cause to believe that the offense or offenses charged occurred and that the defendant committed them." People v. Miller, 45 Misc 3d 1209(A) (Crim Ct NY County 2014). See also People v. Hightower, 18 NY3d 249 (2011).
This Court relies on a common-sense reading of the instrument to determine whether it sufficiently alleges the defendant's identity in a circumstantial case. Thus, for example, in People v. Burke, 48 Misc 3d 1208(A) (Crim Ct NY County 2015), the information alleged that the defendant chased the complaint down an otherwise unoccupied stairway and that the complainant felt a push to her back, which caused her to fall. The Court concluded that these facts led to a reasonable inference that the defendant was the person who pushed the complainant. C. The Information Is Facially Sufficient With Respect to Defendant's Identity as the Person Who Drove the Complainant's Car Without Permission or Authority
Penal Law § 165.05(1) provides that a person is guilty of authorized use of a vehicle in the third degree when he "he takes, operates, exercises control over, rides in or otherwise uses a vehicle" knowing that he lacked the owner's consent to do so. This knowledge is presumed where the defendant in fact lacked consent. Id.
Here, the information makes out a prima facie case that someone drove the complainant's car without the complainant's consent and thus that, presumptively, this person knew that he lacked consent. The only real question is whether it sufficiently alleges that this defendant was that someone.
The Court concludes that it does. According to the information, the key to complainant's car remained in his bedroom from the time he parked the car on October 9, 2015, until October 11, when the complainant discovered the key was missing and that the car was no longer where he had parked it. These facts, standing alone, would not be sufficient to allege that the defendant was the person who moved the complainant's car. But the information also alleges that the defendant was the only person other than the complainant who had access to the complainant's bedroom, where the key had been stored, during this period.
This additional fact leads to a reasonable inference the defendant is the person who removed the car key. And that inference reasonably leads to the conclusion that the defendant, once he took the key, is the person who drove the car knowing that he lacked the complainant's consent.
To be sure, these facts do not entirely eliminate other possibilities. Perhaps someone other than the defendant did have access to the complainant's bedroom, and the complainant either did not know or did not remember this. Or, perhaps, while defendant was the person who removed the car key, he was still somehow not the person who drove the car. But that there are alternative inferences that can be drawn is immaterial, because those alternatives are less likely than the obvious one: that defendant took the car key from the complainant's bedroom and drove the car without the complainant's consent. This case is therefore unlike People v. Miller, 45 Misc 3d 1209(A) (Crim Ct NY County 2014), in which the Court dismissed an assault case for facial insufficiency because inference that defendant himself both caused the complainant's injury and that he did so either intentionally or recklessly, and not accidentally, was no more likely than the other available inferences. Rather, it is more like People v. Heatley, 44 Misc 3d 1221(A) (Crim Ct NY County 2014), in which on facts quite similar to those in Miller, the Court nevertheless concluded that additional facts alleged in the information made the inference of defendant's guilt more likely than the other inferences, even though those facts did not "entirely eliminate" the other inferences.
Accordingly, the information is facially sufficient as to the count charging a violation of Penal Law 165.05(1). D. The Information is Facially Insufficient as to the Criminal Mischief Count
The Court, however, reaches a different conclusion with respect to the count charging the defendant with violating Penal Law § 145.00(3). That section involves "[r]ecklessly damaging" someone else's property without the owner's permission or authority. Here, the information fails to make out a prima facie case both as to identity and to mens rea.
As to identity, while the facts here reasonably allege that this defendant is the person who drove the car, they do not reasonably allege that he is the person who damaged it. The complainant left the car unattended for about two days. Anyone could have damaged it during that period. Unlike the facts supporting the unauthorized use count, the facts supporting the criminal mischief count generate two equally likely possibilities: either the defendant damaged the car during those two days, while he was driving it without the owner's consent, or someone else damaged the car during those two days, after the defendant drove it without the complainant's consent. But absent some fact that might make the first of these possibilities more likely than the other, cf. Heatley, 44 Misc 3d 1221(A), the information is facially insufficient as to identity for this count.
The information is also facially insufficient as to mens rea. Merely alleging that the car was damaged, even assuming, arguendo, that defendant was the person who damaged it, does not by itself lead to a reasonable inference that he damaged it recklessly. He could have done so intentionally, negligently, or purely accidentally.
This Court considered a similar problem in People v. Gonzalez, 49 Misc 3d 1216(A) (Crim Ct NY County 2015), in which an information charged intentional assault, reckless assault and negligent assault, all based on the bare allegation that the defendant hit the complainant with his car. There, "[a]bsent the allegation of any additional facts from which a culpable mental state might be inferred, this bare assertion [did] not make out a prima facie case of any of the subsections of Penal Law § 120.00 with which the defendant [stood] charged." Here, as in Gonzalez, the accusatory instrument lacks that "additional fact from which a culpable mental state might be inferred." It is accordingly facially insufficient for this additional reason, as well. E. Conclusion
The motion to dismiss as to the count charging a violation of Penal Law § 165.05(1) is denied. It is granted as to that charging a violation of Penal Law § 145.00(3). IV. THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Based on the allegations in defendant's motion to suppress statements, the Court orders a Huntley/Dunaway hearing. V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motions to dismiss for facial insufficiency is granted in part and denied in part. The Court also orders a Huntley/Dunaway hearing, This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. Dated: April 13, 2016_______________________ New York County, New YorkSteven M. Statsinger Judge of the Criminal Court