Opinion
B300452
04-29-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN NAVARRETTE, Defendant and Appellant.
Gloria C. Cohen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA471561) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Richard S. Kemalyan, Judge. Affirmed. Gloria C. Cohen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The District Attorney of Los Angeles County filed an information against defendant and appellant Juan Navarrette, alleging one count of pandering (Pen. Code, § 266i, subd. (a)(2)) and one count of meeting a minor for lewd purposes (§ 288.4, subd. (b)). The information also alleged that defendant had sustained two prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j) and 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. --------
At the preliminary hearing, Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Nicole Avila described how, acting undercover and pretending to be a 16-year old, she communicated with defendant through a social media website, by phone, and by text. According to the deputy, defendant offered to take her on dates to perform commercial sex acts until she reached the age of 18 years. He told her how much to charge for various sex acts with customers and stated that she must give him all the money she made until she turned 18. Deputy Avila arranged to meet defendant so that the two could engage in sex and she could demonstrate her ability as a sex worker. Deputies arrested defendant when he arrived at the meeting location.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant entered a plea of no contest to the pandering count and admitted he had suffered one prior strike conviction. During the change of plea colloquy, defendant confirmed his understanding that, under the plea agreement, he "would be serving a period of 12 years in the state prison."
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court inquired whether "arraignment for judgment and time for sentencing [was] waived." Defense counsel stated that defendant did so waive, but advised the court that defendant was having "second thoughts about the plea." Counsel also stated that he had spoken to defendant and did not believe that there was "a legal reason to withdraw [the plea] at this point."
When the trial court reminded defendant that he had pleaded no contest pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant stated, "Well, I'm willing to take the offer. I'm just asking for mercy. Like, it's too much time for these circumstance for being in court, Your Honor." The court responded, "If there's a legal basis for the motion [to withdraw the plea] for the court to consider, I'd be glad to do so. [¶] At this time is arraignment for judgment and time for sentencing waived?"
Defense counsel responded, "Yes. No legal cause." The trial court then sentenced defendant to a total term of 12 years. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
On appeal, we appointed counsel to represent defendant. His appointed counsel filed an opening brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 requesting that we independently review the entire record to determine if there are any arguable issues. We then notified defendant that appointed counsel had failed to find any arguable issues and that he had 30 days within which to brief any grounds for appeal, contentions, or arguments he wanted us to consider. Defendant filed a supplemental brief raising three general categories of contentions.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant first challenges the validity of his conviction by requesting, among other things, that we independently review the discovery produced in this matter as such discovery would impeach Deputy Avila's testimony at the preliminary hearing. We reject defendant's challenge to the validity of his plea because he has not complied with section 1237.5 and rule 8.304(b) of the California Rules of Court by first securing a certificate of probable cause. (People v. Puente (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1149.)
Defendant next challenges the trial court's imposition of the negotiated 12-year sentence, contending that the court did not sufficiently consider certain purportedly mitigating factors. Defendant's contention is meritless. (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295 ["defendants who have received the benefit of their bargain should not be allowed to trifle with the courts by attempting to better the bargain through the appellate process"]; People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 78 [defendant may not challenge the imposition of a negotiated sentence without first obtaining a certificate of probable cause].)
Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court made certain procedural errors at the sentencing hearing. According to defendant, the court "never asked [him] whether there exists any cause why judgment should not be pronounced and never a[d]vised [him] of certain rights and responsibilities nor gave a statement or reason for sentencing choice." Although section 1200 requires the court at sentencing to ask "whether [the defendant] has any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him," here, defendant, through counsel, waived arraignment for judgment, stating twice that there was no legal cause why judgment should not be pronounced. Thus, defendant's argument is meritless. (In re Juarez (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 64, 68 ["It has been traditionally understood that by waiving formal arraignment for judgment, the defendant relieves the court of the requirements of section 1200 and the formalities required in the sentencing procedure"].) As to defendant's contention that the court did not advise him of "certain rights and responsibilities," he does not articulate the rights and responsibilities about which the court failed to advise him or how he was thereby prejudiced. Finally, defendant's challenge to the court's purported failure to state its reasons for sentencing him to 12 years is, at bottom, a challenge to the underlying sentence, which challenge, as discussed, is meritless.
We have reviewed the record and are satisfied that defendant's appointed counsel has fully complied with her responsibilities and no arguable issues exist. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 441.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM, J.
We concur:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
MOOR, J.