Opinion
B302872
09-22-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. QUANTEL LEVELLE NASH, Defendant and Appellant.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Charles S. Lee, and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA406893) APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Lisa B. Lench, Judge. Affirmed. Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Charles S. Lee, and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION
Defendant Quantel Levelle Nash appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for resentencing of his voluntary manslaughter conviction under Senate Bill No. 1437 (SB 1437). Among other statutory changes, SB 1437 added Penal Code section 1170.95. Section 1170.95 provides for retroactive resentencing for some criminal defendants convicted of murder under either felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The trial court found that defendant was ineligible for resentencing because he had not been convicted of murder. We agree with the trial court and several other Courts of Appeal that section 1170.95 does not apply to voluntary manslaughter. We affirm.
All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 27, 2012, defendant and his fellow gang members participated in an attack on a rival gang. One of defendant's cohorts fatally shot the victim.
Although defendant was initially charged with murder, he pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitted gang and firearm enhancements and a prior prison term allegation. On January 29, 2015, defendant was sentenced to a total of 18 years: the middle term of six years for voluntary manslaughter, ten years for gang enhancements, one year for firearm enhancements, and one year for a prior prison term.
On May 6, 2019, defendant filed his section 1170.95 petition. The trial court denied the petition, finding defendant ineligible for resentencing because he was convicted of manslaughter, not of murder. The trial court explained:
"The statute starts out with 'a person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and
probable consequences theory may file a petition with the court.' Then it lists the things that need to apply as subparts of 1170.95(a).
"So it seems to me that the initial hurdle that a defendant needs to overcome in making a prima facie case is it be a person convicted of murder, either as a felony murder or murder under natural and probable consequences theory.
"I understand the position . . . statutory language precludes it."
We recently decided codefendant Robert S. Cobb's appeal on this same issue. (People v. Cobb, May 1, 2010, B299664.)
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court's interpretation of section 1170.95 was "inconsistent with the language and goals of the statute, well-established canons of statutory construction, and relevant precedent, and violates equal protection and due process." We agree that this appeal is principally about statutory interpretation but we reject defendant's proffered meaning. We also reject his constitutional arguments.
In an appeal founded on statutory construction, our review is de novo. (People v. Morrison (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 980, 989.) Our "primary task is to give effect to the Legislature's intended purpose in enacting the law." (People v. Hubbard (2016) 63 Cal.4th 378, 386 (Hubbard).) "We must look to the statute's words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] The statute's plain meaning controls the court's interpretation unless its words are ambiguous." (People v. Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 177.) If we need to go beyond the literal words, we consider the challenged language, not in isolation, but in light of the statute as a whole. (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142.) Finally, if the statute's meaning remains unclear, "we may consider various extrinsic aids—including the legislative history—to the extent they are helpful in illuminating that purpose." (Hubbard, at p. 386.) 1. The Express Words of Section 1170 .95 Render Defendant Ineligible for Resentencing on His Voluntary Manslaughter Conviction
Section 1170.95 authorizes a "person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory [to] file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder conviction vacated" as long as three conditions apply. (Id. at subd. (a).) First, the People must have alleged charges against the petitioner under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Id. at subd. (a)(1).) Second, the petitioner must be "convicted of first degree or second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder." (Id. at subd. (a)(2).) Third, the petitioner could no longer be convicted of first or second degree murder if tried under the changes to section 188 or 189 effective January 1, 2019 through SB 1437. (Id. at subd. (a)(3).)
The plain language of the statute creates the specific threshold requirement that the defendant seeking resentencing be "convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory." (§ 1170.95, subd. (a).) Defendant directs us away from that provision to subdivision (a)(2). He argues that the language "or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder" extends the applicability of the statute to those initially charged with murder but ultimately convicted of manslaughter.
In People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 992 (Flores), our colleagues in the Fourth District were also asked to expand section 1170.95 to manslaughter convictions. And like the Flores court, we "reject [the defendant's] interpretation of section 1170.95, which places outsized importance on a single clause to the exclusion of the provision's other language." (Ibid.)
Defendant's proposed interpretation of section 1170.95 would improperly render superfluous "A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition . . . ." (See People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1313 [an appellate court attempts "to give effect to every word in a statute and avoid constructions that render statutory terms superfluous or meaningless."].)
Here, the language of subdivision (a) does in fact expressly limit resentencing to those convicted of murder. "Murder" is but one subset of homicide; it does not include voluntary manslaughter. (See § 187 ["Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice aforethought."]; § 189 [degrees of murder]; § 192 ["Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice."].)
At bottom, defendant would have us insert the word "manslaughter" into a law where it is nowhere to be found. The word "murder" is used 11 times in section 1170.95; manslaughter not once. By its deliberate word choice, the Legislature limited section 1170.95 to those convicted of murder. "Through its repeated and exclusive references to murder, the plain language of section 1170.95 limits relief only to qualifying persons who were convicted of murder." (Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 992.)
Our plain meaning analysis of section 1170.95 is consistent with that of our sister courts. The Second District, Division Six in People v. Cervantes (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 884, 887 (Cervantes); the Fourth District, Division One in both Flores, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at page 993, and People v. Turner (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 428, 435-436 (Turner); and the Fourth District, Division Two in People v. Sanchez (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 914, 915 each held that the plain language of section 1170.95 limits relief to those convicted of murder, thereby excluding convictions of voluntary manslaughter. 2. Defendant's Authorities Are Distinguishable
In arguing that Cervantes, Flores, and Turner were wrongfully decided, defendant directs us to In re R.G. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 141 (R.G.) and People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page). Neither R.G. nor Page has anything to do with manslaughter.
Defendant does not cite Sanchez, supra, 914 Cal.App.5th at page 915 as it had not yet been decided when defendant submitted his opening brief. Defendant did not file a reply brief. --------
In R.G., a minor had committed murder under the natural and probable consequences theory. On direct appeal, the minor argued that the juvenile court's finding should be reversed because SB 1437 applied retroactively to him. (R.G, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 144.) The appellate court concluded that section 1170.95 relief was available to a minor even though the minor was not, in the words of the statute, "convicted," but only "adjudicated." "Where the juvenile court has sustained a murder allegation on a natural and probable consequences theory, a juvenile may, pursuant to the provisions of section 1170.95, petition the court to have that conviction vacated and the corresponding commitment (or other disposition) recalled." (Id. at p. 151.) Defendant points to R.G. as proof that section 1170.95 should be interpreted broadly, and covers manslaughter. We are not persuaded.
The present appeal offers little similarity to R.G. There, the court found that the connection between juvenile procedure and substantive criminal law was such that it "would be absurd" not to apply section 1170.95 to juveniles. (R.G, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 147.) Because the juvenile court's jurisdiction is premised on the violation of criminal law, the Legislature "understood that the bill's changes to section 188 [through SB 1437] would apply to juvenile offenders." (Id. at p. 148.) R.G. provides no support for the expansion of section 1170.95 to a crime nowhere mentioned in SB 1437. Quite the contrary, R.G. is consistent with the holdings of Cervantes, Flores, Turner, and Sanchez: an adult defendant must have been convicted of murder (or a juvenile must have been so adjudicated) to be eligible for resentencing. (Id. at p. 149.)
We likewise find defendant's reliance on Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th 1175, unconvincing. The Supreme Court in Page considered whether the unlawful taking of a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 was an offense eligible for resentencing under Proposition 47. (Id. at pp. 1179-1180.)
Based on both the statutory language and legislative intent, the Page court concluded that those convicted of taking a vehicle were eligible for resentencing (even though Proposition 47 does not explicitly mention Vehicle Code section 10851) because taking a vehicle fell within the statutory definition of theft. (Page, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 1180, 1183, 1187.) The Supreme Court found that a theft is a theft is a theft whether it is charged under the Penal Code or the Vehicle Code. The defendant's conviction was for theft; hence, he was eligible for Proposition 47 relief. (Page, at p. 1187.) Page's analysis is inapt: manslaughter is not a murder. 3. Defendant's Other Arguments are Unpersuasive
Defendant argues that "the rule of lenity militates in favor of the broader interpretation." Lenity is applicable when a statute is ambiguous. (People v. Manzo (2012) 53 Cal.4th 880, 889.) There is no ambiguity here.
Defendant finally contends that excluding from resentencing petitioners who were initially charged with murder but who pled to manslaughter under section 1170.95 would lead to an "absurd" result that the legislature did not intend. The Turner court pointedly rejected this argument, stating "nor does our construction produce absurdity by undermining the Legislature's goal to calibrate punishment to culpability. The punishment for manslaughter is already less than that imposed for first or second degree murder, and the determinate sentencing ranges of 3, 6, or 11 years for voluntary manslaughter and 2, 3, or 4 years for involuntary manslaughter permit a sentencing judge to make punishment commensurate with a defendant's culpability based on aggravating and mitigating factors." (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at pp. 438-439.)
We agree with the three reasons offered in Turner: "First, the Legislature understood the distinction between murder and manslaughter and focused its efforts on revising accomplice liability under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory. Second, nearly every committee report and analyses made note of the life sentences imposed for defendants convicted of first- or second-degree murder. . . . Finally, the petitioning procedure was restricted by amendment to apply to persons convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory." (Turner, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 438.) 4. Defendant's Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process Rights Were Not Violated
Defendant argues that by declining to extend section 1170.95 to those convicted of voluntary manslaughter, we are violating his equal protection and substantive due process rights.
Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pages 888-889, persuasively rejected the defendant's equal protection argument both because the defendant was not similarly situated to those convicted of murder and because the legislature had sufficiently good reason to treat them differently. We agree with that court's analysis.
We also agree with Cervantes in our rejection of defendant's substantive due process claim. Substantive due process "requires a rational relationship between the objectives of a legislative enactment and the methods chosen to achieve those objectives." (Cal. Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. City of W. Hollywood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1330.) Here, such a rational relationship exists. The Legislature could have reasonably concluded that it was more important to reform murder convictions than other types of convictions, including voluntary manslaughter. (Cervantes, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 888-889.) The Legislature is "responsible for determining which class of crimes deserves certain punishments and which crimes should be distinguished from others." (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 840.) / / / / / /
DISPOSITION
The order denying the section 1170.95 petition is affirmed.
RUBIN, P. J. WE CONCUR:
BAKER, J.
MOOR, J.