Opinion
2011-10-13
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,v.Augustin NORALES, Defendant–Appellant.
Steven Banks, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Ellen Dille of counsel), for appellant.Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Hannah E.C. Moore of counsel), for respondent.
Steven Banks, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Ellen Dille of counsel), for appellant.Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Hannah E.C. Moore of counsel), for respondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (David Stadtmauer, J.), rendered February 11, 2009, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of criminal trespass in the third degree, and sentencing him to a conditional discharge and a $150 fine, unanimously affirmed.
The misdemeanor information sufficiently alleged that defendant knowingly and unlawfully entered a nonpublic area of a building. There is no material distinction between the allegations of this information and those upheld in People v. Maresca, 19 Misc.3d 133[A], 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 50663[U], 2008 WL 879749 [App. Term, 1st Dept.2008] and
People v. Quinones, 2002 N.Y. Slip Op. 50091[U], 2002 WL 432917 [App. Term, 1st Dept.2002], lv. denied 98 N.Y.2d 680, 746 N.Y.S.2d 469, 774 N.E.2d 234 [2002]. The allegations plainly indicate that defendant entered a nonpublic lobby, and not merely a public vestibule. The factual allegations of an information are to be “given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading,” and are sufficient so long as they “give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense” ( People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354, 360, 717 N.Y.S.2d 88, 740 N.E.2d 233 [2000] ).
The information was also sufficient to allege that defendant knowingly entered the lobby unlawfully. The allegations that defendant entered the lobby through a locked door, notwithstanding a conspicuous no-trespassing sign, and when questioned did not claim to be a resident or invited guest, satisfied the knowledge element of trespass ( see e.g. People v. Flores, 21 Misc.3d 141[A], 2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 52371[U], 2008 WL 5005190 [App. Term, 2d Dept.2008] ).