Opinion
E033058.
10-14-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AASIM NIA, Defendant and Appellant.
Barbara A. Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Anthony Da Silva and David Delgado-Rucci, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Aasim Nia appeals from judgment entered following a jury conviction for first degree, premeditated murder. The court also found true the allegation defendant intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury. The court sentenced defendant to two consecutive indeterminate prison terms of 25 years to life.
Penal Code section 187. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendants motion for new trial. Specifically, defendant claims the trial court applied the wrong standard of review by applying the substantial evidence standard rather than deciding the motion by acting as the thirteenth juror. Defendant also contends there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation.
Based on a review of the record, we conclude the trial court applied the proper standard of review and did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants motion for new trial. We also conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the jurys first degree murder verdict. We affirm the judgment.
1. Facts
On February 17, 2001, in the hallway of the Tyler Mall in Riverside, defendant and a companion, Ron Metoyer, walked past Johnny Washington, his girlfriend, Cedonia Frierson, and Friersons four-year-old son and her seven-year-old brother. Washington and Frierson were headed to the Footaction store to pick up shoes on layaway. Defendant and Metoyer were headed in the opposite direction. As they passed, defendant and Metoyer and Washington exchanged stares, described by Frierson as "mad-dogging."
Shortly thereafter defendant, Metoyer, and Washington encountered each other at the Footaction store. Metoyer and Washington began verbally insulting each other while Washington was trying on shoes and Frierson was waiting in line to purchase shoes on layaway. The store was quite busy at the time, with 25 to 30 customers.
The verbal altercation between Metoyer and Washington escalated into one pushing the other into a shoe display wall and then one punching the other or the two exchanging one or two punches. Defendant, who had been passively observing the verbal and physical altercation between Metoyer and Washington, moved behind Washington, pulled out a loaded gun from his pants waistband, and fired four shots into Washingtons side and back, killing Washington. Defendant and Metoyer then ran from the scene and were apprehended by the police.
Witnesses testimony regarding the incident differs significantly, and in some instances witnesses accounts are fundamentally irreconcilable. The various witnesses versions of the incident are summarized in the parties briefs. Where pertinent, their testimony is summarized in this opinion below.
2. Motion for New Trial
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial. Specifically, defendant claims the court applied the wrong standard of review and therefore the judgment must be reduced to voluntary manslaughter or second degree murder and remanded for resentencing due to insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation. Alternatively, defendant requests the case be remanded for reconsideration under the proper standard of review. We conclude the trial court applied the proper standard of review and there was no abuse of discretion in denying defendants motion.
A. Background Facts
Defendant moved for a new trial on the ground there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation. During the hearing, the trial court stated that under People v. Davis the law was clear that the court sits as a thirteenth juror and reevaluates the evidence but must give deference to the jurys verdict.
People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463.
After argument on the motion, the court again stated that, in deciding defendants motion for new trial, the court intended to follow the mandate of People v. Davis and therefore consider the jurys verdict but determine "in my own mind independently sitting as a thirteenth juror if there is sufficient evidence presented to support that verdict, even though, so the record is clear, my verdict, if I were sitting as a trial court, might have been different." The trial court acknowledged that the standard in deciding the motion was not the same as that of the appellate court reviewing a verdict but recognized that the trial court could not entirely disregard the jury verdict.
The trial court then stated there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation, "even though I might not have agreed with it. Reasonable minds can differ. . . . I think Mr. Nia taking a loaded firearm into the shopping mall is indicative of, at the very least, a willingness and a readiness to use that weapon if he felt it appropriate and necessary and therefore to use lethal force. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [N]ot only was it fully loaded, but a bullet had to be chambered, at least by the time Mr. Nia entered the Footaction store, which makes it really ready to be used and fired on a moments notice."
In discussing the three factors establishing premeditation and deliberation under People v. Anderson, the court concluded that bringing the loaded firearm into the mall and chambering a round was evidence of planning activity. As to the prior relationship factor, there was evidence Washington and his girlfriend had passed by defendant and Metoyer in the mall and had been staring at each other or "mad-dogging," while heading in opposite directions. Shortly after defendant and Metoyer first encountered Washington in the hallway, they all ended up in the Footaction shoe store at about the same time. Washington had a reason for being at the store whereas reasonable inferences could be made that defendant did not and followed Washington into the store after the confrontational staring incident.
People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27.
The court concluded Washington pushed Metoyer into the shoe rack but this was part of an ongoing verbal altercation. The court concluded defendant did nothing to calm down the situation because he knew he had a loaded gun he could use if things escalated "and now hes going to have to pay the price for it." The court added that there were many things defendant could have done rather than use deadly force to defend Metoyer, such as leaving the store, contacting security, or simply backing off.
The court stated that testimony that defendant had said shortly before shooting Washington, "[T]ake it off safety," also demonstrated a certain amount of forethought, planning, and preparation. The court noted, "We know the gun is chambered. Maybe its on safety. Thats a quick easy thing to do is take it off safety." The court acknowledged it did not know what defendant meant by the statement and it could be construed in different ways. The court nevertheless concluded defendant was indicating to Metoyer that defendant was ready to use his gun if necessary. This, the court concluded supported premeditation and deliberation. The court also noted that an officer testified a witness told him defendant said after shooting Washington, "Thats what you get," although a couple years later, during the trial, the witness said she did not recall hearing this or telling an officer she heard this.
As to the manner or nature of the killing, the court stated that even though it took a few seconds, defendant fired four shots. Defendant took a more aggressive position when Metoyer and Washington began physically fighting. He moved to a more advantageous position behind Washington and then shot him four times in Washingtons side and back. The court concluded the location of the wounds also supported a finding of premeditation and deliberation.
The court stated that "I do find that based upon the standard that Im utilizing as previously stated that there was sufficient evidence to support the jurys finding of first degree murder, and therefore I will deny the defendants motion for a new trial . . . ."
B. Defendants Contentions
Defendant argues that, based on the following statements made by the court, the trial court applied the wrong standard of review. The court stated during the hearing on the motion for new trial that People v. Davis indicated that "the court must, even sitting as the thirteenth juror, give deference to the jurys verdict and determine as the thirteenth juror if there is sufficient evidence to justify or support that verdict even though the Court sitting as the trier of fact might have reached or rendered a different or alternative verdict."
The court also stated that, while there was a difference between the appellate sufficiency of evidence standard of review and the trial courts standard of review applied to a motion for new trial, the motion for new trial standard of review under Davis was somewhat inconsistent since the trial court was required not to disregard the verdict but "consider the proper weight to be accorded to the evidence and then decide whether or not in this opinion there is sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict. . . . Youre not truly sitting as a thirteenth juror. But then again, youre right, youre not sitting as an appellate court considering the light most favorable of the verdict to consider whether theres sufficient evidence. Its something in between."
In addition, the court stated: "I am going to look at the jurys verdict and determine in my own mind independently sitting as a thirteenth juror if there is sufficient evidence presented to support that verdict, even though, so the record is clear, my verdict, if I were sitting as a trial court, might have been different. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I do find that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation, again, even though I might not have agreed with it. Reasonable minds can differ."
Defendant contends that these statements show that the trial courts exclusive focus was on evidence sufficient to support the jurys finding, not on the courts independent review of the evidence. He claims that the trial court erred by examining the evidence under an incorrect standard of review, in violation of Section 1181, subdivision 6.
C. Applicable Law
Section 1181 provides that the trial court may grant a new trial when it finds that the verdict or finding is contrary to the law or the evidence. Section 1181, subdivision 6, in relevant part provides: "When a verdict has been rendered or a finding made against the defendant, the court may, upon his application, grant a new trial . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [w]hen the verdict or finding is contrary to law or evidence, . . ."
In reviewing a motion for a new trial, the trial court must weigh the evidence independently. It is, however, guided by a presumption in favor of the correctness of the verdict and proceedings supporting it. The trial court "should [not] disregard the verdict . . . but instead . . . should consider the proper weight to be accorded to the evidence and then decide whether or not, in its opinion, there is sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict."
People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 761, overruled on other grounds in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572; People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pages 523-524.
People v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 822, 832; People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pages 523-524.
People v. Robarge (1953) 41 Cal.2d 628, 633; People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pages 523-524.
A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial. "`The determination of a motion for a new trial rests so completely within the courts discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears."
People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1318; People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pages 523-524.
In People v. Robarge, the Supreme Court explained the standard of review as follows: "While it is the exclusive province of the jury to find the facts, it is the duty of the trial court to see that this function is intelligently and justly performed, and in the exercise of its supervisory power over the verdict, the court, on motion for a new trial, should consider the probative force of the evidence and satisfy itself that the evidence as a whole is sufficient to sustain the verdict. [Citations.] It has been stated that a defendant is entitled to two decisions on the evidence, one by the jury and the other by the court on motion for a new trial. [Citations.] This does not mean, however, that the court should disregard the verdict or that it should decide what result it would have reached if the case had been tried without a jury, but instead that it should consider the proper weight to be accorded to the evidence and then decide whether or not, in its opinion, there is sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict. [Citations .] [¶] . . . [¶] The statement by the trial judge that `the Court sits as a thirteenth juror has an unfortunate connotation; the phrase is misleading, and it does not properly describe the function of a trial judge in passing upon a motion for a new trial. As we have seen, it is the province of the trial judge to see that the jury intelligently and justly performs its duty and, in the exercise of a proper legal discretion, to determine whether there is sufficient credible evidence to sustain the verdict."
People v. Robarge, supra, 41 Cal.2d 628.
People v. Robarge, supra, 41 Cal.2d at pages 633-634.
D. Discussion
We find no abuse of discretion here. Defendant argues the courts statements during the hearing on the motion for new trial indicate the trial court applied the wrong standard of review. We find no such error.
The trial court clearly stated that it recognized there was a difference between the appellate sufficiency of evidence standard of review and the trial court standard of review applied to a motion for new trial. The court acknowledged that it must independently review the case as a thirteenth juror but at the same time under People v. Davis take into account the jury verdict and consider the proper weight to be given the evidence supporting the verdict. The trial court articulated the correct standard of review and indicated it had independently considered the evidence.
People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th 463.
Although defendant isolates statements in which the trial court refers to the jurys verdict, it is clear from the record as a whole that it did not regard itself as bound by any of the jurys findings but rather correctly concluded it could take into consideration the verdict in determining whether to grant a new trial. While the court indicated it might have decided the case differently had it been a juror, the court recognized it must give deference to the verdict and appropriately concluded that there was ample evidence to support it. On the issue of premeditation and deliberation, the trial court discussed the evidence in detail and offered what were clearly its own independent findings in reaching the conclusion the evidence supported the verdict and was proper.
Defendant argues the court found that defendant unreasonably believed he needed to use deadly force and even though the court did not mention this until after ruling on the new trial motion, defendant claims this confirms that the trial court failed to abide by the thirteenth juror standard of review and grant a new trial based on the courts own determination the evidence supported a finding of imperfect self-defense. After ruling on the motion for new trial, the court mentioned during the hearing on defendants motion for modification of the judgment that Washington, to some extent, provoked the altercation and defendant believed he needed to use deadly force to protect Metoyer.
But defendant fails to acknowledge that the court added that, based on the totality of the circumstances, it was not inclined to reduce the verdict to second degree murder and did not find any evidence sufficient to support heat of passion, sudden quarrel or imperfect self-defense. The court stated that, even though there was a quarrel, it did not involve defendant directly. The court further stated it did not find sufficient evidence of imperfect defense of another because the altercation was nothing more than, at most, relatively benign mutual combat between Metoyer and defendant, involving one or two punches with neither participant having any advantage over the other.
We thus conclude the trial court did not apply an erroneous standard but rather found that the verdict was within the proper range of jury choices, and that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Defendant thus has not overcome the "strong presumption that [the trial court] properly exercised [its] discretion." The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant a new trial.
People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at page 524.
4. Sufficiency of Evidence of Premeditation and Deliberation
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation. Rather, the evidence established defendant acted in unreasonable defense of another. Defendant adds that this is "an almost classic heat of passion, sudden quarrel and provocation scenario." We disagree. While the evidence may support defendants version of the facts, there is sufficient evidence to support the jurys premeditated murder verdict, as the trial court concluded after independently reviewing the evidence.
"In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears `that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction]. [Citation.] In People v. Anderson[], we identified three categories of evidence relevant to resolving the issue of premeditation and deliberation: planning activity, motive, and manner of killing. However, as later explained in People v. Pride[]. . . : `Anderson does not require that these factors be present in some special combination or that they be accorded a particular weight, nor is the list exhaustive. Anderson was simply intended to guide an appellate courts assessment whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing occurred as the result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse. [Citation.] Thus, while premeditation and deliberation must result from `"careful thought and weighing of considerations" [citation], we continue to apply the principle that `[t]he process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of time. "The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly . . . ." [Citations.] [Citation.]"
People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pages 26-27.
People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 247.
People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331-332.
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish that he deliberated and premeditated in killing Washington. As defendant notes, there were vast divergencies in witnesses accounts of the incident. While there was evidence supporting defendants claim that he acted in unreasonable self-defense of Metoyer, there was also substantial evidence that defendant premeditated the killing. It is undisputed defendant brought a concealed gun into the mall and the gun was loaded when he entered the Footaction store. There was also testimony defendant, Metoyer, and Washington had a confrontation in the mall before they all entered the Footaction store. The evidence supports the reasonable inference that after the initial confrontation in the mall hallway, defendant and Metoyer changed directions and followed Washington into the Footaction store. Once they arrived at the store, Metoyer and Washington began exchanging insults. The verbal altercation escalated into a physical altercation. Defendant simply stood by passively observing the confrontation, knowing he had a loaded, concealed gun in his waistbelt and waiting for the opportune moment to shoot Washington.
The evidence indicates both were equally engaged in a very brief physical altercation, which consisted of only one or two punches, and there were many other bystanders, as well as security, who could have intervened if necessary to prevent Metoyer from being harmed.
The evidence thus supports a reasonable finding that defendant did not act because he believed Metoyer needed to be defended against a serious threat of injury. Rather, after Metoyer and Washington exchanged a couple punches, defendant methodically moved behind Washington and shot Washington at close range in the side and back, and then told him, according to witness testimony, "Thats what you get."
Evidence of premeditation and deliberation also included witness testimony that shortly before defendant shot Washington, defendant told Metoyer "Take it off safety," which the court construed as meaning, defendant was indicating to Metoyer he was preparing to use his gun. In addition, witnesses testified that defendant appeared calm when he shot Washington and when he left the scene. There was thus sufficient evidence to establish that defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation.
As to heat of passion and sudden quarrel, as the trial court explained, these were not valid defenses since defendant was not engaged in the altercation. Until shooting Washington, defendant stood and passively observed the altercation between Metoyer and Washington.
While there is evidence supporting defenses version of the events, there is also sufficient evidence supporting the jurys finding of premeditation and deliberation, as well as the jurys rejection of defendants unreasonable self-defense claim.
5. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McKinster, Acting P. J. and Richli, J.