Opinion
2015–12115 Ind.No. 251/15
05-01-2019
The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Maureen MYLES, Appellant.
Salvatore C. Adamo, New York, NY, for appellant. Timothy D. Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Marcia R. Kucera and Guy Arcidiacono of counsel), for respondent.
Salvatore C. Adamo, New York, NY, for appellant.
Timothy D. Sini, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Marcia R. Kucera and Guy Arcidiacono of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., JEFFREY A. COHEN, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ.
DECISION & ORDERORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The charges against the defendant arose from a charity fundraiser that she organized to raise funds to purchase a wheelchair-accessible van for her friend's son. The defendant was accused of using donated funds for her own benefit, as opposed to the charitable purpose for which they were raised.
The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support her convictions is unpreserved for appellate review, as defense counsel made only a general motion for a trial order of dismissal based upon the People's alleged failure to make out a prima facie case (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 491–492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946 ; People v. Barnett, 163 A.D.3d 700, 701, 80 N.Y.S.3d 461 ; People v. McAuley, 154 A.D.3d 720, 720, 63 N.Y.S.3d 60 ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of each crime charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 644, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt of grand larceny in the third degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree (two counts), scheme to defraud in the first degree, and petit larceny (three counts) was not against the weight of the evidence (see id. at 644, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
The defendant's contention that the County Court's Sandoval ruling (see People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413 ) deprived her of her constitutional right to a fair trial is unpreserved for appellate review, as she did not raise any constitutional challenge to the Sandoval ruling before the County Court (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Grant, 7 N.Y.3d 421, 424, 823 N.Y.S.2d 757, 857 N.E.2d 52 ; People v. Wheelings, 137 A.D.3d 1310, 1311, 28 N.Y.S.3d 435 ). The defendant's further contention that the court abused its discretion in its Sandoval ruling is without merit. "The extent to which the prosecution should be allowed to impeach the credibility of a defendant is a matter that is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court" ( People v. Lipton, 162 A.D.3d 1070, 1071, 80 N.Y.S.3d 338 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Wheelings, 137 A.D.3d at 1311, 28 N.Y.S.3d 435 ). Here, the court's Sandoval ruling permitting the People to inquire as to whether the defendant had been convicted of three felonies involving crimes of theft and engaging in a scheme to defraud, but precluding any questioning about the underlying facts of those prior crimes, avoided any undue prejudice to the defendant and constituted a provident exercise of the court's discretion (see People v. Lipton, 162 A.D.3d at 1071, 80 N.Y.S.3d 338 ; People v. Lombardo, 151 A.D.3d 887, 887–888, 58 N.Y.S.3d 401 ; People v. Edwards, 118 A.D.3d 909, 909, 987 N.Y.S.2d 452 ), particularly because "[c]rimes of theft will usually have a very material relevance as to the defendant's credibility" ( People v. Wright, 121 A.D.3d 924, 928, 994 N.Y.S.2d 396 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).
The defendant's contention that the County Court erred in admitting evidence regarding her educational background is also without merit. Contrary to the defendant's contention, this evidence was not Molineux evidence (see People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 ), since it did not concern uncharged crimes or other bad acts (see People v. Brewer, 28 N.Y.3d 271, 276, 66 N.E.3d 1057 ; People v. Binning, 108 A.D.3d 639, 639, 968 N.Y.S.2d 583 ). Accordingly, we agree with the court's determination not to consider the documents related to the defendant's educational background under the Molineux standard. To the extent that the defendant challenges this evidence on relevancy grounds, the evidence was relevant to demonstrate the lies made by the defendant in order to defraud her victims.
The defendant's contention that certain oral statements she made to a detective prior to her arrest should have been suppressed is academic in light of the fact that those statements were not introduced at trial (see People v. Murad, 55 A.D.3d 754, 755, 865 N.Y.S.2d 331 ; People v. Menendez, 50 A.D.3d 1061, 1061, 856 N.Y.S.2d 647 ; People v. Musmacher, 133 A.D.2d 352, 353, 519 N.Y.S.2d 253 ).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).
DILLON, J.P., COHEN, DUFFY and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.