Opinion
October 31, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Lawrence Tonetti, J.).
Defendant was convicted for the stabbing death of his estranged common law wife at her apartment, during a heated argument. The argument, immediately preceding the assault, although not the stabbing itself, was observed by the wife's female house guest. Defendant admitted shortly thereafter to other witnesses that he had killed his wife, as he asked them to summon an ambulance.
The only issue raised on appeal is defendant's challenge to the Court's instruction on intent. Defendant's contention that the Court's instruction converted a permissive inference, that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his act, into a mandatory inference, is without merit. (See, Sandstrom v Montana, 442 U.S. 510; People v. Getch, 50 N.Y.2d 456.)
The charge as a whole made clear that it is the jury's role to determine intent, and that the burden of proof was upon the People. Further, the Court properly instructed the jury that in determining intent, it should look at "all the facts and circumstances" of the event. Nor, under the circumstances of this case, do we find infirmity with the instruction that intent "is the secret and silent operation of one's mind. It's only visible physical manifestation is the deed accomplished; what did he do." Contrary to defendant's position on appeal, this phrasing does not direct the jury to a verdict on the basis that defendant's intent must be inferred from the act itself. The Court's charge as a whole instructed the jury on the appropriate principles of law. (People v. Coleman, 70 N.Y.2d 817, 819.)
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Milonas, Kupferman, Asch and Kassal, JJ.