Opinion
G053101
04-24-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THE NORTH RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY et al. Defendants and Appellants.
Jefferson T. Stamp for Defendants and Appellants. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Suzanne E. Shoai and Carolyn M. Khouzam, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 13WF0311) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Clarence Haynes, Temporary Judge (pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21), and Frances Muñoz, Judge (retired judge of the Orange Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 21 of the Cal. Const.). Affirmed. Jefferson T. Stamp for Defendants and Appellants. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Suzanne E. Shoai and Carolyn M. Khouzam, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
The North River Insurance Company and its bail agent Bad Boys Bail Bonds (collectively, Appellants) appeal from a judgment forfeiting the bail bond they posted to obtain Chuani Wei's release from custody. Appellants moved to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond under Penal Code section 1305, subdivision (g), which requires the trial court to vacate a bail forfeiture when the bail agent locates the fleeing criminal defendant in a foreign jurisdiction and the prosecuting agency elects not to seek extradition after being advised of the defendant's location. We affirm the trial court's decision to deny Appellants' motion and enter judgment against Appellants.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Here, Appellants located Wei in China and later discovered she traveled to the United Arab Emirates on a tourist visa. In opposing Appellants' motion, the County of Orange (County) established extradition from either country was infeasible because neither has an extradition treaty with the United States, and neither otherwise will extradite a fugitive to the United States. Appellants do not dispute the infeasibility of extraditing Wei from China or the United Arab Emirates. Instead, they contend the Orange County District Attorney (District Attorney) elected not to seek extradition by declining to seek a red notice through Interpol. An Interpol red notice acts as an arrest warrant in all member countries and may assist in extradition if the fugitive is arrested or detained in a country from which extradition is feasible. The notice, however, does not make an infeasible extradition feasible, and therefore the decision not to seek a red notice is not an election against extradition. Appellants also assert the County is estopped to dispute the feasibility of extradition because it did raise the issue when Appellants moved to extend the period for seeking to vacate the forfeiture. As explained below, Appellants fail to identify any basis for an estoppel.
I
LEGAL BACKGROUND ON BAIL BOND FORFEITURE
"'While bail bond proceedings occur in connection with criminal prosecutions, they are independent from and collateral to the prosecutions and are civil in nature. [Citation.] "The object of bail and its forfeiture is to insure the attendance of the accused and his obedience to the orders and judgment of the court." [Citations.] "In matters of this kind there should be no element of revenue to the state nor punishment of the surety." [Citation.] Nevertheless, the "bail bond is a contract between the surety and the government whereby the surety acts as a guarantor of the defendant's appearance in court under the risk of forfeiture of the bond." [Citation.] Thus, when there is a breach of this contract, the bond should be enforced.' [Citation.] 'The surety enters a contract with the bailee which encompasses the risk that the bailee will not appear and has charged a fee which presumably is sufficient to provide a profitable enterprise despite occasional forfeitures of bail . . . .'" (People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co. (2004) 132 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1138.)
"When a criminal defendant for whom a bail bond has been posted fails to appear, the trial court must declare the bond forfeited in open court. (§ 1305, subd. (a).) Thereafter, the surety that posted the bond has a statutory 'appearance' period in which to either produce the accused in court and have the forfeiture set aside or demonstrate other circumstances requiring the court to vacate the forfeiture." (People v. Western Ins. Co. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1030 (Western); see People v. Seneca Ins. Co. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1079 (Seneca).)
"For a bond exceeding $400, this appearance period is 185 days, the 180-day standard period plus five days for mailing of the required notice of the forfeiture to the surety. (§ 1305, subds. (b)-(c).) However, on the surety's motion, the court may, upon a hearing and a showing of good cause, extend that period to a time not exceeding 180 days. (§ 1305.4.) No additional extensions of this bond exoneration period are statutorily authorized. [Citation.] If the forfeiture is not set aside by the end of the appearance period, the trial court must enter summary judgment against the surety. (§ 1306, subd. (a).)" (Western, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1030; see Seneca, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1079-1080.)
Section 1305, subdivision (g), provides a means for a surety to exonerate a fleeing defendant's bail if the surety can locate the defendant in a foreign jurisdiction, including a foreign country, and the defendant is not in custody. (People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1184; see County of Orange v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 795, 800-801 (Ranger).) Specifically, the trial court is required to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate bail if the bail agent temporarily detains the defendant before a local law enforcement officer in the jurisdiction where the defendant is found, that law enforcement officer positively identifies the detained person as the wanted defendant in an affidavit signed under penalty of perjury, and the district attorney elects not to seek extradition after being informed of the defendant's location. (Western, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1029.)
Section 1305, subdivision (g), provides as follows: "In all cases of forfeiture where a defendant is not in custody and is beyond the jurisdiction of the state, is temporarily detained, by the bail agent, in the presence of a local law enforcement officer of the jurisdiction in which the defendant is located, and is positively identified by that law enforcement officer as the wanted defendant in an affidavit signed under penalty of perjury, and the prosecuting agency elects not to seek extradition after being informed of the location of the defendant, the court shall vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond on terms that are just and do not exceed the terms imposed in similar situations with respect to other forms of pretrial release."
"Section 1305 'must be strictly construed in favor of the surety to avoid the harsh results of a forfeiture'" because the law traditionally disfavors forfeitures. (People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139; see County of Los Angeles v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 661, 665 (American Contractors).) "In adopting a rule of strict construction the courts' concern is not so much for the bail bond companies, to whom forfeiture is an everyday risk of doing business, but for those who bear the ultimate weight of the forfeiture, family members and friends who have pledged their homes and other financial assets to the bonding companies to secure the defendant's release." (American Contractors, at p. 666.)
Nonetheless, "[t]he statutory requirements [of section 1305] must be strictly followed or the court acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction." (County of Los Angeles v. Nobel Ins. Co. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 939, 942-943.) "[T]he surety company bears 'the burden of coming forward with a request [for relief from forfeiture under section 1305] and making the necessary showing within the statutory time frame . . . .' [Citation.] It is the bonding company's obligation 'to establish by competent evidence that its case falls within the four corners' of section 1305." (People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139; see People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1185 ["It was Surety's burden to show that its case falls within [section 1305, subd. (g)]"].)
Whether to grant a motion to vacate a forfeiture and exonerate a bail bond "'"is entirely within the discretion of the trial court."'" (People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139.) We review the court's ruling for abuse of discretion. (People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1184; County of Los Angeles v. Fairmont Specialty Group (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 538, 542 (Fairmont).) "'The abuse of discretion standard[, however,] is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court's ruling under review. The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.'" (Fairmont, at p. 543, quoting Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-712.)
II
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Wei is a citizen of China. In January 2013, the District Attorney charged her with five counts of pandering, and the trial court set her bail at $35,000. Wei gained her release from custody after Appellants posted a bail bond for her. Wei's husband, Chris Chace, posted security for the bond.
On April 29, 2014, Wei failed to appear for her preliminary hearing and the trial court ordered her bond forfeited. The next day, the court mailed Appellants notice of the forfeiture, advising that the 185-day appearance period during which Appellants may seek to vacate the forfeiture would expire on November 1, 2014.
Appellants hired investigator William Ulmer to locate Wei. Working with Chace, Ulmer arranged a meeting with Wei in Shenyang, China, for August 8, 2014. At that time, Ulmer obtained Wei's photograph and fingerprints, and had her sign a declaration confirming her residence in Shenyang, China. Wei, however, refused to accompany Ulmer to the local police station to obtain an affidavit from a local law enforcement officer confirming her identity. A few days later, Ulmer also obtained copies of Wei's Chinese passport, her Chinese National Identification Number, and her expired United States Visa.
Over the next few months, Ulmer worked with a Chinese law firm to obtain the affidavit required by section 1305, subdivision (g). On October 31, 2014, Appellants filed a motion to extend the appearance period, supported by a declaration from Ulmer describing his efforts to identify Wei and establish her location under section 1305, subdivision (g). The County did not oppose the extension motion, and the trial court extended the appearance period to May 19, 2015.
In April 2015, Appellants obtained the "Resident Identity Information Certification Report" for Wei from the Chinese law firm Ulmer hired. The report provided an address for Wei in China, but no one signed the report under penalty of perjury. On April 23, 2015, Appellants forwarded the report to Deputy District Attorney Erin Rowe, and requested an extradition decision and an agreement to toll the appearance period under section 1305, subdivision (h). On May 1, 2015, Appellants e-mailed Rowe, informing her they had learned that Wei may have left China and traveled to Dubai in the United Arab Emirates on a tourist visa.
On May 4, 2015, Rowe e-mailed Appellants: "As Chuani Wei's location is unknown at this time, the Orange County District Attorney's Office is unable to make an extradition election regarding Orange County Superior Court case 13WF0311. Please be advised, however, that if the defendant is still in China, her extradition is infeasible. According to the Office of International Affairs, Department of Justice, which oversees all international extraditions, the defendant cannot be extradited because the United States does not have an extradition treaty with China."
On May 12, 2015, Appellants responded to Rowe's e-mail, providing her with a copy of Wei's tourist visa issued by the United Arab Emirates and explaining Wei must return to China by June 5, 2015, because that was the date on which her visa expired. Appellants suggested Rowe "should request the issuance of a red notice with Interpol and attempt to extradite the Defendant from Dubai and/or the next country that she travels to." Finally, Appellants again requested that Rowe agree to toll the appearance period under section 1305, subdivision (h).
On May 18, 2015, Appellants e-mailed Rowe asking for a response to their previous e-mail. Rowe responded she would not agree to toll the appearance period under section 1305, subdivision (h), but she did not respond to Appellants' suggestion about obtaining an Interpol red notice.
On May 19, 2015, the last day of the extended appearance period, Appellants moved to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond under section 1305, subdivision (g). They argued the "Resident Identity Information Certification Report" for Wei satisfied section 1305, subdivision (g)'s affidavit requirement, and the District Attorney effectively elected against extradition by refusing to seek a red notice from Interpol and refusing to toll the appearance period under section 1305, subdivision (h).
The County opposed the motion, arguing Appellants failed to submit an affidavit from a local law enforcement officer in either China or the United Arab Emirates, and extradition from either country nonetheless was infeasible because the United States does not have an extradition treaty with China or the United Arab Emirates. In support, the County submitted a declaration from Rowe confirming she checked with the Office of International Affairs for the United States Department of Justice about Wei's case, and it informed her extradition from China was not possible because the United States does not have an extradition treaty with China and China does not extradite its nationals. Rowe also explained a red notice serves as a global request to the 190 member countries of Interpol to arrest a fugitive, but the notice simply results in a member country detaining the fugitive. If the country that detains the fugitive does not have an extradition treaty with the United States, or it has a practice of not extraditing persons wanted for certain types of crimes, the red notice does nothing to help return the fugitive to the United States. Finally, Rowe stated she decided to forego seeking a red notice concerning Wei because the United States did not have an extradition treaty with either China or the United Arab Emirates, and the notice therefore would only warn her that the District Attorney was seeking her return to the United States.
The trial court denied Appellants' motion without making any written findings and there was no court reporter present during the hearing on Appellants' motion. The court's minute order simply states the court denied the motion. Thereafter, the court entered a summary judgment against Appellants.
Appellants later moved to vacate the summary judgment on the ground the court entered judgment in favor of the County instead of the People of the State of California. The court denied the motion, but amended the judgment to state it was entered in favor of the People of the State of California. On appeal, Appellants raise no issues concerning their motion to vacate the judgment.
III
DISCUSSION
A. Appellants Failed to Show the District Attorney Elected Not to Extradite Wei
Appellants contend the trial court erred in denying their motion to vacate the forfeiture because they made the required showing under section 1305, subdivision (g). We disagree. Appellants failed to show the District Attorney elected not to extradite Wei, and therefore we need not decide whether Appellants satisfied section 1305, subdivision (g)'s other requirements. (Ranger, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 804-805 & fn. 6.)
As explained, section 1305, subdivision (g), requires a trial court to vacate forfeiture and exonerate the bond when the fleeing defendant is detained and identified in another jurisdiction, "and the prosecuting agency elects not to seek extradition after being informed of the location of the defendant." (§ 1305, subd. (g), italics added.) As used in subdivision (g), "[t]he term elect implies a choice of options . . . [and therefore] the implication is that the prosecutor will have the option whether or not to seek extradition." (Ranger, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 802.) "If the record shows extradition is not feasible, the prosecutor has no real choice in deciding whether to seek the defendant's extradition, and the terms of section 1305, subdivision (g) have not been met." (Ranger, at p. 804.) "Extradition will be deemed infeasible when the host country, as a matter of policy and practice, refuses to grant extradition requests in the category of cases involved in the controversy at hand." (Id. at p. 803.) "[T]he circumstances of each case must be examined to determine whether the defendant's extradition is feasible." (Id. at p. 804; see Seneca, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1081 ["It is clear that if a criminal defendant flees to a jurisdiction that will not extradite individuals to California, section 1305, subdivision (g), does not require vacation of the forfeiture and exoneration of the bond merely because the government does not actively try to extradite the defendant"].)
In Ranger, the criminal defendant was a Mexican citizen charged with several drug offenses who fled to Mexico. The surety located the defendant in Mexico and moved to vacate the bail forfeiture after the prosecuting agency told the surety it could not legally extradite the defendant because he was a Mexican citizen. The trial court denied the motion because the evidence showed Mexico's policy and practice was to extradite its citizens to the United States only for heinous crimes, but not for drug offenses. The Court of Appeal affirmed, explaining this evidence established extradition was not feasible, and therefore the court could not vacate the forfeiture under section 1305, subdivision (g).
Similarly, in Fairmont, the Court of Appeal concluded relief was not available under section 1305, subdivision (g) because the evidence showed the criminal defendant was a Honduran citizen, he had fled to Honduras, the United States extradition treaty with Honduras did not require it to extradite its citizens, and Honduras had refused the prosecuting agency's previous requests to extradite Honduran citizens. (Fairmont, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 545.) In People v. Lexington National Ins. Co. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1242 (Lexington), the Court of Appeal concluded the prosecuting agency had made no election against extraditing a criminal defendant from Chechnya because the United States did not have an extradition treaty with Chechnya, and "[e]xtradition is not feasible in the absence of an extradition treaty." (Id. at p. 1247.)
"The feasibility of extradition in a particular case is a question of fact, for it depends on a foreign state's practices at a particular time." (Fairmont, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 544.) We therefore review a "trial court's finding of lack of feasibility under the substantial evidence test." (Id. at p. 543.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the conclusion extradition from either China or the United Arab Emirates was not feasible. Rowe declared she contacted the Office of International Affairs with the United States Department of Justice, and it confirmed Wei's extradition from China would not be possible because the United States did not have an extradition treaty with China and Wei was a Chinese citizen. Rowe also declared the United States did not have an extradition treaty with the United Arab Emirates, and therefore extradition from there was not possible. Appellants do not argue Wei's extradition from either of these countries was possible, let alone feasible. (See Fairmont, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 545, fn. 3 ["Feasible means 'practicable—i.e., capable of being done or carried out. It does not mean "possible" or "probable" . . .'"].)
In the trial court, Appellants presented evidence attempting to show extradition from China was possible. This evidence included the "Extradition Law of the People's Republic of China (Order of the President No. 42)" and an Agreement between the United States and China concerning "Judicial Assistance." Appellants, however, have abandoned this argument by failing to raise the issue on appeal. Nonetheless, neither of these documents further Appellants' cause. The extradition law expressly states that an extradition request shall be rejected if "the person sought is a national of the People's Republic of China." Moreover, the agreement between the United States and China concerns cooperation between the countries on obtaining and providing evidence, but it does not address extradition.
Instead, Appellants argue they satisfied section 1305, subdivision (g)'s election requirement because the District Attorney elected not to seek extradition by declining to seek a red notice from Interpol, and the County's failure to raise feasibility when Appellants moved to extend the appearance period estops the County from raising feasibility now. Both of these arguments lack merit.
As explained above, section 1305, subdivision (g), does not apply when extradition is infeasible. (See, e.g., Fairmont, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 544 ["If the situation is such that the prosecutor has no meaningful choice because extradition is not feasible, the prosecutor cannot elect whether or not to seek extradition. Thus, a statutory condition to vacating the forfeiture and exonerating the bond cannot be met"]; see also Lexington, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247; Ranger, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at pp. 802, 804-805.) The District Attorney's decision to seek, or not seek, a red notice does not change the feasibility of extraditing Wei.
A red notice essentially asks the member countries of Interpol to detain a fugitive if he or she is found in their country. That detention allows the prosecuting agency to initiate the extradition process with the country detaining the fugitive without concern the fugitive will flee again while the process is being completed. Interpol's members include countries that have an extradition treaty with or are otherwise willing to extradite a fugitive to the United States, and also countries that have no treaty and are unwilling to extradite a fugitive to the United States. A country's detention of a fugitive based on a red notice has no bearing on whether that country has an extradition treaty with the United States or otherwise is willing to extradite a fugitive. Accordingly, if extradition from a country is infeasible, the availability of a red notice does not change the feasibility of extraditing a fugitive from that country.
Here, the County established extradition from either China or the United Arab Emirates was infeasible because the United States does not have an extradition treaty with those countries and they are not willing to extradite a fugitive to the United States. Appellants therefore failed to show they satisfied the conditions required for the trial court to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate the bond under section 1305, subdivision (g), regardless whether the District Attorney chose to seek a red notice.
Appellants' estoppel argument is equally unavailing. They contend the County is estopped to assert extradition is infeasible based on the lack of an extradition treaty because the County failed to raise that objection when Appellants moved to extend the appearance period. Estoppel generally requires that the party to be estopped either misrepresented or concealed facts uniquely within its knowledge or successfully asserted inconsistent positions in official proceedings. (Hopkins v. Kedzierski (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 736, 756 [elements of equitable estoppel]; Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107, 121 [elements of judicial estoppel].) Neither of those conditions are present here.
In November 2014, Appellants moved to extend the appearance period so they could obtain the evidence necessary to satisfy the requirements under section 1305, subdivision (g). Section 1305.4 allows a trial court to extend the appearance period upon a showing of good cause. To make that showing, Appellants submitted Ulmer's declaration describing his efforts to obtain the necessary information about Wei's location in China. The County did not oppose the motion. Instead, it acknowledged the efforts Appellants claimed to have made, and left it to the trial court's discretion to determine whether those efforts established good cause.
The feasibility of extraditing Wei was not at issue on the extension motion and the County took no position on the feasibility of extradition. Neither did the County make representations about extradition nor did it have any duty to advise Appellants about the feasibility of extraditing Wei from China. In fact, Appellants do not even show the County knew extradition from China was not feasible when Appellants brought their extension motion. There is simply no basis for an estoppel against the County.
To support their estoppel argument, Appellants cite People v. Far West Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 791 (Far West). There, a criminal defendant fled California after a surety posted bail. The surety's investigator located the defendant in Georgia and local law enforcement arrested him based on the outstanding warrant in the underlying California case. The Georgia police, however, released the defendant from custody after the California police mistakenly released the hold on the defendant. (Id. at pp. 793-794.) The Far West court concluded equity required the trial court to exonerate the surety's bond even though the defendant was not transferred back to California as the statutory scheme required. The court explained the surety had done all that it was required to do to exonerate the bond, but the final condition of transferring the defendant to California was not satisfied because of a law enforcement mistake. (Id. at pp. 797-798.)
Far West does not apply here. Neither the County nor the District Attorney share any fault in Appellants' failure to satisfy the conditions required to exonerate the bond under section 1305, subdivision (g). (See Lexington, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1249 [Far West does not apply when surety fails to satisfy statutory conditions to exonerate bond through no fault of prosecuting agency or other governmental entity].) B. The District Attorney Did Not Violate Appellants' Due Process Rights by Refusing to Toll the Appearance Period
Appellants contend the summary judgment forfeiting the bond is void and must be set aside because the District Attorney denied them due process by failing to respond timely to Appellants' request for a tolling agreement under section 1305, subdivision (h), and by failing to provide a reason for the refusal to enter into a tolling agreement. Not so.
In cases arising under section 1305, subdivision (g), the bail agent and the prosecuting agency may agree to toll the 180-day appearance period when additional time is needed to return the defendant to the court's jurisdiction. (§ 1305, subd. (h).) Because it is limited to cases arising under section 1305, subdivision (g), section 1305, subdivision (h) "requires the agreement of the prosecutor after a decision to extradite has been made," and therefore "allows tolling only after the prosecutor has decided to extradite but needs more time to do so." (People v. Tingcungco (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 249, 258, italics added (Tingcungco).)
In its entirety, section 1305, subdivision (h), provides as follows: "In cases arising under subdivision (g), if the bail agent and the prosecuting agency agree that additional time is needed to return the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court, and the prosecuting agency agrees to the tolling of the 180-day period, the court may, on the basis of the agreement, toll the 180-day period within which to vacate the forfeiture. The court may order tolling for up to the length of time agreed upon by the parties."
As explained above, the District Attorney could not elect to extradite Wei because extraditing her from either China or the United Arab Emirates was not feasible. Section 1305, subdivision (h), therefore could not apply in this case, and the District Attorney did not violate Appellants' due process rights by allegedly failing to timely respond to Appellants' request for a tolling agreement or explain its reasons for refusing to toll the appearance period.
Moreover, Appellants fail to cite any authority that required the District Attorney to respond to their tolling request within a certain period or provide an explanation for its refusal to agree to toll the appearance period. Nothing on the face of section 1305, subdivision (h), imposes any such obligation on the District Attorney, and whether to toll the period rests solely within the District Attorney's discretion. (Tingcungco, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 258-259.)
To support their contentions to the contrary, Appellants cite Gete v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (9th Cir. 1997) 121 F.3d 1285 (Gete), and Clutchette v. Procunier (N.D.Cal. 1971) 328 F.Supp. 767 (Clutchette). Neither case involves section 1305 or bail forfeiture procedures.
Clutchette was affirmed by 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.1974), modified by 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.1975), and reversed on other grounds in Baxter v. Palmigiano (1976) 425 U.S. 308.
Gete involved the seizure and administrative forfeiture of property under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1324), which authorized the forfeiture of vehicles used to transport illegal aliens. (Gete, supra, 121 F.3d at p. 1289.) The Ninth Circuit held the Immigration and Naturalization Service violated the plaintiffs' due process rights because it failed to provide sufficient notice of the legal and factual basis for the forfeiture of the plaintiffs' vehicles or the reasons for its administrative decision declaring the vehicles forfeited. (Id. at pp. 1297-1298.) Appellants fail to explain how Gete's observations about notice of a pending property forfeiture apply to the District Attorney's refusal to toll the statutory period after a bail forfeiture has occurred. The statutory period for forfeiture proceedings does not make Gete applicable to tolling under section 1305, subdivision (h).
Clutchette involved claims by state prisoners that prison officials violated their due process rights in prison disciplinary hearings. (Clutchette, supra, 328 F.Supp. at p. 769.) The case addressed the amount and type of notice prison officials were required to provide the prisoners concerning the disciplinary charges against them. Appellants fail to explain how Clutchette's statements about a prisoner's due process rights to receive notice of disciplinary charges apply to the District Attorney's refusal to toll a statutory period in which a surety may seek to vacate a bail forfeiture that already occurred.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The County shall recover its costs on appeal.
ARONSON, J. WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J. BEDSWORTH, J.